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The initial success and ultimate failure of the communist movement in the Malay 
world during the postwar years hinged upon the socio-political situation in which the 
Chinese diaspora existed within the Nanyang region. This ultimately was greatly 
impacted by the issue of citizenship in the lands they were settled. This dissertation 
explores the dynamics of international and local politics which converged with the 
geography of the Malay world in the postwar years that brought the iron and bamboo 
curtain to a region which was undergoing fundamental changes brought on by 
decolonization. The Chinese diaspora were both players and pawns within this theatre 
of the Cold War since they had the numbers, connections and resources, and were not 
encumbered by indigenous traditions and culture of the place of their domicile. At the 
same time, they were also deeply rooted to their lands, having settled there for 
centuries. They too aspired for local political rights and representation. Hence, they 
became “players” in this political battle. The eventual outcome was greatly shaped by 
forces beyond their control – that is, the creation of nation-states that ended their 
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This thesis will show that the socialist agitations in the Malay world in the 1950s and 
1960s were more than ideological or military struggles waged during the height of the 
Cold War. By examining the socio-economic and political conditions of Chinese society 
then, one could better understand the context in which the Chinese communist insurgency 
took place. It is in doing so that the advance and eventual retreat of the Chinese 
communists could be contextualized within the progress of the Chinese diaspora of the 
region. Its ultimate failure was due to the fundamental dilemma of citizenship afflicting 
the Chinese diaspora in the Nanyang. The preamble of this historical narrative, however, 
begins in dark days of the Syonan interlude when the militant arm of the Malayan 
Chinese communist was born. The impact of the World War in Asia had set the stage for 
decolonization and the political awareness of the diaspora communities throughout Asia. 
The advent of the Cold War then propelled these sociopolitical headwinds to a whole new 
level which eventually shaped the form of the newly created nation states in most of 
Southeast Asia. This, in turn, impacted the progress of the Chinese diaspora in general, 
and the Chinese communists specifically. 
 
Before launching into the study of the Chinese communists in the Malay world, it is 
acknowledged that communism in the Nanyang was not an exclusively Chinese affair. 
There were, after all, non-Chinese who were drawn to the ideology and movement in the 
pre and post-World War II years. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was started in 
1920 in the Netherlands East Indies. Most of its members were ethnic Malays. In Malaya, 
in the postwar years, non-Chinese communists such as Devan Nair, PV Sharma, and 
Samad Ismail played a crucial part in the communist movement. In Indonesia, the 
Chinese were a minority both in the nation and in the communist party and the non-
Chinese there thus dominated the movement. Communist party activities were thus led by 
indigenous peoples there, rather than by the Chinese. Nevertheless, in the years leading to 
the 1948 global communist outbreak and the years after, the Chinese communists would 
dominate the socialist movement in the Nanyang, perhaps due to the ascent of China at 
this time. As such, this dissertation focuses on the ethnic Chinese communists rather than 
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the communist movement as a whole so as to examine the cultural dimensions that the 
Chinese communists brought to their political and ideological struggle.  
 
In this dissertation, the term “Nanyang”, literally translated as ‘South Seas”, is a 
geographical term referring to the lands of present-day Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore. The “Nanyang Chinese” thus refers to Chinese who had settled in these lands 
and were to some extent domiciled. The term “Overseas Chinese” underscores the origins 
of the Chinese, who were ethnically linked to China but lived outside of the motherland, 
while “diaspora” refers to the status of the Chinese on the land, that is to say, they were 
not indigenous and were treated as guests. Ultimately, the terms “Nanyang Chinese”, 
“overseas Chinese” and “Chinese diaspora” are used interchangeably in this dissertation 
to refer to the domiciled Chinese living in the Malay world. 
 
 
A. Historical Overview and Context of this Dissertation 
 
Lying along the international and historical East-West maritime highway, the China 
Maritime Trade Route, Southeast Asia has been home to millions of Chinese overseas 
since ancient times. The Chinese, in varying degrees, had either formed communities of 
their own or had been assimilated with indigenous populations over time. Whichever 
reality these diaspora communities existed in, most of them maintained some form of 
connection with China or with other Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia. 
These communities, in turn, became platforms for Chinese immigrants and sojourners to 
continually visit or settle in the Nanyang. The result was that many of the overseas 
Chinese communities had remained culturally distinct even though they were domiciled 
overseas for centuries. It was not until after World War II, with the processes and forces 
of decolonization and the rise of nation-states throughout the world that the question of 
the ethnic and national identity of the Chinese diaspora came into focus and had to be 
resolved. Till this point, the Chinese overseas were simply “guest” in the lands they made 
home. The post-WWII years also ushered in a war of a new kind, the Cold War. This 
added yet another dimension to the political landscape of decolonizing European colonies 
in the East when the setting sun of colonialism encountered the emerging international 
ideological polemics, which also shaped the growth of new nation-states in the postwar 
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years. The overseas Chinese found themselves pawns in this game of international and 
local positioning which they had to negotiate. Their dilemma, as individuals and as 
communities, was further deepened when mainland China embraced communism in 
1949. At this juncture, the Chinese communist parties in the Nanyang found themselves 
transcending their role as a political party attempting to export its communist ideology to 
becoming representatives of the incumbent authority of the Chinese Motherland, thus 
placing them in the pole position to take leadership, harness and direct the energies and 
support of their countrymen overseas to join the struggle for Marxian Socialism across 
the globe. 
 
The socio-economic realities for many Chinese diaspora in post-war Southeast Asia 
involved great challenges. Conditions of poverty, displacement, unemployment, limited 
education (overage students who missed school during the Occupation Years), 
overpopulation created by the baby-boomer, lack of economic opportunities (for those 
who graduated from Chinese schools), lack of proper housing and social-political 
marginalization in the lands of their sojourn and settlement had all led to feelings of 
disenfranchisement and hopelessness. The Chinese diaspora, particularly the blue-collar 
laboring class who were living in such difficulties during these trying times, naturally 
perceived their condition as having been exploited by their employers and therefore 
leaned towards socialism, hoping for a more equitable distribution of wealth to better 
their livelihood. Their issues and position were fundamentally socio-economic and 
perhaps political, but certainly not ideological. It was in this context that their struggles 
were exploited by the Chinese communists, who articulated identical goals of change 
through changing the incumbent government (decolonization). The communists offered 
them leadership and a vision for a better future, guided by belief and conformance to the 
Marxian socialist ideology. 
 
At the same time, the ascent of China as a united and sovereign nation, free from internal 
strife and foreign encroachment, ushered in an era of nationalist fervor throughout the 
1950s. This national pride was naturally shared amongst the millions of diaspora Chinese. 
The students and intellectuals in the Nanyang were particularly enchanted by this new 
reality and the promises it brought. The Chinese communists, in Malaya in particular, 
were quick to exploit and direct the aspirations of this group of pro-China overseas 
Chinese. The conditions were therefore right for the Malayan Chinese communist to 
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incorporate the struggles of the Chinese working class and aspirations of the Chinese 
intellectuals into their agenda, and subsumed the local socialist and pro-China movement 
into the wider soviet struggle that aimed to claim leadership of the decolonization 
movement in Southeast Asia. It was their goal and modus operandi to take the helm of a 
train that was already heading in the same direction and steer it into their brand of 
extremism. The decolonizing powers, who were at the same time partners against the rise 
of the global  “iron and bamboo curtain”, also responded by attempting to win the hearts 
and minds of the Chinese as well as to guide the process of decolonization so as to ensure 
the newly formed nation states were not pro-Communist. The leftists would eventually 
label this as Neo-colonialism. 
 
Essentially, the departing colonial powers in the Malay world, more so for the British 
than the Dutch, saw the necessity of integrating or assimilating the diaspora peoples of 
their colonies into the new nation states. Herein lay the first of several fundamental 
dilemmas of the Chinese diaspora in the Malay World – citizenship. The Chinese in the 
Nanyang had to decide if they wanted to become nationals in the new sovereign entities, 
and to participate in the political processes of these states on their journey there. The 
second was the path to be taken to form the nation state. Both of these decisions were not 
simply a matter of choice for the diaspora Chinese as they were not entirely welcome in 
China nor were the new governments of the Malay World prepared to accord their ethnic 
Chinese full rights, except in the case of Singapore, an immigrant society whose 
population and leaders were majority Chinese.  Their struggle for equity and better 
working and living conditions were also intertwined with the communist agitation in the 
1950s. 
 
It did not take long for many Chinese in the Nanyang to realize they had no option but to 
remain where they were and they needed to get involved in the political process to 
determine their own future. In Malaya, the British had already ensured that the Chinese 
population were involved with the establishment of the Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA) in 1949. In Singapore, the Chinese, having been the majority of the population, 
were already involved through the early multi-cultural political parties and through local 
communal organizations like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In Indonesia, the 




. In the case of the former two, there arose in these territories anti-
communist Chinese who were mostly Kuomintang (KMT) supporters or English-
educated. It was also towards the mid-1950s that more vocal non-Marxian Chinese 
political forces which advocated the political participation and determinism via 
democratic socialist means emerged. 
 
By the mid-1950s, the Chinese communists in Malayan Communist Party (MCP) were 
already in retreat in Malaya and had lost influence over the majority of the Chinese 
population there. In Malaya, the MCA’s success eroded the support of the Chinese 
masses for the communists. In Singapore, the Chinese began supporting political parties 
that advocated Democratic Socialism instead of the MCP’s Marxist Socialism which 
supported an armed struggle to wrest power from the British. The Democratic Socialists 
believed that independence could be achieved through democratic processes. Hence, in 
order to win the support of the Chinese masses, they championed the causes of the 
Chinese classes. 
 
In Singapore, the Labour Front was the first to gain the support of the Chinese students 
and workers. In the later half of the 1950s, the PAP helmed this leadership. The Chinese 
Left saw these political parties as having been “on their side” and supported them in their 
electoral victories respectively.
2
 It was only when the British were out and when the 
elected party became incumbent that they occupied the Right of the political scene. This 
created a rift within the PAP and led to the breaking up of the Party, giving birth to the 
Barisan Sosialis which continued the Marxist socialist agitations thereby, albeit without 
the extreme violence and armed struggle of the MCP. However, it was too late for the 
communists and their sympathizers in Singapore. The Chinese no longer supported their 
cause as nationhood had been achieved. In Malaysia, the Chinese parties were gathered 
                                                        
1 In 1947, the Chinese formed an estimated 2.8% of the total population of Indonesia. The proportion of 
Chinese was higher in Malaya and Singapore, which formed 38.4% and 77.8% of the total population in 
those countries respectively. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, sec. ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), p.3. 
2 The “Left” would comprise of all Marxists, communists and socialists. To achieve the goal of creating a 
socialist state, those on the “Left” generally used agitation and any other form of public protest to support 
workers’ rights and demand social equity. The more radical elements of the “Left”, such as the communists 
in the MCP, took to armed struggle. Those on the “Right” were those who were pro-Establishment, anti-
communist, and supported democratic means in pursuit of independence. Cheah Boon Kheng uses the 
categories of “left, right and centre” to describe the leadership of the Malayan Democratic Union, 
Singapore’s first political party that existed from 1946 to 1948. These definitions can also be applied when 
considering the political spectrum in the 1950s in the Malay world. See Cheah Boon Kheng, “The Malayan 
Democratic Union, 1945-1948”, (M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya), 1975. 
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into the Alliance headed by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) which 
operated on the basis of communal cooperation. Though only the Malays were 
considered Bumiputra, which was inevitable since the Malay Royalty in each state 
remained the Head of State in the Malayan political hierarchy, the Chinese became 
partners and friends in the new national franchise. The Marxist Socialists were also 
robbed of their initiative and rhetoric of representing the cause of the Chinese there. As 
such, under this political arrangement, the Chinese remained a political distance within 
the ruling front till this day. In Indonesia, independence had already been achieved when 
the impact of the Cold War had started in earnest in the Nanyang. The Indonesian 
Chinese communists however had never any opportunity to advance their cause. The 
general Chinese population at this point was still an insignificant minority which had 
made little or no progress on the political front. They remained guests in their own land. 
 
The story of the Chinese communist movement in Malay World was integrally tied to the 
political activism and aspirations of the domiciled Chinese. As the Chinese in Indonesia 
were limited in size, it inevitably limited the scope of operations of the Chinese 
communists in that theatre. Their movement was overshadowed by that of their larger 
Indonesian communist brethren, the PKI. In Malaya, while the British were victorious 
against the communist military insurgency, it was the Alliance government’s communal 
politics that snubbed out the communists’ political challenge when it provided the 
Chinese masses an alternative route to political participation. In this instance, the Malays 
had managed race relations well in as far as dealing with the communists. In the case of 
Singapore, the moderate socialist, or Democratic socialists were the ultimate victors 
against the Chinese communists. 
 
The narrative of the Chinese communists in this dissertation focuses much on the reason 
for the failure of their movement in the Malay World, that is, their dependence on the 
Chinese diaspora had rendered them strong and weak at the same time. While they were 
able to launch their agitation with the initial support of the overseas Chinese – resources, 
networks and manpower, the crux of the matter was that the Chinese diaspora were 
themselves not “sons of the soil” and were not the majority of the land in most cases, 
with the exception of Singapore. Hence, while this thesis elucidates the real cause of the 
Chinese communist failure in the Nanyang, in providing the context for this, it also 
provides insight to the socio-political condition of the Chinese diaspora in Malay lands. 
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At the internal level, the Marxists, and later, the Maoists, had taken turns to use the 
Chinese people as pawns in their internal polemics.
3
 They also took turns to abandon 
their proxies in the course of history. In local politics, the overseas Chinese were used by 
the incumbent as well as the democratic and Marxist socialists. In either case, it was the 
Chinese-educated who came out short at the end. Their dilemma lay with the fact that 
they were Malayan or Indonesian, as well as Chinese and diaspora. 
 
 
B. Review of Historical Discourse and Extant Literature 
 
The Cold War in the Malay World 
 
In reviewing the historiography of Cold War, the main literature on the subject has 
traditionally been the concern of political and military historians who are concerned with 
international superpower politics and the development of proxy wars in the Third World, 
a case in point being the Malay world. 
 
In Malaya, studies on the topic revolve around the political and military battles during the 
Emergency. Early studies of the Emergency written in the 1960s and 70s deal with the 
military strategies of both the MCP and the British in the jungles of Malaya. For example, 
reports by Riley Sunderland for American think-tank RAND Corporation provide a 
wealth of information on British strategies taken to fight the Emergency, including their 
army operations, intelligence gathering processes, resettlement and food control in rural 
Malaya.
4
 Other early accounts of the conflict between the British and the communists that 
unfolded during the post-WWII years in Malaya and Singapore include Anthony Short’s 
authoritative account on the Malayan Emergency based on British official sources,
5
 and 
Richard Clutterbuck’s Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963 which 
                                                        
3 There were communists who followed the ideology of Karl Marx closely, as well as those who were more 
influenced by Mao Zedong thought. As Communist China became more prominent in the Cold War and 
began to export her ideology to the rest of the world, many groups began to see Mao’s methods of 
revolution as a model for their own political and ideological struggle. 
4  See Riley Sunderland’s papers on “Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960”; “Organising 
Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1947-1960”; “Antiguerilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948-1960”; 
“Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya”; “Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People – Malaya, 
1948-1960”, Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1964). 
5  See Anthony Short, The Communist insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960 (London: Muller, 1975). 
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focused on the violence that resulted from the MCP’s policy of armed struggle.6 Besides 
accounts of the actual fighting that took place, Richard Stubbs and more recently, Kumar 
Ramakrishna, have examined the psychological aspects of the counter-insurgency efforts, 




As the Vietnam escalated in the 1960s, the British victory against the communists in the 
Malayan Emergency also raised practical questions as to how a similar victory could be 
scored by the Americans in Vietnam. For example, Sir Robert Thompson provided a 
comparison of the two wars based on his own participation in both conflicts on the side of 
the West. In it he advocated implementing long-term political solutions to existing 
problems rather than the mere use of military force.
8
 More recently, John Nagl has also 
done a comparative study on the two wars by comparing the differences in organizational 





While these studies are important for understanding the military battles and strategies of 
the Emergency, the focus on the Emergency in Malaya has overshadowed other aspects 
other aspects of the communist movement. For instance, Singapore’s role in the Malayan 
communist movement has been left out and developments in Singapore are often seen as 
subordinate to those in Malaya.
10
 That is of course not to say that there are no studies on 
the communist movement in Singapore. Lee Ting Hui’s studies on communist 
mobilization techniques and the “open united front” between the communists and legal 
political and social organizations are useful in understanding the political strategies of the 
                                                        
6 See Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963 (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1973). 
7  See Richard Stubbs, Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare: the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989) and Kumar Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: The 
Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948-1958 (Surrey: Curzon, 2002);  
8 See Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1966). In response to contemporary attempts to compare the two wars, political scientist 
Robert Tilman also produced an article published in 1966 explaining why the Malayan experience was 
unique and how the counter-insurgency strategies there would not apply to Vietnam. See Robert O. Tilman, 
“The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency”, Asian Survey, 6, 8 (1966): 407-19. 
9 See John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).  
10  For example, Lee’s periodization for the struggle follows the Malayan insurrection, in that the 
communists alternated between political maneuvering and military confrontation in the post-war period. 
However, there was no military confrontation in Singapore, thus another timeline ought to be drawn up for 
Singapore. See Lee Ting Hui, The Communist organization in Singapore: its techniques on manpower 
mobilization and management, 1948-66 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), p.4. 
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communists operating in Singapore.
11
 Yeo Kim Wah’s Political Development in 
Singapore, 1945-1955 is a good resource for understanding how Singapore’s politics 
developed in the first decade after WWII until Singapore attained partial self-
government. His discussion of the dynamics of the period includes the growth of a pro-
communist student and labour movement.
12
 A number of academic exercises are also 
useful accounts of the communist movement especially among students and labourers. 
These include Chan Cheng Hai’s general study of the communist movement in Singapore 
with reference to agitation among Chinese students,
13
 Ang Poh Kim’s study on the 
communist manipulation of the Nanyang University Students’ Union,14 and Jayletchimi’s 
thesis on the PAP and pro-communist trade unions.
15
 These studies are useful for 
understanding various aspects of the local communist movement in Singapore, but 
because they are dealt with separately, there has yet been any attempt to assess the rise 
and fall of the communist movement in its broader context of the Cold War, regional 
communism, and Singapore’s path to nation-hood. 
 
Attention to political and military dimensions of the Cold War in Indonesia is also shown 
in studies of the long-standing tension and confrontations between the PKI and their 
American-backed opponents. Ann Swift’s The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian 
Communist Uprising of 1948 provides an account of the first post-WWII clash between 
the PKI and the Republican government which inevitably drew American intervention in 
Indonesia and led to a long-standing feud between the military and the communist 
party.
16
 During the PKI’s ascent and fall in the 1950s and early 1960s, contemporary 
scholars also conducted studies on the party’s history. These include Donald Hindley’s 
                                                        
11See Lee Ting Hui, The Communist organization in Singapore: its techniques on manpower mobilization 
and management, 1948-66 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976) & The Open United 
Front: the Communist Struggle in Singapore, 1954-1966 (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1996). 
12 Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945-1955 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1973).He has also written about student politics in the University of Malaya and the appeal of Marxism to 
English-educated intellectuals in Singapore. See Yeo Kim Wah, “Student Politics in University of Malaya, 
1949-51”, JSEAS 23, 2 (1992): 346-380 & "Joining the Communist Underground: The Conversion of 
Radicals to Communism in Singapore, June 1948-January 1951", JMBRAS 67, no. 1 (1994): 29-59. 
13  Chan Cheng Hai, “The communist movement in Singapore”, (M. Soc. Sci. Thesis, University of 
Singapore, 1978). 
14 Ang Poh Kim, “Communist Manipulation of a Chinese student body: the Nanyang University Students' 
Union 1956-1964” (Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1984). 
15 Jayletchimi, “PAP and the pro-communist trade unions, 1954-61”, (Academic Exercise, National 
University of Singapore, 1986). 
16 See Ann Swift, The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 (New York: Cornell 
University, 1989). See also Harry Poeze, “The Cold War in Indonesia, 1948”, JSEAS 40, 3 (2009): 497-
517. 
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The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963, Arnold Brackman’s Indonesian 
Communism: A History, and Van der Kroef’s The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its 
History, Program and Tactics.
17
 They can be gleaned both for information on the party’s 
developments, as well as to provide insight into Western attitudes towards communism 
arising from the Cold War. Finally, the PKI’s eventual demise in 1965 – in particular, the 
events of October 1965 that led to a regime change – has been the subject of much 
controversy and debate,
18
 and much attention has also been given to the violence in its 
aftermath by various scholars including an edited volume by Robert Cribb and another by 
Douglas Kammen and Katherine McGregor.
19
 Although these studies provide a wealth of 
information of the communist movement in Indonesia, the story is predominantly one of 
violence and oppression resulting from political and military struggles. 
 
Taking the military and geo-political approach to studying the Cold War is typical of the 
official/colonial accounts written using official sources and taking into account only the 
story of the “victors” of the conflict. In Southeast Asia, there is still a need to consider the 
socio-political and cultural dimension of the conflict. In recent years, there have been 
attempts to shift the focus from the political and military struggles to examine culture and 
society. Studies dealing with the Cold War waged in propaganda, art and popular culture 
have emerged, beginning with Patrick Major and Rana Mitter’s edited volume Across the 
Blocs: Exploring Comparative Cold War Cultural and Social History, in which the 
editors called for scholars to “organise the socio-cultural aspects of that era 
systematically and paradigmatically, rather than as an afterthought to the analysis of high 
politics.”20  Other articles and chapters on the cultural aspects of the Cold War have 
followed in its wake.
21
 Nevertheless, these studies are still limited by the geo-political 
                                                        
17 See Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1964); Arnold Brackman’s Indonesian Communism: A History (New York, Praeger, 
1963); Justus van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics 
(Vancouver: University of British Colombia, 1965). 
18 For a historical review of interpretations of the movement, see John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, The 
September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup D'état (The University of Wisconson Press, 2006), pp.61-81. 
19 See Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Vic., 
Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990); Douglas Kammen, Katherine 
McGregor, eds., The contours of mass violence in Indonesia,1965-1968 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012). 
20 Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East is East and West is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural 
History of the Cold War,” in Across the Blocs: Exploring Comparative Cold War Cultural and Social 
History, eds. Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), p.1. 
21 See Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds., Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, 
and Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Zhang Yangwen, Hong Liu, Michael Szonyi, eds., 
The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010); Tony Day and Maya 
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paradigm of Cold War studies, in that they examine how politics and policies influenced 
culture and society, but not vice versa. In reality, there was a more complex dialectal 
relationship between Cold War politics and local society that needs to be examined. For 
instance, changing local socio-political conditions involving ethnicity, decolonization, 
and nationalism would have shaped expansion strategies of local communists, as well as 
governmental counter-responses.  This study will go beyond political and military studies 
of the Cold War by exploring society and politics in the Nanyang, and how they shaped 
the territories’ Cold War outcome. 
 
 
The Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia 
 
Extant literature on the Chinese in Southeast Asia generally focuses on their socio-
economic characteristics. In 1970, Wang Gungwu outlined patterns of Chinese migration 
according to social class and professional background, a distinction which continues to be 
influential today in understanding early overseas Chinese society.
22
 Yen Ching-Hwang 
and Cheng Lim-Keak’s works are useful for understanding the organization of Chinese 
society along clan and dialectal lines.
23
 Studies of Chinese businesses and religions are 
also built upon these classifications, for example, by focusing on the niche industries 
developed by specific dialect groups, or the corresponding religious organisations that 




Although the socio-economic focus of diaspora studies is strong, there are also studies on 
the interaction between the overseas Chinese and politics. For example, Yen has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
H.T. Liem, eds., Cultures at War: The Cold War And Cultural Expression In Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New 
York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2010). 
22 See Wang Gungwu, "Chinese Politics in Malaya," The China Quarterly 43(1970): 1-30. For an example 
of how his ideas continue to influence later scholars, see Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese 
Diasporas, 1842 to 1949," The Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 2 (1999): 306-27. 
23  Yen Ching-Hwang, Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995); Cheng Lim-Keak, Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore: 
A Socio-Economic Geography with Special Reference to Bang Structure (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1984). 
24 See Clement Liew, “Rooting A Church in an Immigrant Society: The Chinese Catholic Community Of 
Singapore, 1832 To 1935”, (M.A. Thesis, National University of Singapore, 1999) and Jack Chia Meng 
Tat, "Sacred Ties across the Seas: The Cult of Guangze Zunwang and Its Religious Network in the Chinese 
Diaspora, 19th Century – 2009", (M.A. Thesis, National University of Singapore, 2009). 
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examined the impact of the 1911 Revolution in China on the overseas Chinese,
25
 while 
C.F. Yong and R.B. McKenna provide a detailed account of the KMT Movement in 
British Malaya.
26
 On the other hand, political studies of the overseas Chinese where they 
settled usually focus on their relationship with the state. For example, Charles Coppel has 
provided a useful portrait on the Indonesian Chinese by examining the evolution of their 
legal and political status, and the discrimination they faced under the strong New Order 
regime.
27
 Leo Suryadinata has contributed to the discourse by focusing on the role that 
the Chinese played in building the nation-states of Southeast Asia.
28
 Nevertheless, studies 
relating to the political history of the overseas Chinese toggle between being Sino-
centric, with political developments in China viewed as forces that drew from and shaped 
the behavior of the Chinese diaspora, or, if viewed from the perspective of the ethnic 
Chinese in the nation-states, portray them either as “victims” of oppression or “nation-
builders”. The result is that the Chinese diaspora in the Malay world are perceived as a 
homogenous bloc, ignoring the socio-economic and cultural differences within the 
community which may have been critical to shaping the history of the region. 
 
While traditional cultural and socio-economic groupings involving clan groups and 
occupations are useful in classifying the diaspora in the 19
th
 century, other determinants 
involving ideology, Chinese and local nationalism, the rise of the nation-state and 
decolonization have to be factored in when considering the 20
th
 century. To do so would 
allow for a deeper appreciation for the variety within overseas Chinese community and 
avoid generalisations about their political and social inclinations. Clearly, there is a gap in 
the historiography of the Cold War involving the overseas Chinese which this dissertation 





                                                        
25  See Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, with special reference to 
Singapore and Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
26  See C.F. Yong and R.B. McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912-1949 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990). 
27 See Charles Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983); Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 2002). 
28  Leo Suryadinata, Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ethnic 
Chinese (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004). 
 13 
Nanyang Chinese Communist Biographies 
 
Apart from discourse on the Cold War and the overseas Chinese,  there exist 
numerous biographical accounts of former communists from Malaya and Singapore. 
Many of these reflections and memoirs, which are almost entirely written in Chinese, 
have emerged in the past one or two decades after the end of the Cold War and the 
communist threat. Aimed at providing personal, and to some extent, the communist 
perspective of what happened during the height of the Emergency and Cold War, at 
times, these memoirs challenge the existing narrative with its portrayal of 
communists as terrorists seeking to overthrow the incumbent government. They 
provide useful information about the underground communist movement in Malaya 
and Singapore after 1948, life as guerilla fighters in the jungles of Malaya, or about 
the exile to China in the late 1960s. Not surprisingly, many of these tracts centered 
upon the leader of the Malayan Communist Party, Chin Peng. His autobiography My 
Side of History which was published in both English and Chinese in 2003 and 2004 
respectively provides a platform for the most wanted man during the Emergency to 
share his life experiences, including his early initiation into the communist party, 
narrow escapes from the authorities and his journey in exile.
29
 At the same time, 
there have been other publications honouring his contributions to the party such as 
He is with the people forever! and In everlasting memory of Chin Peng.
30
 Besides Chin 
Peng, the spotlight has also been cast on other communist leaders such as Eu Chooi 
Yip, a bilingual intellectual who was the first to return from exile to Singapore in the 
1990s, through the publication of the transcript of his oral history interview done in 
1992 with the National Archives.
31
 Autobiographies of Fong Chong Pik, best known 
for being the MCP representative who met Lee Kuan Yew to discuss the possibility 
                                                        
29 See Chin Peng, My Side of History (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003) & Chen Ping 陈平, wofang de lishi 
我方的历史 [My Side of History] (Singapore: Media Masters Pte Ltd, 2004). 
30 For example, see Yongyuan huo zai renmin xinzhong 永远活在人民心中 [He is with the people forever!] 
(Jilongpo: 21 shiji chuban she, 2013); Yongyuan huainian Chen Ping 永远怀念陈平 [In everlasting 
memory Chin Peng] (Jilongpo: 21 shiji chuban she, 2009); Jinian he ai heping xieyi: Jiao dian: Chen Ping 
yao huijia 纪念合艾和平协议：焦点： 陈平要回家 [Remembering the Hat Yai peace agreement: Chin 
Peng wants to go home] (Jilongpo: 21 shiji chuban she, 2009). 
31 See Chen Jian 陈剑, ed., Langjian Zhumeng – Yuzhuye koushulishi dangan浪尖逐梦 — 余柱业口述历
史档案 [Pursuing Dreams beyond the High Seas: Oral History of Eu Chooi Yip] (Petaling Jaya: Strategic 
Information Research Development,  2006). 
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of the PAP and the MCP’s cooperation and Wong Soon Fong, a Leftist who joined 
the PAP and later the Barisan Sosialis, and who escaped capture in Singapore by 
fleeing to Indonesia in 1963, are also valuable resources. 
32
 At the same time, there 
are various other accounts of life as guerilla fighters in the jungles and party leaders. 
These include the multiple volume autobiography of Dan Ru Hong, a central 
committee member, Liu Zhi Sheng, a regiment leader, and a compilation of the 




Many of these biographies provide insight into the motivations of many Chinese 
young people that led to their involvement in the communist movement. They reveal 
that many of these communists were very influenced by radical Leftist teachers in 
Chinese schools, or came from families that were also radicalized.
34
 These works are 
useful for providing the context of their struggle, a brief historical chronology from 
the communist party perspective and anecdotes of life as a Chinese communist.  
However, because they are written from a single perspective, they tend to be 
polemical, and need to be corroborated and consulted alongside other sources for a 




                                                        
32 See Fang Zhuang Bi 方壮壁, Fangzhuangbi huiyilu 方壮壁回忆录 [The memoirs of Fong Chong Pik] 
(Petaling Jaya, Selangor: celue zixun yanjiu zhongxin, 2006); Huang Xin Fang 黄信芳, Lishi de bubai: 
yige taowang de xinjiapo lifa yiyuan 历史的补白 : 一个逃亡的新加坡立法议员 (Jilongpo: Chaohua qiye, 
2007). 
33 See Dan Ru Hong 单汝洪, Cong bakuo dao kangying zhanzheng: magong zhongyang zhengzhiqu 
weiyuan aching huiyilu zhisan 从“八扩”到抗英战争:马共中央政治局委员阿成回忆录之三 Jilongpo: 
21 shiji chuban she, 2006); Hong Sheng 宏勝, Canjun.chuguo.bianqu.xiashan: Junshi ganbu hongsheng 
tongzhi huiyilu 參軍·出國·邊區·下山 : 軍事幹部宏勝同志回憶錄 (Jilongbo: : 21 shiji chuban she, 2013); 
Lei Yang 雷阳, Zou guo xiao yan de sui yue : Ma gong bu fen zhong ji gan bu fang tan lu 走过硝烟的岁
月 : 马共部分中级干部访谈录  (Xuelanyi: Celue zixun yanjiu zhongxin, 2010). See also Ying Min 
Qin/Suriani Abdullah应敏钦, Di shi zhi dui yu du li : Jin ji man tu de ma lai ya min zu dou zheng shi 第十
支队与独立 : 荊棘满途的马来亚民族斗争史  (Jilongpo: 21 shiji chuban she, 2013). 
34 For instance, Chen Tien joined the student movement during the Japanese occupation partly due to 
family influence and after reading progressive Chinese literature provided by a teacher from South 
China. See Chen Tian Jinian Wenji; Neianfa xia de zhonghun 陈田纪念文集 (Petaling Java, Selangor: 
Celue zixun yanjiu zhongxin, 2008). 
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C. Sources of History 
 
Most sources of history in relation to the Cold War or communist per se, are still 
considered “sensitive” materials in most government and official repositories. It is 
therefore necessary to uncover and use newly declassified official sources as well as 
untapped private sources if is new story is to be told. 
 
One of the core sources of information for this dissertation are from the British 
Library and National Archives (Public Records Office) in the United Kingdom, some 
of which were only declassified in 2013. The documentation in these repositories 
have come some way to complement and fill the gaps in the official sources held by 
the National Archives of Singapore. In the public domain, contemporary data from 
social science surveys, government annual reports and newspapers that provided 
indicators of the socio-economic conditions of the past, including the cost of living, 
unemployment figures, family size, average income vis-à-vis cost of living, etc, have all 
given a more realistic socio-economic context of the period in this study. 
 
Contemporary Chinese sources were also obtained from libraries in the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong and the National University of Singapore, including vernacular 
news reports, school magazines and various communist and anti-communist publications. 
The graduation magazines, in particular, opened a window into the mood of the times and 
opinions and aspirations of the Chinese-educated from those days. Engagement with 
heritage solution firms like Signum Fidei and with antique dealers who ply their trade on 
weekend flea markets have provided another wealth of resources and critical information 
not available at any official repository. These materials have gone a long way to fill 
knowledge and information gaps as well as to present unique perspectives and angles 
which would not have been possible by just using documented sources in official 
archives alone. Such a process of sourcing for material through various avenues allows 
for a more balanced understanding of the times both from the top-down and ground-up 
perspectives. Oral history interviews from the National Archives were also used, and in 








 The story of the outbreak of the Chinese communist insurgency in the Malay 
Archipelago in the late 1940s has its roots in the Second World War which was the 
aberration in history that set in motion the momentum for the eventual clash of the Cold 
War titans as well as the decolonization of Southeast Asia. It was also during the World 
War II that the militant Chinese communists first took form and began their work to 
garner support from the Chinese masses in Malaya. The narrative of this dissertation 
therefore, must began in 1942, with the beginnings of the armed insurgency in Malaya. 
 
1.1  The Resistance and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army 
 
The Japanese victory over the British and the Dutch in the Malay Archipelago and the 
subsequent occupation of the colonies set the stage for fundamental changes in overseas 
Chinese society. The animosity between the Chinese and Japanese that had begun in 
mainland China had been exported to Southeast Asia, and tens of thousands of Chinese 
were tortured and killed by the Japanese. It was amidst this Sook Ching that arose a 
resistance movement against the Japanese in Malaya, where many Chinese worked 
together with the British to form armed units like Dalforce and the Malayan People’s 
Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to engage in guerilla warfare against the Japanese.
35
 Most 
of these Chinese resistance fighters were communists.
36
 In the eyes of most Chinese in 
Malaya, they were heroes who remained and risked their lives to resist the Japanese. It 
was not lost to the general population that the British had abandoned them and that the 
lesson of this war, if there was one, was that they could only depend on themselves. It 
was in this context that the MPAJA formed in 1942 rose to become popular amongst the 
Chinese in postwar Malaya.  As a case in point of this popularity especially among the 
rural Chinese, two companies of the Resistance Army (MPAJA) were welcomed in a 
march past at the Chinese enclave of Bukit Panjang, Singapore, in September 1945 after 
                                                        
35 Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp.57-68. 
36 Ibid. 
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the Second World War ended.
37
 It was the only “victory march” held outside of the city 
limits, and it was also an all-Chinese affair. The significance of this display of autonomy, 
influence and power of the Chinese communists amongst the Chinese people at the end of 
war should not be understated. It was one of the signs that a new war was to come, and 
that the Chinese communists were already positioning themselves as protectors and 
representatives of the Chinese overseas.  
 
The common experience of WWII created a fostered a sense of unity among the Chinese 
community, making distinctions between Straits-born Chinese and more recent arrivals 
(in the 1930s) less significant than before WWII. There were Chinese who emerged from 
the war with the desire to “obliterate the demarcation between the terms local-born and 
China-born”.38 These Chinese who stressed the unity of the overseas Chinese community 
viewed it as more important to identify traitors to the Chinese community by hunting 
down Japanese collaborators and bringing justice to those who had suffered during the 
war. For instance, the editors of a bilingual publication entitled Mirror of Life (《华侨生
活》，translated “Life of the Overseas Chinese”) declared that it was their aim “to 
promote the mutual understanding between the local-born and the China-born Chinese 
with a view to assimilation”. Demonstrating this, they distributed forms for all “Chinese 
victims” to describe the suffering they had undergone and to identify traitors responsible 




The experience of war and Occupation had created a realization that the people living in 
the region could not depend on the Europeans to defend them. As a result, many 
indigenous peoples began to develop greater political consciousness, which translated 
into their progressively greater participation in politics after the war. In the words of a 
teacher who had lived through the war, the Japanese Occupation brought “the birth of a 
new spirit of independence among the young people”, as the myth of European 
supremacy was shattered.
40
 As part of this heightened political consciousness, many 
Chinese joined or tacitly supported the MCP, who had been established themselves as 
protectors of the Chinese in the lands abroad. For instance, the Singapore Chinese 
                                                        
37 The Straits Times, 11 Sep 1945, 8 Aug 1965. 
38 Mirror of Life, 10 Sep 1945. 
39 Mirror of Life, 10, 25 Sep 1945. Also see Plate 1. 
40 Gay Wan Guay, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 000374, Reel 22. 
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communist leader Eu Chooi Yip attributed his involvement in the communist movement 
to his respect for the communist-led anti-Japanese army.
41
 This was perhaps the main 
reason why the MCP continued after WWII to be most successful in its advances among 










1.2 International Communism Stirring 
 
The stage for the outbreak of the Cold War in Southeast Asia was set in the outcome of 
World War II in Europe. The end of the Second World War saw changes in the global 
                                                        
41  Eu Chooi Yip, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 001359, Reel 4. 
42 A case in point of how the non-Chinese in the Malay world were generally resistant to communism is 
reflected in the remarks of a Muslim intellectual from Singapore in 1949 advocating the fostering of 
religious spirit of Islam to prevent the growth of communism. See The Straits Times, 21 Jul 1949. 
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balance of power. Half a decade of war against Nazi Germany in Europe had left the 
countries of the traditional Imperial powers war-torn and in desperate need of recovery, 
while America and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers in what had become a 
bipolar world. Although the two powers had become allies in the battle against facism, 
the alliance broke down soon after 1945 to form two opposing ideological and political 
blocs competing for global influence. 
 
In the aftermath of the war, the Soviets occupied and set up communist governments in 
Eastern Europe which acted as a security “buffer zone” to Russia itself. The Communist 
Information Bureau (Cominform) was established in September 1947 to provide 
leadership for the communist governments in the Eastern European bloc. At the 
Cominform’s inaugural conference, Soviet Central Committee secretary Andrei Zhdanov 
made a speech distinguishing between the “imperialist and anti-democratic” camp headed 
by the USA, as well as the “democratic and anti-imperialist” camp by the Soviet Union, a 
distinction that was subsequently adopted as part of Soviet foreign policy and was 




The Soviet action invariably sparked the Cold War. Some of the earlier responses to 
Soviet expansionism came in the form of the “Long Telegram” and “Iron Curtain” speech 
that warned of the Soviet threat.
44
 These were followed by the American Truman 
Doctrine and Marshall Plan which were announced in March and June 1947 respectively 
to provide aid for the rebuilding of Europe. It did not take long for this  
“internationalizing” conflict to spread to Southeast Asia. Already, the civil war in China 
between the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang (KMT) had opened a new Cold 
War battle front in Asia. Hostilities between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
KMT forces resumed soon after the Japanese surrender, ending the wartime “united 
front” and any prospect of a negotiated peace. Although the long-standing civil war was a 
                                                        
43  Andrei Zhdanov, “U/M die internationale Lage”, quoted in Heinz Timmermann, “The Cominform 
Effects on Soviet Foreign Policy”, Studies in Comparative Communism, XVIII 1 (1985): 5-6. 
44In February 1946, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan sent a “Long Telegram” back 
home warning of Soviet aggression. A month later, British former Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a 
speech to a small audience in the United States that pointed out the falling of an “Iron Curtain” across 
Europe. See Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"], 22 Feb 1946. Harry S. 
Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers. Accessed at 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf (30 Jun 
2014); Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace”, quoted in Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World 
History (New York, Harper Collins, 1995), pp.298-302. 
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struggle for the future of China, it also took on a broader international dimension when 
the Soviet Union provided aid to the CCP, for instance by secretly helping the latter gain 
control over Manchuria during the former’s withdrawal from 1945-1946,45 and when the 
USA continued to provide military and financial aid to the KMT after WWII ended. 
 
The ideological and political struggle between the two opposing camps not only divided 
the Chinese in China, but also extended the polemics to the Chinese diaspora. While 
many of the overseas Chinese had initially emerged from the war celebrating the Allied 
victory and hopes of the unity of the Chinese,
46
 the outbreak of civil war in China forced 
many of them to take sides. For example, in the Malay world, supporters of the KMT and 
the CCP organized themselves into overseas branches of KMT and the pro-CCP China 
Democratic League (CDL) where they competed for power and influence over the 
Chinese diaspora community.
47
 This division prior to the full outbreak of the Cold War 
would set the stage for further polarization of the Chinese community in the 1950s and 
60s. 
 
It should be noted that the CDL was started as an anti-Japanese nationalist organization in 
1941 to raise money for the war effort in China. However, after the war, it became clearly 
pro-Communist, pitting itself against the local KMT branches. The rivalry was played out 
in the KMT-CDL struggle to control schools across the Federation,
48
 and was mirrored 
by the Chinese press war amongst the local Chinese. While the Nan Chiau Jit Poh was 
sponsored by the pro-Communist Tan Kah Kee who was affiliated with the CDL, the 
opposing press, Sin Chew Jit Poh, was backed by the Hakka Aw brothers who supported 
the KMT before 1949.
49
 During the height of industrial agitation in late 1947 and early 
1948, the different political positions of the newspapers could be discerned. For instance, 
although both newspapers provided coverage on a handout issued by the MCP-led 
Singapore Federation of Trade Union to celebrate the 2
nd
 year anniversary of its parent 
body (the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Union, PMFTU), the Nan Chiau Jit Poh 
                                                        
45 Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, c2004), pp.51-125. 
46 For example, see Mirror of Life, no. 1(10 Sep 1945); New Democracy, 1 Jan 1946; Sin Chew Jit Poh, 26 
Jan 1946. 
47 Singapore Free Press, 24 Jun 1948. 
48 Singapore Free Press, 3 Oct 1947; Malayan Security Service, Political Intelligence Journal (MSS PIJ) 
4/1948 & 5/1948, MSS: IND.OCN.S, 251. 
49 Supplement to PIJ, 6/1947, MSS: IND.OCN.S, 251. 
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included false accusations from the MCP of British killing of innocents at the 
inauguration of the PMFTU in 1946.
50
 Also, while the Leftist press came out in full 
support of the strikers in Singapore, the Sin Chew Jit Poh carried the advertisements of 
pro-KMT unions calling for workers to take the place of strikers.
51
 The clash of these 
Chinese titans also inevitably split the Chinese in Malaya, drawing a deeper line between 
their respective supporters and detractors. The Malayan Chinese Association’s success in 
Malaya clearly underscores the KMT victory of the paper war across the Causeway. In 
Singapore, Tan Kah Kee was a more revered figure amongst all Chinese, and hence, the 
press propaganda of the Chinese Left seemed to have more of a foothold. 
 
 
1.3 The Situation in Postwar Southeast Asia 
 
Before one can understand the responses of the Chinese populace in the Nanyang to the 
ideological forces facing them, it is necessary to understand their socio-economic 
condition during the postwar recovery years. 
 
Three and a half years of hardship under the Japanese Occupation had left most of 
Southeast Asia in desperate need of recovery and rebuilding. In Malaya, the British 
Military Administration was given various tasks,
52
 the most immediate of which were the 
prevention of disease and the maintenance of law and order.
53
 Socio-economic hardships 
including food shortage, unemployment and the high standard of living confronted the 
administration, which took steps to provide food rationing, encourage rubber production, 
reopen schools, maintain a police force, and so on.
54
 However, the pace of recovery was 
slow and conditions remained dismal for years. For instance, in the immediate post-WWI 
years, food rationing was introduced to control food supply. The rice rations available 
were generally insufficient for Malaya, and this led to poverty as many were forced to 
buy food and other supplies from the black market, costing them cost two to three times 
                                                        
50 MSS PIJ, 4/1948, MSS: IND.OCN.S, 251. 
51 Ibid. 
52 The British Military Administration was the temporary government that lasted from September 1945 in 
the aftermath of the Japanese surrender to April 1946 when the Malayan Union was formed. See The 
Straits Times, 8 Sep 1945. 
53 The Straits Times, 8 Dec 1945. 
54 Singapore Department of Education Annual Report, 1946, p.5; The Straits Times, 30 Sep, 8 Dec 1945. 
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more than the controlled items sold in shops.
55
 These conditions left many feeling 




Indonesia faced similar conditions of hardship including starvation and inflation, which 
were exacerbated with the armed conflict between the Indonesian Republicans and the 
returning Dutch colonial masters that prevented a stable government from being formed 
to oversee its rebuilding. The links between different parts of the archipelago which were 
under different governments were cut until 1949.
57
 The fighting between the two 
opposing forces resulted in displacement for many, and in the case of many Chinese, the 




Politically, the recovery in the Malay Archipelago faced another challenge when the 
withdrawal of the colonial powers in the postwar years. Even before the onset of WWII, 
the Dutch in the East Indies had taken steps to introduce limited democracy. In 1918, a 
People’s Council (Volksraad) was formed to provide representation to various groups and 
allowed for limited growth and representation of various political parties.
59
  Although 
only seen as a token step, the forming of the Council could be said to be the first step 
towards decolonization. The outbreak and end of the Second World War pushed the 
Dutch and indigenous peoples further towards this direction. When the Japanese 
Occupation started, the Japanese co-opted the indigenous nationalists such as Sukarno 
and Hatta into leadership positions, using them to mobilize the people for their war effort. 
Military and paramilitary units such as Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta) were also 
formed to assist the Japanese forces against the Allies who were attempting to recover 
control of Southeast Asia. As the tide of war turned, Japan announced in September 1944 
that the islands of former Dutch East Indies would become independent, and in March 
1945 organised the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian 
Independence (BPUKPI) for indigenous peoples to decide the constitution of the new 
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 The political vacuum that was created with the Japanese surrender finally 
provided the Indonesian nationalists an opportunity to declare independence in August 
1945, a condition which created a dilemma for the Dutch who returned after the war. 
 
In Malaya, the British knew that one of the reasons they had lost Singapore and Malaya 
to the Japanese was because most of the local people were not part of the political process 
and the lack of a common identity certainly did not add to the strength of their colony. 
While there were units like the couple of Malaya Regiment and a smaller Straits 
Settlements Volunteer Corp, very few Chinese in Malaya had been part of the military 
that defended their lands. As a result, the British conceived of the Malayan Union plan in 
London in 1943, even before the end of the war, to offer citizenship rights to the Chinese 




Political developments before the end of WWII had set the stage for decolonization in the 
postwar years, when waves of former European colonies across the world, from Africa to 
Asia, began their transition to independence, either through peaceful negotiation or 
violent revolution. Internationally, the European colonial powers were preoccupied with 
their internal challenges of recovery and rebuilding and were fundamentally too weak to 
continue holding on to their colonies. In the context of the Cold War, America also 
pressured some European powers to relinquish their hold on to their colonies. In the case 
of the Dutch East Indies, she used the threat of withholding Marshall Aid from the 
Netherlands to force the latter’s withdrawal from the East Indies and to focus on internal 
rebuilding. It was hoped that this would make way for what was perceived as an 




1.4 Impact of Decolonisation in the Malay World  
      on the Chinese Diaspora 
 
The decolonization process in the East Indies and Malaya started soon after the European 
powers returned to Southeast Asia. While experiences of WWII had facilitated the 
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growth of indigenous nationalism in Southeast Asia by altering the psychological mindset 
of the people, the Western powers were also planning their own political withdrawal. 
 
In Indonesia, the Dutch encountered the unique situation of having to “re-conquer” their 
colony before decolonization could commence. Indigenous nationalists had already 
declared an independent Republic in August 1945. This began a war between the Dutch 
and the Indonesian nationalists that ultimately ended in the former relinquishing power 
by 1949.
63
 Unfortunately for the Chinese, the war between the Indonesians and the Dutch 
resulted in tragedy for many of them, as many of them who were of a higher socio-
economic status represented elements of an old colonial regime that the Indonesian 
nationalists felt had to be eradicated. Consequently, from 1946 to 1947, anti-Chinese 
massacres occurred in parts of the Indies in the name of fighting against the returning 
Dutch. Unfortunately, in existing discourse, there have only been brief mentions of 
violence towards Chinese and destruction of their property due to the Republican army’s 
“scorched-earth” policy against the invading Dutch.64 The acts of extreme murder and 
violence committed by the Indonesian Republican forces have generally gone unnoticed 
in historical tracts.
65
 For example, extant literature suggests that the worst massacre 
resulting from Dutch-Republican clashes was of 600 Chinese at Tangerang in June 
1946.
66
 However, contemporary news reports indicate that the violence occurred on a 
wider scale and persisted throughout 1947.
67
 In fact, the violence by the indigenous 
Indonesians was not simply the result of a military “scorched earth” policy to prevent the 
Dutch returning, but in many cases was motivated by racial hatred. In less than a month 
                                                        
63 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, pp.247-48. 
64 Mary F. Somers Heidhues, “Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution”, in Changing Identities of 
the Southeast Asian Chinese Since World War II, edited by Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), pp.121-22. 
65 Although Indonesians remember the massacre by the Dutch in Rawagede in which at least 150 people 
were killed, there have been no demands for compensation or mention in the press of the anti-Chinese 
massacres by the Indonesians in 1947. Discourse on massacres of Chinese during the Revolution has also 
been overshadowed by studies on the events of 1965-66 and more recently, the anti-Chinese violence in 
1997. See “Dutch Apology for 1947 Indonesia Massacre at Rawagede” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-16104751 (accessed 16 Jul 2014); Robert Cribb and Charles A. Coppel, “A genocide that never was: 
explaining the myth of anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia, 1965–66”, Journal of Genocide Research, 11, 
4 (2009): 447-65; Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-99 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2006). 
66 David Morzingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949-1967, p.40; Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in 
Indonesia 1996-1999, p.7. 
67 Estimates of the number of Chinese massacred in June 1946 range from 600 to over 1000. Thousands 
more became refugees in Dutch-occupied areas after fleeing the anti-Chinese violence carried out by the 
Indonesian army. See Singapore Free Press, 6, 12 Jun 1946, 16 Aug 1947; The Straits Times, 6 Jun, 6 Jul 
1946; Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Jun 1946. See also Central Intelligence Agency, “Chinese Minorities in 
Southeast Asia”, ORE-7, 2 Dec 1946, p.5. 
 25 
from 21 July to 15 August 1947, Chinese from Java counted among them tens of 
thousands of casualties. It was even reported that some of the Chinese victims had their 
skins stripped off, while others were found disemboweled, bayonetted and so on.
68
 From 
Medan in Sumatra also came reports that Chinese were being burnt alive by retreating 
Republican forces, with even more displaced and left homeless.
69
 Since the Indonesian 
suppression of the Chinese was treated by the Indonesians as nationalist exercises as part 
of decolonisation, many in the Western world simply “closed an eye” to the atrocities the 
Chinese faced. Hence, the shocking realities facing the Chinese were played down,
70
 and 
continue to be missing from the official narrative for that period. 
 
 
Plate 2: Photograph of a Chinese mass grave in Malang, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 
26 Sep 1947. 
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The pertinent point here, however, is that the Chinese were already, by and large, 
“rejected” by the Indonesians even before the outbreak of the Cold War. Hence, it would 
not be too difficult to conjecture that the Chinese communists had no chance of success 
even before the open conflict started. After all, the total Chinese population in the East 




In Malaya, the process of decolonization was relatively less violent, as the British put into 
place schemes to hand power over to the indigenous peoples. The large numbers of 
Chinese made it necessary for them to take them into account in the planning for 
decolonization. The British implemented the Malayan Union Plan in 1946 which was 
liberal towards the Chinese in terms of the citizenship clauses, but the general apathy 
among the Chinese then and the resistance of the Malays towards the scheme resulted in 
a change of plan and the introduction of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. This 
represented a loss of grounds for the Chinese. In Singapore, the introduction of limited 
elections in 1948 and the granting of limited representation in the Singapore Legislative 
Council, which was dominated by the right-wing, pro-British Progressive Party,
72
 did not 
see the indecision of most of the Chinese as they were not eligible to vote in the early 





1.5   The End of the Political Route 
 
Before WWII, the communist parties in the Nanyang had simply been political 
organisations that were crushed or tolerated by strong colonial regimes, but the end of the 
war gave the communists an opportunity to contest legally for political power since they 
fought on the side of the Allies. As indigenous peoples struggled to break free from 
colonialism to form new nations, communism became an alternative political ideology to 
choose from, and communists presented themselves as local nationalists who could lead 
the anti-colonial decolonization process. The Chinese communists in the MCP attempted 
to fill the political vacuum by participating in open electoral politics from 1945 to 1948, a 
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concession granted by the British colonial government in recognition for their 
contributions to the wartime resistance against the Japanese. The PKI also operated as a 
local political party within constitutional means in cooperation with the other nationalist 
parties when the war between them and the returning Dutch forces was waged. 
 
By 1948, the honeymoon between the communists and their ideological foes was over 
worldwide. The outbreak of the Cold War in Europe marked by communist uprisings 
across the world spurred and gave encouragement to the Chinese communists in Malaya 
and their Indonesian counterparts in the PKI to assume their position in the struggle for a 
new socialist world order. The advances of the CCP in China further provided the 
Nanyang Chinese an Asian model for revolution, especially for the Chinese communists 
to begin their march forward. By 1948, the Chinese communists of the Malay world were 
deeply frustrated by their impasse in their democratic experiment, causing them to look 
for other means to seize power. By exploiting the dissatisfaction that many had with 
colonial authorities given the poor living conditions and the desire for self-determination, 
the MCP launched their armed struggle in Malaya in June 1948. The Indonesian PKI also 
rose in uprising in September 1948. 
 
Changing international and local conditions converged to give rise to communist 
uprisings in the Malay world in 1948. Taking 1948 as a starting point, this thesis shows 
how the Chinese communists launched and sustained their ideological and nationalist 
struggle with the help of the overseas Chinese. Given the former’s global connections and 
the latter’s widespread presence and multi-faceted networks, a Chinese communist 








 The world changed once more after 1948, the silent cold war was between the 
democratic countries of the world suddenly found themselves faced off with the 
Soviet Bloc in Europe, in a fast heating Cold War. As the Iron curtain fell over 
eastern Europe, the Chinese communist would in the following year set up their own 
bamboo curtain in Asia. The polemics spread to the Malay Archipelago fairly quick 
as the soviet agents organized into the MCP were already well emplaced having 
emerged from WWII as heroes to the Chinese community. The MCP soon found it 
expedient and advantageous to leverage on the needs of this community and to 
position themselves as the new political leaders of the Chinese diaspora. The 
Overseas Chinese consequently found themselves in a great dilemma as the question 
of their national identity, citizenship and loyalty required resolution. China becoming 
communist in 1949 further added to the dilemma of Chinese diaspora. 
 
 
2.1  Global Breakout and the Contagion Spreads to Southeast Asia 
 
In 1948, the tsunami of world communism raised an Iron Curtain in Europe that was 
closely followed by a Bamboo Curtain over Asia. In Europe, the Soviet Union backed a 
coup launched by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, while tension over zones of 
control in Germany led to the Berlin Blockade in June that year. At the same time, the 
Asian continent, which was initially seen as peripheral to the superpower rivalry, became 
critical to world communism when two communist conferences in Calcutta were 
followed by uprisings in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. In China, the civil war between 
the communists and the Republican KMT forces had turned decidedly in favour of the 
communists which had made inroads in their battle against the nationalists and looked 
poised for victory by 1948. Regardless of whether the communists worldwide had 
received any directive from the Soviet Union, 1948 was a year of euphoria and optimism 
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for them as they celebrated their uprisings as well as those by their ideological brethren 
elsewhere. 
 
Responding to fears of a global communist takeover, the Western powers tried to 
consolidate their political influence by ensuring, where they could, that democratic 
regimes emerged in colonies which they were withdrawing from. A Cold War thus 
ensued, and this polemic between two nuclear powers was seen as a “zero-sum” which 
shaped politics everywhere else in the world. 
 
In Malaya, in recognition for their cooperation and participation in the anti-Japanese 
resistance, the British colonial government allowed the MCP to participate in local 
politics. In Singapore, from 1945 to 1948, the MCP openly canvassed the public for 
support and struck up alliances with leftist political parties such as the Malayan 




However, this brief period of operating as an open political party did not last. In early 
1947, MCP members discovered that their former secretary-general, Lai Teck, was really 
a British spy.
75
 After he absconded with party funds, and fearing an imminent crack-down 
by the British authorities, the Party’s Central Committee decided in December that year 
that the time had come to abandon their previous strategy of cooperation with the British. 
Concurrently, the British had also grown wary of the MCP’s influence on the general 
population, and sought to reduce or eliminate it. They took action to tighten labour laws 
and arrest key communist leaders for inciting trouble. To the MCP, this was a Western 
plot to undermine communism. An MCP representative expressed this perception in a 
speech to 100 trade union leaders in Singapore when he called upon the workers to stand 
firm, proclaiming, “We do not want bloodshed but the authorities want us to shed our 
blood. We want tranquility in Malaya but the authorities have created chaos.”76 In the 
MCP Review of June 1948, the communists also linked Britain’s participation in the Cold 
War in Europe to her suppression of communist activities in Singapore and Malaya 
beginning in April that year.
77
 Thus, they responded by increasing their militancy in 
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Malaya and this eventually culminated into an open and violent confrontation, and with 
this, their democratic experiment ended. It was also at this time that the PKI reached an 
impasse in local politics,
78
 and with new leadership in 1948, they too abandoned their 
democratic honeymoon and openly declared their goal of creating a soviet state by 
capturing the Indonesian town of Madiun.  
 
In Singapore, during the fourth Plenary meeting of the MCP in March 1948, the party’s 
leadership declared that it would lead the “people’s revolutionary war”, reverse the 
previous “ostrich policy” of “surrenderism” and prepare the masses for the struggle for 
independence. Subsequently, on 10 May 1948 at the fifth Plenary meeting, the MCP 
adopted a 12-point plan for struggle to counter the government’s programme that viewed 
concerted struggle and the use of armed struggle as necessary.
79
 With this decision to 
prepare for their eventual armed struggle. The Chinese communists began a campaign of 
violence including terror attacks, murders and inciting urban unrest.
80
 In all, the 
downward spiral of violence in Malaya culminated in the murder of three European 
planters in the Sungei Siput district, on 16 June 1948 which placed pressure on the British 
to finally declare a state of Emergency in Perak and Johore.
81
 Communist newspapers 
were banned for inciting violence, and on 18 June, this state of Emergency was extended 
to the whole of Malaya. On 17 July, the MCP captured Gua Masang and announced the 
formation of the People’s Democratic Republic of Malaya,82 almost mirroring the Maoist 
model of revolution which focused on first securing the rural areas before the cities. A 
month after the Emergency was declared in Malaya, on 23 July 1948, the MCP and its 
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satellite organisations such as the National Democratic Youth League and MPAJA Ex-




The tensed situation in Singapore had already reached a heightened earlier with a series 
of strikes and MCP-instigated demonstrations that resulted in clashes with the 
government.
84
 After the communist insurrection began in Malaya, Emergency 
Regulations were also applied to Singapore. The MDU chose to voluntarily dissolve itself 
shortly after the declaration, effectively closing off the opportunity for the communists to 
continue in the constitutional struggle.
85
 Although the Singapore branch of the 
communist-controlled Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) was not 
banned together with its Malayan counterparts before the Emergency was declared,
86
 by 
the end of the month it had quietly dissolved itself.
87
 Most of the party members who had 
been active in the unions and other organisations headed for the safety of the Malayan 
jungles, although some remained in Singapore to continue in underground insurgency. 
 
 
2.2  The Politics of Use: Leveraging on the Difficulties of the Nanyang 
Chinese 
 
Although news of speedy recovery of the Malayan economy frequently appeared in the 
English-medium press in the late 1940s,
88
 the socio-economic realities faced by most 
people was that of hardship. The post-war recovery period was one in which the cost of 
living was high, as people suffered from high prices and low wages. For example, from 
1947 to 1953, staple price increased by 36%, and the price of poultry by approximately 
12%.
89
 Apart from high costs of staples, average wages also remained low until 1951, 
with certain industries such as the sago industry experiencing a 45% decrease in wages 
from 1948 to 1949.
90
 The high cost of living resulted in increased participation in labour 
strikes as workers clamored for higher wages. In 1947, there were 245 strikes in 1946 and 
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45 strikes in Singapore, most of them over wages.
91
 There were also many who could not 
find employment, a condition faced by many as the post-war recovery was slow in the 
area of industrial production. From September 1947 to September 1948, Singapore’s total 
work force decreased by 6,000 workers, or 5%, as a result of downsizing or closing of 
factories in the colony.
92
 The lack of jobs also contributed to large numbers of Chinese 
turning to illegal hawking to try to make ends meet. In 1948, there were 7000 licensed 
itinerant hawkers in the Municipal area of Singapore, but it was estimated that there were 
also an additional 20,000 hawkers without licenses.
93
 Apart from wage and employment 
conditions, living conditions contributed to much discontent. Many had been displaced 
from their homes after the war,
94
 and lived in overcrowded and damaged lodging.
95
 There 
was in fact a housing shortage, and rental rates for public housing continued to be high 
until the mid-1950s.
96
 These data certainly reveal the reality of the socio-economic 
condition of the laboring class in the late 1940s, and provide insight into why the 
communists could entice large numbers to their cause. 
 
Families also struggled with the cost of sending their children to school,
97
 while the 
government struggled to open enough schools to house the large number of children.
98
 
The situation was exacerbated by the post-war baby boom which ensured that almost 
every family was large. Also, many of the schools that re-opened after the war were 
Chinese-medium schools run by clans and individuals that took in the majority of the 
Chinese population.
99
 However, because many of the pre-war Chinese patriarchs lost 
their wealth and lives during the war, there were fewer resources from the communal 
hierarchies to support Chinese education by the late 1940s. Consequently, Chinese 
schools suffered from a lack of facilities and resources when compared to English 
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missionary and government-run schools.
100
 The lack of accommodation often resulted in 
overcrowding in classrooms, while lowly-qualified and lowly-paid teachers were made to 
teach an additional day compared to their counterparts in English schools.
101
 Naturally, 
these conditions gave rise to suspicions that the colonial government intended to 
eradicate or control Chinese education.
102
 At the same time, in the 1940s, because those 
hoping for non-blue collar jobs or to be in the government service had to know English, 
those educated in Chinese schools therefore became socially and emotionally 
disenfranchised. As such, Chinese students had become increasingly despondent over 
their employment prospects in the English-speaking colonial economy, and they became 
the ideal catchment for the communists. 
 
The Chinese diaspora in the post-war Nanyang struggled with the dilemma of being 
Chinese and non-indigenous in the Malay world. The Malays, by and large, saw the 
Chinese as foreigners, or “guests”, and in the case of Indonesia, even “foes” to the 
indigenous people.
103
 The rise of Malay nationalism and anti-Chinese sentiment signaled 
to some Chinese that they were not welcome, or at best, they were “guests” who would 
be tolerated as long as they obeyed the laws of the land that they were domiciled. In 
March 1948, in debating the Federation of Malaya’s constitutional proposals, some 
Malays had asserted their right over the land.
104
 The view of the Chinese as “guests” was 
also present within the community. After the Emergency broke out in 1948, a Chinese 
community leader from Singapore wrote to the press to denounce the MCP’s violent 
methods, and referred to Malaya as “a land belonging to other people”.105  
 
In the wake of the anti-Chinese massacres that had occurred in Indonesia, the situation 
for the Chinese there was far worse as compared to Malaya.
106
 In such a situation, the 
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Chinese communists in Indonesia could not make any headway with their political 
struggle. The inherent weakness of the larger Chinese community in Indonesia was also 
the communists’ critical weakness. 
 
The difficult conditions which confronted the Chinese diaspora in the Nanyang had 
created a sense of alienation and socio-economic marginalization. It gave the Chinese 
communists the perfect opportunity to spread their message of hope, with the promise of 
change through decolonization. This ideological message was tied to global and regional 
changes, for instance, by promising a communist utopia for the working class, and the 
protection of China and unity of the overseas Chinese. 
 
The MCP interpreted, or “translated”, the socio-economic inequalities of the Chinese 
diaspora in terms of class struggle, and presented themselves as the champions of 
ordinary people seeking better lives for everyone. In 1947, a poem entitled “You have 
and I have” that appeared in the communist paper Min Sheng Pao highlighted the plight 
of the worker in stark contrast to the rich capitalist.
107
 After the insurgency broke out, 
underground communist propaganda continued to point to the British “imperialists”, with 
their “economic exploitation” as the main culprits responsible for existing socio-
economic problems of unemployment and low wages suffered by the “ruled class”.108 
 
In this light, the MCP promised to care for the welfare of the people, and among other 
things, promised to abolish high taxes, “improve the livelihood of the people”, “set up 
widespread social welfare organs to look after the destitute women and children” under 
their new democratic programme.
109
 Besides targeting workers and peasants,
110
 the MCP 
planted cells in Chinese schools, recruiting students by promising to protect Chinese 
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 Similarly, the PKI could draw on the dissatisfactions of the diaspora 




In Malaya, the communists leveraged on their reputation as heroes that they had acquired 
during the Japanese Occupation. Many anti-Japanese Chinese viewed the communists as 
the heroes of the resistance movement (MPAJA) who remained and fought the oppressors 
while the British fled and left them to fend for themselves. The admiration that many 
youths had for the communists drew many to join the insurgency prompting N.G. Morris, 
Assistant Commissioner of Singapore’s Special Branch, to refer to them as a “generation 
growing up which confuse[d] the Communist bandits with those men who fought the 
Japs.” 113  Hence, to many Chinese, the British were the real oppressors when they 
outlawed the MCP, their “protectors”. In fact, many local Chinese viewed the Chinese 
communists as fellow Chinese brothers. As such, in the early days of the Emergency, the 
communists were highly successful in collecting protecting money, recruiting members, 





Such was the politics of use. The first candidates who could be recruited to the Marxist 
cause were the disenfranchised. While the communists’ rhetoric and promises had served 
to entice this segment of the populace, it should be noted that in order for the politics of 
use to be effective, conditions must exist that the “victims” are also willing parties who 
also hoped for a better life. The problem of the overseas Chinese in the Malay world was 
that not only were they not enfranchised, and had been the most ideal community to steer 
towards extremism, but they were themselves choosing the option to their solution. In 
other words, they were not mere victims in the international chess game of the Cold War.  
 
 
                                                        
111  Guo Ren Huey, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 000039, Reel 8. 
112 This was more evident in the 1950s after they had recovered from the failed Madiun uprising, although 
it was probably a strategy that had been used earlier. See Mochtar Lubis, “The Indonesian Communist 
Movement Today”, Far Eastern Survey, 23, 11 (1954):164. 
113 The Straits Times, 21 May 1950. 
114 A contemporary observer identified that the “most difficult single problem the Government faced (sic) 
in the suppression of terrorism” was Chinese support for communism and refusal to cooperate with the 
government. For instance, many Chinese were suspected of paying protection money to the communists, 
and those with information on communist activity and whereabouts were unwilling to provide it. The 
Straits Times, 7 Dec 1948. 
 36 
2.3 The Malayan Emergency and the Cold War 
 
The communist insurgency in Malaya was not a conventional war nor simply a matter of 
“Police Action” as the official position of the “Emergency” declared it. It was “total war” 
which the British waged, because the communists’ strategy of leveraging on the larger 
Chinese community to extend their insurgency added a new dimension to the conflict. 
Military action was taken, but the MCP’s ability to survive with the support of the 
Chinese meant that a different approach had to be taken to counter the insurgency. To 
confront the threat at the communal level, the British supported the formation of the 
Malayan Chinese Association to oversee the welfare of Chinese squatters,
115
 whom they 
had planned to re-settle in “New Villages” away from the communist-occupied jungles of 
Malaya.
116
 In 1949, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs for the Federation of Malaya noted: 
 
The important thing of the project (forming the MCA)… is that at last 
through this organization the moral influence and practical assistance of 
the Chinese community can be brought to bear on the Chinese dwelling in 
the danger zones to encourage these unfortunate people that at last they 
have someone, something, and somewhere to which they can attach their 
loyalties and hopes. More than anything else will this isolate the 
terrorists.117 
 
These policies were designed to isolate the communist insurgents from the rural Chinese 
population, thus denying them of aid and supplies. The longer-term goal of resettling the 
Chinese, also called the “Briggs Plan”, and giving the MCA a role in this new set-up, was 
to provide the Chinese a safe haven and an alternative Chinese leadership so as to wean 
support away from communism. Just as the MCP had appealed to the unity of the 
overseas Chinese for support in their anti-colonial struggle, so too did the MCA in its 
move towards shaping the future of the domiciled Chinese in Malaya, albeit through 




                                                        
115 Supplement no. 2 of 1949 to MRCA, Mar 1949, CO 717/182. 
116 Ray Nyce, “Chinese New Villages in Malaya” (Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd, 1973), p. 
xxxvi. 
117 Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA), Feb 1949, CO 717/182. 
118 The Straits Times, 8 Mar 1949; Singapore Free Press, 11 Apr 1949. 
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While Britain’s political thinking was to withdraw political from Malaya over time, they 
held on to Singapore as a separate colony to prevent it from falling to communism.
119
 
Measures taken to tighten security in Singapore included the use of police action and 
arrests under the Emergency Regulations.
120
 The Chinese in Singapore in the late 1940s 
were still by and large untouched by the MCP outbreak across the Causeway. Although 
hundreds had been arrested and a number of incidents had occurred in the city, the main 
effort of the communists vis-à-vis the Chinese on the island itself was centered around 
industrial action and limited infiltration of a small number of Chinese schools.
121
 The 
contest for the loyalty of the hearts and minds of the Chinese diaspora had began by the 
end of the 1940s. 
 
 
2.4 When China Became Communist 
 
A new dimension to the dilemma of the diaspora Chinese emerged after Mao Tze-Tung 
declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The growing sense 
of national pride boosted the morale of Chinese everywhere. The newspapers in Hong 
Kong and Malaya, for example, declared that the overseas Chinese were “no longer 
orphans”.122 However, this also meant that the diaspora Chinese were thrust into the fray, 
having to decide if they were Chinese citizens or not. Almost immediately in the 
Nanyang, the Chinese overseas were divided, with some preferring to see themselves as 
localized Chinese and others preferring to acknowledge their Chinese roots by supporting 
the new Chinese Communist regime. 
 
The feeling of pride had spread among many overseas Chinese, especially those who had 
                                                        
119 Singapore Free Press, 3 Jul 1948. 
120 Barely after the Emergency had begun, by late October 1948, there was a total of 302 detainees under 
the Emergency Regulations in the colony. Singapore Free Press, 20 Oct 1948; The Straits Times, 8 Feb 
1949. Singapore was also used as a base to fight communism in Asia, for example, by means of shortwave 
radio broadcasts. See The Straits Times, 19 Jan 1949. 
121 While there were armed members of the MCP members in Singapore who were arrested, the number of 
terror attacks were few compared with the Federation. There were none at all in 1949 – the first act of 
terrorism by MCP members in Singapore since the early months of the Emergency in 1948 was in February 
1950, with a hand grenade explosion. South East Asia Department, Colonial Office, Report No. 53 27 Jan – 
2 Feb 1950, POL 11127/49/1, India Office Records (IOR): L/PJ/7/14869. In early 1949, captured 
communist documents also reveal that the MCP cells in schools in Singapore faced a “general lack of 
interest and zeal” from the students, suggesting that while they had ongoing activities, these were not 
widespread and met with limited success. PMR no. 10 of 1949, 11 May 1949, CO 537/4866. 
122 See Plate 3; also MRCA, Dec 1948, CO 537/3750. 
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for a long time admired Mao’s party, such as Singapore’s leader, Tan Kah Kee. For Tan, 
there was hardly much of a dilemma as his allegiance was clearly to mainland China and 
the CCP. Malaya was his temporary abode which he could leave for his motherland and 
the land of his origins, China. In March 1949, he relinquished the chairmanship of the 
Singapore Chinese Hokkien Community Guild to prepare for his return to China, and in 
April 1949, on the eve of his departure to Hong Kong, he openly declared his support for 
the CCP by saying that if Shanghai was not Communist held by the CCP, he would “wait 
in Tientsin until it [was]”.123 While he was in Peking in June 1949, he represented the 
overseas Chinese supporters of the CCP, declaring their elation and hope for a 
Communist China.
124
 After the CCP victory in 1949, Tan, together with his supporters, 
congratulated Mao and hoisted CCP flags to show support for New China.
125
 Tan’s 
influence even extended to Chinese communities in Burma where many from Amoy, 
Tan’s own birthplace, became pro-communist.126 
 
The euphoria and pride that the rise of a strong China was so great that even a 
“previously right-wing or neutral” paper like the Nanyang Siang Pau in Singapore shifted 
its stance and started to focus its reporting on the changing developments in China.
127
 
Many Chinese students were attracted by the success of this socialist party and were 
enamored by the possibility of change in the Nanyang as well. As a case in point, 
students/teacher trainees from Chinese High School produced artwork denigrating the 
KMT and the West, and celebrating the march forward of Chinese leaders and workers 





China’s ascent in 1949 presented many diaspora Chinese with the dilemma of allegiance. 
                                                        
123 The Straits Times, 11 Mar, 29 Apr 1949. 
124 The Straits Times, 6 Jun 1949. 
125 PMR No 21/1949, 12 Oct 1949, CO 537/4867; The Straits Times, 11 Oct 1949. 
126 “Interview With Edwin Webb Martin Consular Officer Rangoon (1950-1951)”, Burma: Country Reader, 
p.12. Accessed at http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Burma.pdf. The “wealthy Chinese... from 
Amoy” who was in Singapore referred to in this document is Tan Kah Kee, although he is not mentioned 
specifically. 
127British security analysts observed that this paper which enjoyed a daily circulation of 50,000 copies in 
Singapore and Malaya, had shifted its attitude from “hostility” to “unqualified approval” of Communist 
rule beginning from August 1949, and had even began to criticise certain British policies of detaining 
communist collaborators. They also observed that the welcome towards the new regime appeared to be “on 
patriotic rather than on Communist grounds”, with the hope that a powerful China would protect them. 
Appendix to PMR No. 21/49, CO 537/4867; Also in Report of Colonial Office from 21-27 Oct 1949, IOR 
L/PJ/7/14868. 
128 See Plates 4-6. 
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Were they to participate in China’s nationalism or partake in the nationalist movement in 
the Malay lands where they had set up home? There was of course no unified answer to 
this issue at the end of the 1940s – some Chinese like Tan Kah Kee returned to settle in 
Communist China and urged others to do likewise,
129
 while others like the MCA and the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce advocated the localization of the Chinese in 
Malaya.
130
 There were also anti-communist Chinese from the KMT who opposed the 
Communist regime in China,
131
 and still others who were non-political and had wanted 
simply to remain culturally Chinese.
132
 In Indonesia, the persecution by the indigenous 
Indonesians made their choice of allegiance a clear one. Thousands of Chinese had 
already started to make their way to China by the end of the 1940s. However, their 
fundamental dilemma was rather, would China truly accept them? While China appeared 
to accept a high profile overseas Chinese leader like Tan Kah Kee, other ordinary 
overseas Chinese who returned to China without kin or kith took the risk of being 
rejected. There was therefore no single and clearly demarcated, path to follow. Clearly, 
divisions existed at every level of Chinese society, and the regime change in China only 
served to accentuate this dilemma of loyalty. 
 
Plate 3: Cartoon with caption: "The Huaqiao are no Longer Overseas Orphans", Hwa Shiang Pao, Hong 




                                                        
129 Singapore Free Press, 19 Aug 1954, 19 Jun 1956. 
130 The Straits Times, 1 Mar 1949, 6 Jan 1951. 
131 The Straits Times, 6 Jun 1950. 
132 A case in point is the China Society of Singapore formed in 1949, which promoted the understanding of 
Chinese culture including Confucianism, ancient customs and traditions, poetry, etc. Although it was 
formed in the year China turned communist, it deliberately avoided any political references or suggestion 
that the Chinese in Singapore were linked politically to China. See China Society Annual Publications, 
1949-1960.  
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2.5  Considering Ideology, Nationalism, Citizenship and Socialism 
 
Amidst struggles with livelihood in the post-war recovery period, the Chinese diaspora in 
Southeast Asia were confronted with the changing international and local realities of the 
Cold War. China’s ascent as a communist state at the start of decolonization processes in 
Southeast Asia had affected the Chinese diaspora in a way and magnitude that was 
unprecedented. They were pulled in different directions by competing ideologies and 
groups which used contemporary issues to influence the overseas Chinese to support their 
cause. 
 
It should be remembered that the MCP had launched their struggle in concert with the 
Soviet-led world communist outbreak in 1948. Hence, the initial outlook of the conflict 
was more ideologically motivated. With the entrance of Communist China, more 
overseas Chinese were pulled into the Marxian Movement (or Maoist among the Chinese 
in Southeast Asia). However, the general motivation in this instance was more “China” 
nationalism and in response to the general or perceived hardship where they were 
domiciled. In this instance, since China became communist, the support for China saw 
the convergence of ideology and nationalism which was a dilemma for some and not for 
others. When the pace of decolonization in the Malay world accelerated from the early 
1950s, the issue of indigenous nationalism surfaced as yet another issue for all diaspora 
Chinese. By this time, the dilemma affected all overseas Chinese since home was where 
they were domiciled. Every Chinese in the Nanyang had to decide on their political 
course and confront the fundamental issue of their own citizenship. 
 
Citizenship for the Chinese in the Nanyang was not merely about having voting rights. 
Instead, the Nanyang Chinese sought basic rights of protection and opportunity. As a 
distinct cultural and ethnic group, many of the Nanyang Chinese wanted to preserve their 
right to live and work in the lands of their domicile without being discriminated because 
of their ethnicity, and to retain their unique socio-cultural identity. This explains the 
widespread support the MCP had amongst the local Chinese in Singapore during the 
1950s. They were after all, supporting a “Chinese party”. The MCA’s success in Malay 
could also be seen in this light. However, cultural affliation was not the only sentiments 
they held during these days. Part of the dilemma was thus whether these rights would be 
 41 
protected if they retained their links to China, or if they gave those links up and 
participated in the building of the new nations in the Nanyang. 
 
In Indonesia, while automatic citizenship qualification was granted to all aliens after 
1946 if they were above the age of 21 and had resided in the former colony for at least 5 
years, most of the Chinese there were still tied to their Chinese identity and wanted to 
retain their Chinese citizenship and have dual citizenship.
133
 This was not accepted by the 
Indonesian authorities, thus the Chinese had to choose. The dilemma then became a 
protracted one and largely unresolved for decades. Many Malayan Chinese were also torn 
between allegiance to Communist China and the polity in which they resided. Mainland 
China’s unification offered new hopes of a better future, thus creating a period of 
euphoria in which many Chinese migrated from Southeast Asia to China. In 1948 and 
1949 respectively, a total of 66,804 and 63,588 passengers departed by sea from Malaya 
to Hong Kong and China.
134
  At the same time, many Chinese had built homes in Malaya, 
and the citizenship proposals created by the Malayan Union and the Federation of 
Malaya, together with the introduction of elections, also offered them alternatives in 
determining their socio-political and economic future. It was during this time when 
various political parties emerged to contest for leadership over the Chinese who were 
faced with the dilemma of citizenship and identity. 
 
It was also in the midst of this local nationalist fervor that a less radical socialist 
movement arose amongst the Chinese of the Malay world. In all, every group vied to lead 
the diaspora Chinese and to steer them to support their own political agenda. The initial 
conflict waged from 1948 to 1949 saw the beginnings of the Chinese diaspora’s 
citizenship dilemma. 
  
                                                        
133  Elizabeth Chandra, “We the (Chinese) people”: Revisiting the 1945 Constitutional Debate on 
Citizenship”, Indonesia  94 (2012): 90. 
134 These numbers partly reflected the postwar situation in which many who were displaced by the war 
returned to their homes, and also the euphoria brought about by the rise of a unified communist China. See 
Malayan Statistics: Digest of Economic and Social Statistics Relating to the Colony of Singapore and the 














Plate 4."National Day Special", in Singapore Chinese High School Teacher’s Training Graduation Special, 



















Plate 5: "Sleeping Giant Wakes Up" in Singapore Chinese High School Teacher’s Training Graduation 




Plate 6: Various Posters in the Chinese High School, in Singapore Chinese High School Teacher’s Training 








 The Chinese communist’s strategy of leveraging on their country brethren to 
launch their insurgency was a most logical opus operandi that should have guaranteed 
some measure of success, at least at the initial stage. The connections and empathy of 
fellow Chinese was an undeniable source of strength. Hence, they championed the issues 
afflicting the Chinese populace – wages, housing, employment, education and cultural 
issues, and many more. However, the MCP was not the only Chinese political party 
vying for the Chinese support. As such the overseas Chinese in general were inundated 
with political rhetoric from many fronts, with all promising them a political solution to 
their situation in the Nanyang. In all, the question and dilemma of their citizenship status 
came to fore, and with the diverse nature of this diaspora community, the overseas 
Chinese became divided. This eventually mitigated the progress of the MCP as well. 
 
3.1 The Marxist March 
 
In recent years, there have been debates in Singapore studies over the definition of a 
“communist”. According to British official administrative definitions in Malaya, the term 
“communist” was synonymous with “terrorist”, that is to say, a communist was a member 
of the MCP who directly or indirectly supported the armed struggle by fighting or 
providing the party with resources to engage in guerilla warfare.
135
 A person who 
supported the CCP, or advocated socialism without getting involved in MCP-associated 
terrorism was strictly not a “communist” in the narrow sense of the term. Instead, he or 
she could be labeled a “Leftist”, “socialist”, or simply “pro-CPG”.136 This administrative 
                                                        
135 In 1952, the British government decided to refer to the MCP as “communist terrorists”, the MRLA as 
“communist terrorist army”, and the Min Yuen as “communist terrorist organization”. This was a change 
from the previously-used term “bandits”, which was vague and did not point to the MCP as being 
responsible for the violence in Malaya. See Memorandum, Secretary for Defence, “Official Designation of 
the Communist Forces”, 21 Jun 1952, CO 1022/48. 
136 To be on the “Left” of the political spectrum indicated an opposition to the incumbent government, as 
opposed to those on the “Right” who were seen by many of the diaspora as “government traitors” or 
“running dogs”. The term “socialist” was also loose in its definitions, and encompassed a wide range of 
people on the political spectrum, from those who supported the Soviet camp to those who preferred a 
“third” middle alternative to either communism or democracy. To be “pro-CPG” meant supporting 
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use of the term “communist” has been used in the field of Singapore studies.137 However, 
by adopting this definition, the discourse community has created artificial boundaries 
between the ideological and geo-political aspects of the communist movement. From this 
perspective, any study of communism is contained to only the MCP or PKI, and would 
not encompass any prevalent movement to spread socialist ideals among the larger 
diaspora Chinese community. Such an approach lends itself to misunderstanding of the 
nature of communism, which was an international ideology not limited to party 
organisations. For many living in the period, there was no clear line drawn between card-
carrying MCP cadres and those generally belonging to the《左派》 (zuopai, “Left-
wing”), or “socialists”.138 In fact, there was a spectrum of socialism ranging from Marxist 




This thesis adopts a broader definition of communism to include the wide range of 
socialists to examine the ascent of the Chinese communists in the Malay world. This 
includes Chinese who were not members of any communist party, but nevertheless 
subscribed to socialist ideals of equality and the eradication of socio-economic class.
140
 
Some of these Chinese were open to allying themselves with the international Marxist 
socialists in their goal of building a socialist world, while others were drawn to local 
democratic socialism which sought to give a better life to the people who faced poverty 
and other socio-economic problems. Each group would take turns in competing for the 
loyalty and support of the broader Chinese community, beginning with the Marxists in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Communist China’s regime and was given as a right of the diaspora because their homeland was China. 
The British paid attention to Chinese who were “pro-CPG”, but in general left them alone if they were not 
found to be supporting the local communist movement. 
137 For example, Tim Harper argued that there is no evidence that Lim Chin Siong was a communist, and P. 
J. Thum argued that Lim and his associates who were in the PAP in the 1950s and Barisan Sosialis in the 
1960s were not communists, but merely victims of a political struggle. In other words, because these 
characters did not hold a membership card, and were not engaged in acts of terror, they were not 
“communists”. See Tim Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and “the Singapore Story””, in Jomo K.S. and Tan Jing 
Quee, eds., Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History (Forum: Kuala Lumpur, 2001), pp.1-56. Thum 
Pingtjin, “The Fundamental Issue is Anti-colonialism, Not Merger’: Singapore’s “Progressive Left”, 
Operation Coldstore, and the Creation of Malaysia” ARI Working Paper 211, Nov 2013, pp.1-25. 
138 For instance, Ong Chang Sam, a former PAP cadre who later helped to form the Barisan Sosialis, was 
under the opinion that the Barisan was under the control of the MCP. He says that he “had pro-Communist 
and leftist ideology” at that time, and “did not object to the Communist line”. Ong Chang Sam, NAS Reel 
10. Many Chinese-educated students of the 1950s and 60s saw themselves as “leftists”, regardless of 
whether they supported the MCP during the Emergency, or voted for the PAP or the Barisan Sosialis in the 
1960s. This was in part due to the influence of China’s political development. Information from Mr Chan 
Seck Sung, May 2014. 
139 Information from Prof Ng Chin Keong, May 2014.  
140 Cheng Yinghong, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Decline of the Left in Singapore", Journal 
of Chinese Overseas 7, (2011): 211-46. 
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the early 1950s. This was the time of the MCP’s great march forward in Malaya. At the 
same time, Red China also started engaging the Chinese of Indonesia. It would appear 
that the beginning of this decade heralded a new phase of political consciousness 
amongst the Chinese diaspora of the Malay world, in other words, a Red fever had 
descended in the Nanyang. 
 
In Malaya, the MCP waged their war against the British in the Malayan jungles where 
they sent regiments of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). These units which 
were engaged in frequent skirmishes with the security forces in Malaya depended on the 
help of the rural Chinese to provide them with food and other supplies. There they 
engaged in frequent skirmishes with the security forces in Malaya.
141
 Besides the 
insurgency in the jungles, there were also Red cells in urban centers who gathered 
resources for the insurgency and carried out terror attacks against political targets, 
namely, Europeans and “capitalist” Chinese (usually KMT and MCA members). At the 
high point, in April 1950, a communist cell threw a hand grenade was thrown at Sir 
Franklin Gimson, the Governor of Singapore, and in October 1951, successfully 
assassinated Malayan High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in the outskirts of 
Malaya.
142
 The other favoured target of the MCP was the MCA, which the communists 
denounced as a product of British Imperialism designed to take the place of “now 
moribund KMT”.143 The fact of the matter was that many of the MCA members were 
previously KMT members.
144
 As such, the MCA was a thorn in the flesh for the MCP 
because it competed with them for the support of the Chinese population. The MCP’s 
modus operandi included kidnapping towkays and MCA leaders and murdering many of 
them.
145
To justify these atrocities, the communists simply branded the MCA members as 
“running dogs of the British Imperialists”.146 
                                                        
141 For more details on the communist insurrection in Malaya, see Anthony Short, In Pursuit of Mountain 
Rats: The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2000). The frequent clashes 
between the MRLA and the British were frequently reported in the press and in Colonial Office Reports. 
For example, see “Colonial Office Weekly Situation Reports on the Emergency in Malaya”, CO1022/20; 
“Security Forces weekly intelligence summaries on bandit activity in Malaya”, CO 1022/13 – CO 1022/19. 
142 Many of these incidents were also characterised by the reluctance of anyone to step forward voluntarily 
as eye-witnesses. Singapore Free Press, 29 Apr 1950; The Straits Times, 29, 30 Apr 1950, 7 Oct 1951. 
143 This view was expressed in a pamphlet entitled “A Comment on the Malayan Chinese Association” 
produced in early 1949. PMR no. 15 of 1949, 20 Jul 1949, CO 537/4866. 
144 MRCA, Feb 1949, CO 717/182. 
145 For example, a grenade was thrown at local Chinese leaders in Ipoh in April 1949, injuring MCA leader 
Tan Cheng Lock. See The Straits Times, 11 Apr 1949. 
146 PMR no. 6 of 1949, 16 Mar 1949; PMR no. 15 of 1949, 20 Jul 1949; PMR no. 22 of 1949, 26 Oct 1949, 
CO 537/4867.  
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The first few years of the 1950s were the best years the Chinese communists had in 
Indonesia. They were able to establish themselves without resorting to insurgency like in 
Malaya. This march forward began in August 1950, when Wang Renshu, the first 
ambassador of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Indonesia arrived. Wang was 
previously been expelled by the Dutch from Medan in 1948 for his involvement in China 
Democratic League (CDL). He was the first Chinese consular official there and he 




Back in Malaya, a part of the MCP’s campaign of violence and agitation was waged by 
“grafting” and “morphing” existing networks of the diaspora.148 In places where the party 
lacked control, they “grafted” onto flashpoints such as Chinese schools, businesses and 
villages, where they borrowed resources, such as in using a school to obtain printing 
supplies for their propaganda work,
149
 using the existing postal system to pass on their 
messages,
150
 or using illegal smuggling networks for travel.
151
 In areas where the British 
found difficult to reach and control, the MCP took over and “morphed” communities to 
become overtly made up of communist sympathizers, who then channeled great amounts 
of resources to sustain their struggle. In the early days of the Emergency, this occurred 
                                                        
147 It is likely that Wang wrote a Chinese book urging readers to revolt against the existing government. 
This was discovered in a raid in Medan on 25 November 1950. Memorandum, Secretary for Economic 
Affairs (Singapore) to Secretary for Defence & Internal Security (Singapore), 27 Nov 1950, Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) 141/14402. 
148 Grafting involves latching on to an institution or system in order to influence, guide or give imput and 
direction. The grafting and grafted parties remain independent and distinct entities. (A+B=AB). In 
morphing, the institution being attached to changes fundamentally. That is, the morphed entity will actually 
espouse or mirror the values and ethos of the morphing entity (A+B=A). There is still a further stage that 
could describe the transformation of the communist movement from the 1950s, that is, “metamorphing”. 
While the morphing entity changes the morphed entity to become almost like itself, in “metamorphosis”, 
even the morphing entity changes (A+B=C). This occurs when the first entity’s state of being or identity 
becomes untenable, a fundamental shift is enacted in order for the continuation of its function may carry on 
but in a different form. 
149 In 1950, there were reports from Perak that an abnormal amount of printing ink for duplicating machines 
were sold to schools. Furthermore, two duplicating machines which were allegedly purchased for a school 
in Ayer Kuning, Perak, were not delivered to the school. PMR no. 3 of 1950,  29 Mar 1950, CO 537/6086. 
150 In Penang and Perak, the MCP sent documents through the post to fictitious addresses with the intent 
that these documents ended up in the Dead Letter Office, where they could be picked up by some members 
of the postal staff who could pass them on. Security Intelligence Review (SIR) for the Federation of 
Malaya no. 1 of 1951, 31 Jan 1951, CO 537/7345. 
151 In 1950, a forwarding organisation amongst the Min Yuen in Sepang helped communist leaders and 
sympathizers travel from creeks on the Sepang coast to Sumatra on Chinese junks. The communists utilised 
this illegal smuggling network at a cost, with charges by Chinese owners of $200 per head for passengers 
with identification cards, and $400 per head for those without. This process allowed three members of the 
People's Movement in May and three important leaders in July 1950 to travel from Malaya to Sumatra. SIR 
no. 11 of 1950, 30 Nov, 1950, CO 537/6086. 
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especially in Johore and Perak, where there was strong support from the rural Chinese.
152
 
Morphed villages helped warn the communists of approaching Security Forces,
153
 and 
continued providing them with food supplies despite British strategies to isolate the 
communists.
154
 These networks in the rural areas formally organized into the Min Yuen 
(Masses Organisations) ensured that the MRLA received its supplies.
155
 Hence, with the 
insurgency well organized and supported in those early years, the MCP grew form an 





In Indonesia, prior to the 1950s, the Chinese communists simply joined the PKI because 
they were too few and too weak to form their own organization. However, by the early 
1950s, with external support, a momentum for freedom surfaced. The main strategy of 
the Chinese communists in the early 1950s was somewhat similar to their counterparts in 
Malaya. They grafted onto Chinese communal networks, for instance, by using Chinese 
schools as the conduit to spread communist ideology.
157
 Likewise, their Indonesian 
counterparts, the PKI, also tapped on their connections with the Chinese embassy and 
those of the diaspora Chinese in Indonesia to obtain funds for the party and members for 
their unions.
158
 The early 1950s was perhaps the only phase in history that the PKI and 
Chinese communists operated on near equal footing and shared resources. As a case in 
point, a local-born, Dutch-educated Chinese Siauw Giok Tjhan founded and ran the party 
newspaper Harian Rakyat (newspaper) from 1951-1953, until he transferred the 
                                                        
152The Straits Times, 28 Nov 1952. 
153 MSS PIJ no. 13 of 1948, 15 Jul 1948; PMR no. 3 of 1950, 29 Mar 1950, CO 537/6086. 
154 As a case in point, in Sungei Pelek, Sepang, as part of British strategies to isolate the communists, a 
barbed wire perimeter fence was placed around 4000 people living in a new village and an adjacent old 
village. However, it was discovered in 1952 that a large gap was made in the wire of the fence, and that 
even the Home Guards, who were hired by the government, were drawn into helping the communists. On 
4th April 1952, the guards opened fire at a band of terrorists. However, it was discovered that the incident 
was engineered, and that while attention was being diverted, food was being thrown over the wire to the 
other side of the village. A large store of food and other supplies was also found days later just outside the 
perimeter fence. See Selangor Government Press Statement, 10 Apr 1952, CO 1022/55. 
155 According to an ex-communist interviewed by British analysts, the Min Yuen was established in Malaya 
in 1925, and its members were part of the political organization distinct from the army, and were mainly 
tasked with producing propaganda and collecting subscriptions. The term “Peoples’ Movement” had a 
wider appeal than Communism and aided the party in gaining “support from those whose political outlook 
is to the left but not so far to the extreme left so as to support the communist cause.” PMR No. 15 of 1949, 
20 Jul 1949, CO 537/4866. 
156  Leon Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan 
Emergency (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), p.69. See also “An investigation into communist terrorist 
recruitment and losses in Malaya, 1951-53”, War Office (WO) 291/1782. 
157The Straits Times, 6 Aug 1953. 
158  Mochtar Lubis, “The Indonesian Communist Movement Today”, Far Eastern Survey, 23, 11 
(1954):163-64. 
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editorship to his reporter and PKI central committee member Njoto.
159
 The local Chinese 
community also contributed money to the PKI, some willingly “out of conviction, or as 
insurance against the future, or to protect relatives on the distant mainland”, others not so 
willingly, “out of fear of reprisals or to protect business interests in Indonesia”. 160 
Employees of Chinese-owned firms were also naturally enrolled in unions under the PKI-
led All Indonesia Centre of Labour Organizations (SOBSI),
161
 although many Chinese 
gave up their membership of the union by the mid-1950s, according to a British observer, 
possibly because “the very strongly nationalistic sentiment of the Indonesians” in the mid 





3.2 The Chinese in the Nanyang: Contesting Rights & Citizenship 
 
In the early 1950s, the Chinese in Indonesia faced uncertainty over their future. In 
the aftermath of the Indonesian Revolution that had cost many Chinese lives and 
property, there was understandably a desire among many of them to obtain some 
form of rights and citizenship so that they would be protected. The Chinese 
communists led by the PRC consuls tried to represent the Chinese in Indonesia by 
offering them protection. 
 
A month after Wang Renshu’s arrival in Indonesia, the Chinese embassy formed the 
Association of Overseas Chinese in Jakarta to protect the rights of the diaspora. It also 
functioned to disseminate Central People’s Government’s (CPG) propaganda, and 
facilitate the return of the huaqiao to the motherland. Given the Indonesian government’s 
preoccupation with its own domestic problems then,
163
Chinese communist literature 
spread unhindered among the diaspora with the help of these CCP-backed 
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 Communist textbooks that painted Maoist China as a utopia were also 
widely used in Chinese schools across the archipelago, spreading communist ideology 
amongst many Chinese-educated Indonesian youths.
165
 The spread of Chinese socialism 
among the diaspora aimed at channeling resources back to the mainland was likened to 
building a “state within a state”. 166  The leverage that the Chinese communists in 
Indonesia had over the diaspora was possible only because the issue of citizenship was 
considered unresolved. As long as most of the overseas Chinese were still Chinese 
nationals seeking protection from the consuls, the Chinese communists could influence 
and steer them towards supporting China. 
 
Locally, there emerged Chinese parties such as the Persatuan Tionghoa (Chinese 
Association) in 1948 to defend the position of the Chinese. It was later reorganized as a 
political party, the Partai Democrat Tionghoa Indonesia, or the Democratic Party of 
Indonesian Chinese. However, this party met with limited success in its aim to achieve 
equal rights for Indonesian Chinese, and together with other Chinese minority 
organizations, it morphed into a new political organization known as Baperki 
(Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship).
167
 Baperki represented a coalition of 
various groups of Chinese who generally hoped to play a more significant role in the 
future of the Indonesian nation of which the Chinese would form a part. 
 
In Malaya, the larger proportion of Chinese there vis-à-vis the indigenous population as 
compared to their brethren in Indonesia meant that the British had to co-opt them into the 
decolonization process. This resulted in the formation of a political alliance (United 
Front) between the Chinese, Malays and Indians represented by the MCA, UMNO and 
the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) respectively. The elections in 1955 represented the 
Chinese with the opportunity to vote and to be represented in Parliament. 
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At the same time in Singapore, there was an increase in Chinese participation in politics. 
Under the Rendel Constitution which automatically registered eligible voters, the total 
number of voters on the electoral register increased from 70,000 in 1948 to over 300,000 
in 1955.
168
 The earlier election was dominated by non-Chinese voters because the 
requirement for eligible voters then was property ownership and the payment of taxes, as 
well as the need to register for the elections.
169
 Many of the eligible Chinese voters did 
not bother to register themselves to vote in that election. However, by 1955, there was a 
greater interest in politics among the general populace of Singapore. In 1948, only about 
ten per cent of the potential voters registered, whereas about 51% of the eligible voters 




However, it is important to note that representation and citizenship was not the only 
factor that affected the socio-political developments in the colony. Although more 
Chinese participated in the elections, especially the small numbers of Straits Chinese who 
had since the pre-war days seen Singapore as their homeland, there were still many 
Chinese who were not represented or allowed to vote in the 1955 elections. Many 
Chinese laborours in the colony were not naturalized citizens and thus were not 
represented. In 1955, of the 675,000 Chinese in Singapore, at least 290,000 were Chinese 
workers who were not eligible for voting.
171
 Many of these workers who were not 
eligible for citizenship would have been the ones who supported the communist-led 
agitation. Purely constitutional developments would not affect them, and their union 
activities that led to strikes and demonstrations were motivated more by economic and 
socio-cultural concerns. 
 
3.3 The Pied Piper’s Tune:  
      Leveraging on Aspirations and Connections 
 
A victorious, strong and independent Red China captured the imagination of many 
overseas Chinese throughout the Malay world, leading thousands to return to China. 
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Many students took this one-way journey to pursue further studies.
172
 Unfortunately, 
many had their dreams crushed, and eventually tried their best to return.
173
 Why did they 
go to China in the first place? In Indonesia, the discrimination against and persecution of 
the Chinese had made it clear that the Chinese had no future in Indonesia. Hence, it was 
not merely due to China’s propagandistic rhetoric which enticed the Chinese. The 
Chinese themselves needed a ray of hope and many were certain that China would 
provide the solution they needed, and consider them “truly a Chinese”.174 This situation 
was mirrored in Singapore where many Chinese-educated students faced “the meagre 
prospect of unemployment” after graduation, and were also unable to further their studies 
beyond high school.
175
 At this point, Red China exploited their dilemma and welcomed 
them. China also attempted to claim leadership over the overseas Chinese as their 
citizens,
176
 encouraging many students in Indonesian and Malayan schools to return to 
rebuild the mainland.
177
 In China, government bodies were also set up at the national, 
provincial and village levels to conduct work among overseas Chinese.
178
 An Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission was also established, and in its first broadcast on 1 January 
1950, the overseas Chinese were invited “to come to participate in the glorious and great 
task of building a new China and… to redouble [their] efforts to help [their] 
fatherland.” 179  The pro-CPG propaganda at this time was to spread to the overseas 
Chinese to encourage them to return home or send back remittances, but it would 
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eventually be clear that Peking was merely seeking to use the overseas Chinese in order 




Plate 7: “The Red Piper of Peking”, Cartoon from The Straits Times, 3 August 1954 
 
Yet the Chinese communists were not the only “pied pipers” who were interested in 
harnessing the support of diaspora Chinese. On the opposite side of the political 
spectrum, the Republicans (KMT) who had been forced to retreat to their island bastion 
of Taiwan (Formosa) during the Chinese Civil War, also mounted their own counter-
insurgency response in the Nanyang by joining the fray to pull the Chinese overseas to 
their side. On the “Education Front”, the Republicans were able to entice thousands of 
overseas Chinese students to head to Formosa to continue in the 1950s. This was done 
with the help of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in Taipei.
181
 The Chinese 
nationalist government’s efforts also extended to conducting correspondence courses for 
the Chinese in Southeast Asia,
182
 clearly demonstrating that the Chinese civil war that 
had ended geo-politically continued at a socio-cultural level with the overseas Chinese as 
the new battleground. 
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Popular literature on the student movements in Malaya tend to focus on the Students’ 
“Days of Rage” when they fought the local government, having been influenced by the 
Malayan communists. However, few know that there was an equally robust response 
from the anti-communist Chinese. This is where the lines blurred between the conflict of 
two ideological foes of the Cold War, and the Cold War polemics of the CCP and KMT. 
When the MCP got involved, it added the local Malayan dimension to the conflict. 
Initially, the MCP tried to harness the rising Chinese nationalist fervor by presenting 
themselves as representatives of the CCP. They emphasized their ideological connections 
with the Chinese communists, and tapped on the passion the Chinese students had for the 
New China.
183
 In a directive of October 1951, they had identified students as a key target 
to cultivate to become “cultural working personnel”.184They continued planting cells in 
various Chinese middle schools in accordance to the directive.
185
 Their efforts were 
matched by the KMT’s counter-response. For example, for Children’s Day in 1952, the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Department of the Chinese Nationalist Government sent five 
thousand Chinese textbooks and other literature to Singapore Chinese schools, and non-
communist teachers tried to promote democracy among the students by encouraging 




The “hearts and minds” of the Chinese overseas was a highly contested terrain in the 
Cold War. From the international arena to the regional and local battlefield, the Chinese 
diaspora of the Nanyang were pulled in many directions and hence, it would be a mistake 
to view their allegiance as one of being pro-communist alone. From the perspective of the 
playmakers, a victory with the Chinese diaspora would be akin to winning to “war”. In 
the context of the Cold War, the Western world had recognized that poverty had been the 
root cause for the rise of Marxism in undeveloped countries. Marshall Aid, which aided 
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the rebuilding the European economy, was extended to the rest of the world.
187
 This 
included distribution of nutritional milk and general aid to support local educational 
efforts. To fight communism meant fighting poverty. In British Malaya, this also 
translated into the creation of pro-British or anti-communist regimes and political parties. 
In the later part of the 1950s, the USA saw the creation of Nanyang University (Nantah) 




A critical aspect of the “hearts and minds” battle was the appointment of local leaders. 
The communists clearly had identified student leadership as vital to guiding the trade 
unions, while one the political Right, the pro-establishment MCA was given support in 
their claim of leadership of all local Chinese. In the early 1950s, the MCA ramped up 
their claim of leadership of the Chinese communities in both Malaya and Singapore.
189
 In 
Singapore, this was met with resistance from other political parties.
190
 This contest was 
thus not just a challenge against the Marxists; it was also local politics. 
 
The situation in Singapore was somewhat different from Malaya. The leadership of the 
Chinese community was contested by different groups including traditional clan 
organisations and even multi-ethnic political parties. For instance, the Singapore Chinese 
Chamber responded to challenges to their leadership by shifting their position constantly 
to meet the needs of the local Chinese. Its President from 1950 to 1952, Tan Lark Sye, 
was initially seen as an ally of the local British government and a neutral in the civil war 
between the CCP and the KMT.
191
 His reputation as a capitalist even resulted in the 
MCP’s successful burning of his factory in July 1950, after two previously unsuccessful 
attempts.
192
 However, by 1953, he had positioned himself as a champion for the overseas 
Chinese by spearheading the project to establish Nanyang University.
193
 On a political 
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spectrum with the MCP on the Left and the British government on the right, Tan initially 
occupied the centre. However, to claim leadership over the Chinese who were becoming 
more politicized and anti-colonial in their outlook, it would appear that Tan Lark Sye and 
the leaders of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce were pushed further towards the Left. 
Clearly, the SCCC had initially supported the British whom they saw as protectors of 
their business interests, by the early 1950s many of them had begun to oppose them over 
issues relating to Chinese rights and education.
194
 Many businessmen who headed clan 
organisations were also active in school management boards, and their leadership split 
the Chinese community in Singapore further, as schools became battlegrounds that 
reflected their various ideological leanings. As a case in point, Tan Kah Kee’s open 
support for Mao and the Communist regime in China facilitated the spread of 
communist ideals in the schools in which he supported or founded. The Chinese High 
School was a good example of this top-down influence, as was the Nan Chiau Girls’ 
High.
195
 Other clan groupings also had their own schools and board of directors who 
had a hand in politicizing Chinese education. The Hainanese business community 
managed the Yoke Eng School which was another hotbed of communist activities. 




The early 1950s also saw the emergence of the Democratic socialists who led the 
Singapore Labour Front and later, the People’s Action Party (PAP) as well. They actively 
built bridges between the Chinese students and workers in the hope of building a mass 
base of support to fight the 1955 elections.
197
 By being in solidarity with the Chinese 
school students, the PAP was able to convince the students and Chinese community of its 
sincerity. An example of this took place in December 1954, when the PAP led five lorries 




In the 1950s, the Chinese youth had emerged as a formidable force (foot soldiers) in the 
socialist movement. They were young and idealistic, and had aspired for change in an era 
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of post-war recovery where everyone, particularly the workers, were encumbered with 
the need to make ends meet. For quite a number, their aspirations and concerns were 
“adapted” by the communists, who educated and cultivated them in radical Marxist 
ideology to make them ideal cadres to “educate” other students and workers at the behest 
of their leftist cadres. 
 
In Singapore, Chinese students were particularly susceptible to the socialist ideology not 
only because they were young naïve or imbued with great aspirations, but also because of 
the socio-economic hardships that their communities faced until the early 1950s.
199
 At the 
beginning of the decade, there was a shortage in accommodation, food and jobs, a 
situation that was worsened with the government’s open door policy to immigrants.200 
While unemployment rates were decreasing, workers who were employed had to deal 
with the rising price of staples while their wages remained unchanged.
201
 In the early 
1950s, there were also frequent wage disputes between unions and employers, as workers 
lamented their poor living conditions and took action in the hope of securing a better 
deal.
202
 The high cost of living and unemployment was exacerbated by the high 
population growth rate (postwar baby boom),
203
 which created social problems such as 
overcrowding at home and in schools. In 1952, 56,000 children between 6 and 13 years 
old could not attend school in Singapore because of the shortage of facilities.
204
 This 
meant that many of them had to compete to find work in an already-struggling economy. 
Furthermore, among those who managed to attend school, there were more Chinese 
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schools than English-stream schools at that time.
205
 Given that the future of the Chinese-
educated students was in doubt, it was no surprise that the communists found a willing 
audience among the Chinese-educated. 
 
After 1953, however, average wages increased in the colony, while basic costs went 
down.
206
 Since wages for blue-collar workers were improving, the industrial strikes of the 
mid-1950s cannot be explained by low wages.
207
 A more likely explanation for the 
increase in social and political unrest from the early to mid-1950s was that the Chinese 
students faced growing frustration with the decline in popularity and value of Chinese 
education. School enrolment figures reveal that the prestige of Chinese education was 
fast declining. There was a gradual shift to English education as more parents began to 
send their children to English schools, and the growth of Chinese school enrolment 
slowed when compared to total school growth in Singapore.
 208
 The socio-economic shift 
of the Chinese community explains why more students were involved in agitation from 
1950s to 1960s. Those in the Chinese stream saw the decline and felt the need to defend 
the system. However, they did not blame social change, but instead, blamed the 
government for their plight. 
 
Evidence of Chinese students’ dissatisfaction can seen in their school magazines, which 
sketches of Chinese school graduates generally looking downcast and portrayed as doing 
menial jobs because of the lack of employment opportunities.
209
 Graduating students 
urged their schoolmates in their graduation magazines to bear their privileged burdens of 
removing the “stumbling blocks” preventing a “beautiful and peaceful” future, of which 
one way was to defend Chinese education in Singapore and Malaya, which had “always 
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been discriminated against.”210 This concern of the Chinese graduates was repeated by 
illustrated publications of most Chinese schools throughout the 1950s. Their themes and 





In this climate of dissatisfaction, the MCP directed the student movement by planting 
cells in schools across the Federation and in Singapore in the early days of the 
Emergency.
212
 Through secret study groups, Marxist propaganda was dished out to 
youths eager for change, who then proceeded to extend their socialist ideas to other 
schoolmates. Students were suitable leaders because they were literate and could teach 
ideological concepts of class struggle and spread the hope of the communist utopia to 
other students and workers. In response, many of the lesser-educated workers supported 
the Chinese students because they latter appeared to care for their rights. In an article 
entitled “Why do Workers need to learn Culture”, Chinese High School students 
expressed their views concerning the topic, including convictions that workers had to be 
taught “to see the darkness of social structures and not to be misled”, to “train oneself up 
to understand the inequality of society”, to “learn culture to improve work and contribute 
to society”, and the “fight to smash all plots and schemes of capitalists”.213 The socialist-
style rhetoric of the students reveal the position of quite a number of Chinese school 
students in relation to the workers. The latter looked to the former who were better 
educated and versed in socialist doctrine to guide and lead them. 
 
The unhappiness of Chinese students were expressed in other ways, including an 
examination boycott,
214
 protests against the National Service call-up in May 1954,
215
 and 
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against the expulsions of fellow students.
216
 They also organized the workers to take 
industrial action. During the City Council strike in July 1954, students gave close to 
$1000 to union officials over one weekend, and were involved in distributing biscuits and 
chatting with the strike leaders.
217
 In September 1954, students from the Chinese High 
School also donated money and food over the weekend towards the 400-worker strike at 




The most notorious of all riots in which both students and workers were involved was the 
Hock Lee Bus riots of May 1955. In this incident, twenty lorries of students from the 
Chung Cheng High School and the Chinese High School were sent to express support for 
the Hock Lee Bus strikers, but culminated in a violent confrontation with the police that 
resulted in four deaths.
219
 In the Legislative Assembly, Chief Secretary William Goode 
“attribute[d] the rioting… to irresponsible political leaders and to Chinese students” for 
inciting the workers against the police.
220
 The students were not only present to 
encourage workers – in certain cases, they were shown to be leading and guiding them.221 
In the words of a foreign journalist, the Chinese middle school students were “child 
commisars”. 222  Not unlike the political officers who served an educative function 
(Political Education Officers) in the KMT army in China (a role inspired by the Russian 
commissars),
223
 Chinese students were suitable candidates for leading the workers in 
Singapore’s socialist movement because of their higher level of education. 224 Besides 
urban agitation, the MCP-linked underground movement also saw student direction, with 
a Chinese High School student controlling approximate 300 personnel including an 
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Brother John Lek, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 001764, Reel 2; The Straits Times 26 Jun 1954. 
217The Straits Times, 25 Jul 1954. The money was likely to have been from sympathetic businessmen. 
218The Straits Times, 21 Sep 1954. 
219The Straits Times, 13 May 1955. 
220The Straits Times, 17 May 1955. 
221The Straits Times 9, 20 Jun 1955. 
222Daily Express, 7 Mar 1955 in CO1030/360. 
223  Chalmers A. Johnson, From Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of 
Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (California: Stanford University Press, 1962), p.80. 
224 The structure of the MRLA also included commissars who tended to have a higher level of education 
than the majority of the Chinese soldiers. For example, see The Straits Times, 28 Jun 1952. 
225 Supplement no. 4, Issued with Singapore PIJ no. 8/1954, FCO 141/15952. 
 61 
Although the students involved in these protests were in favour of communism as the best 
solution to solve existing problems, many of them were in fact not directed and led by the 
MCP. In December 1950, the MCP had lost direct control over its movement on the 
island after the Singapore Town Committee was smashed.
226
 Because there were no other 
members who could fill the MCP positions or no way for the MCP to send members to 
Singapore, “the only way left was to cultivate and promote members from the lower rung 
locally”.227 It was then that the Chinese students themselves took on a greater leadership 
role in the communist movement in Singapore.
228
 Some of them eventually rose to form 
the MCP’s ‘A’ branch and they worked primarily among teachers and students. They 
were also found to have had cells connected with workers.
229
 By this time, MCP’s direct 
connection to the youth seemed to be tenuous. In reality, the student unrest and urban 
agitation of the early to mid-1950s in Singapore was very much the result of spontaneous 
student leadership arising from the weakening of the MCP in Singapore and motivated by 
the socio-economic dissatisfactions that they faced in society. Given that by 1954, links 
between the communists in Singapore and Malaya had been cut, there emerged a new 
structure that replaced the original MCP modus operandi. A Chinese socialist operational 
structure comprising workers, students and Chinese businessmen was beginning to 
emerge locally – the students led the movement, the workers formed the mass base, while 





                                                        
226 In 1950, the Singapore Town Committee faced a police crack-down. On 31 April 1950, the Singapore 
Special Branch four members who formed the entire Singapore Town Committee. The Straits Times, 2 May 
1950; PMR No. 5 of 1950, 31 May 1950. This was followed by raids on hide-outs of the Singapore 
communists. On 12 November 1950, an MCP propaganda centre was discovered in an attap house off 
Serangoon Road, with large amounts of printing material. SIR no. 11 of 1950, 30 Nov 1950. Finally, on 8 
December 1950, an MCP communication centre at Victoria Street was raided. Besides propaganda 
materials, vegetable knives and two imitation pistols were seized. SIR no. 12 of 1950, 31 Dec 1950. These 
police actions effectively smashed the Singapore Town Committee’s organization. 
227  Guo Ren Huey, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 000039, Reel 14. 
228 One such cadre was Wan Fung, who headed the communist movement in Singapore and controlled 
Freedom Press until his detention in January 1954. He moved from being a sympathizer in 1948 to 
becoming a member of the MCP’s Student Branch Committee at the Chinese High School, then 
progressing to becoming the leader of the Committee and finally a full member of the Party. Another 
example was Wong Meng Keong, (better known as ‘Comrade D’), who took over the movement in 
Singapore after Wan Fung’s arrest. PMR no. 7 of 1954, 30 Jul 1954, FCO 141/15952. 
229 The Straits Times, 25 Feb 1955; Also PIJ No. 12 of 1954, 31 Dec 1954, FCO 141/15952. 
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3.4 The Dilemma of Citizenship 
 
The overseas Chinese were pulled in many directions because they faced a fundamental 
dilemma concerning their citizenship which they tied to their cultural identity. They were 
“Malayan” or “Indonesian”, and they were also Chinese. For example, despite seeing 
Malaya as his home, a “Malayan Chinese” who was born in Penang expressed his interest 
in China’s politics after the PRC was established: 
 
Now there are many Chinese in Malaya today who are anxious to know 
what the result of the setting up of a Communist Government in China 
will mean. Their people are still in China, and even a Malayan Chinese 
like myself has an interest in the fate of the people of his country of 
origin…230 
 
Similarly, a Chinese student from Java declared in 1950: 
Every Chinese must choose. Either he goes back to China now, or he 
should give up thinking in terms of loyalty to China.231 
 
In 1953, an Indonesian Chinese reader of the Singapore Free Press also expressed this 
dilemma, saying, “I am an Indonesian while I sojourn in Indonesia, but a Chinese by 
birth.” 232 This sense of having a stake in two countries was symptomatic of the dilemma 
that many faced concerning citizenship. The uncertainties over the future of their 
homeland allowed them to be drawn into both international and local politics where their 
loyalties were contested. The question was for many in the post-WWII era of the Cold 
War and decolonization was whether they still had a homeland in China, or had to create 
a new one. 
 
Regardless of where they lived and how many generations they had been domiciled in the 
Malay world which had become their home 《家》jia, the overseas Chinese were still 
inextricably linked to the fortunes of China, their 《国家》guojia, or cultural homeland. 
Furthermore, China is where their 《家乡》jiaxiang, (ancestral village) is, from where 
ties with the rest of the clan and ancestors were maintained. Thus, one could say that 
                                                        
230 The Straits Times, 31 Oct 1949. 
231 The Straits Times, 20 Feb 1950. 
232 Singapore Free Press, 6 Jun 1953. 
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many Chinese viewed themselves as having two homes, or jia, in that they had a 
permanent abode in the Nanyang, but maintained their connections with the place of their 
birth. Before 1949, the diaspora had seen the Chinese consuls as their political leaders, 
but remained free to adopt various ideologies and beliefs while retaining Chinese cultural 
practices and values.  However, after 1949, China’s “culture” was replaced with a 
communist political culture, which presented the overseas Chinese with a dilemma of 
whether to adopt this or not. To remain diaspora and continue seeing China as one’s 
guojia would necessarily mean embracing the Chinese socialist leadership. The 
alternative to adopting a communist culture was to cut off ties with their original cultural 
home and become part of an entirely new political entity where they were domiciled. 
There were of course problems with either option. To cut off ties with contemporary 
China, for some, meant the need to redefine their own Chinese cultural identity. 
Decisions that impacted the future had to be made, for instance, the choice of Chinese 
textbooks for Chinese schools or which version of the Chinese cultural past to take from, 
of which the Chinese communists had their own Leftist version. The question of 
leadership would inevitably also arise. Before 1949, Chinese consuls in the Nanyang had 
provided some form of leadership over the diaspora by ensuring that they received 
Chinese textbooks, teachers, funds and protection when necessary,
233
 but should this 
continue with Communist China? 
 
Political changes in Indonesia and Malaya had brought the issue of citizenship to the 
forefront for the Chinese diaspora. They were forced to choose their guojia, to which they 
would declare their allegiance. The 1946 citizenship law in Indonesia presented an 
opportunity for the Chinese there to become full Indonesian citizens. However, they 
wavered and placed themselves in a permanent dilemma when the Indonesians insisted 
there be no dual citizenship.
234
 From 1946 to 1955, the Chinese in Indonesia were asked 
to declare their allegiance four times.
235
 This also became a source of tension between the 
Chinese in Indonesia and the State. On one hand, the Chinese community had suffered at 
the hands of the Indonesians, but on the other hand, those who returned to China were 
                                                        
233 The Straits Times, 12 Feb 1948. 
234  Undang-Undang No. 3/1946 granted all indigenous peoples inside the territory of Indonesia and 
residents of the former Netherlands Indies above the age of 21 and who had resided in the former colony 
for at least 5 years Indonesian citizenship, regardless of their ethnic heritage. This was opposed to Chinese 
Nationality laws from the Qing period which maintained that descendants of Chinese persons, regardless of 
birthplace, were Chinese nationals. See Chandra, “We the (Chinese) people”, p.90. 
235 The Straits Times, 6 May 1955. 
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also not welcome. It became clear to some students who returned to China that they 
would only be treated well if they wrote to their families in the Nanyang to ask for 
money. Otherwise, they were usually brushed aside.
236
 There was no obvious solution for 
the dilemma faced by the Chinese in Indonesia. In Malaya where the Malays dominated 
politics through UMNO, their partner the MCA urged local Chinese to choose Malayan 
citizenship,
237
 but this meant that they would never be equal citizens as they had to 
recognize the special rights of the Malays. 
 
3.5 Political Plurality of the Overseas Chinese 
 
The Chinese diaspora was hardly a homogenous group, culturally, socially, economically 
or politically. While traditional descriptors and taxonomies that followed dialectal lines 
and places of origins broadly describes the Chinese immigrant arrivals, they could not 
adequately include those local-born who were called Straits Chinese. These include both 
English and Chinese-educated. In pre-war literature, “Straits Chinese” often refers to the 
English-educated Chinese “British subjects”. 238  In the postwar era, the dichotomy 
between Chinese residents was generally reduced to a division between the English and 
Chinese-educated, with the former linked invariably with the pro-establishment camp and 
the latter, the Leftist. However, in terms of politics, the post-WWII reality was that the 
Chinese in the Nanyang were greatly polarized by the politics affecting the local Chinese. 
Just as there were many pro-Communist factions, the pro-KMT Chinese were also not 
few. It was through their support that the MCA eventually gained victory in Malaya. In 
Singapore, the Leftists seemed to have dominated. In reality, they did not form the 
majority of the resident Chinese in Singapore. In Indonesia, there were also supporters 
and detractors for between the communists and non-communists; the differences in terms 
of class and wealth also characterized the local Chinese with the wealthy occupying 
higher socio-economic positions  because of their dominance in the economy vis-à-vis 
                                                        
236 See Motherland: Four Overseas Chinese students tell the stories of their welcome in China (Kowloon, 
Hong Kong: Union Press, 1956). 
237 The Straits Times, 24 Sep 1950.  
238 This group would include the Peranakan Chinese, a group of Chinese whose cultural practices included 
both Chinese and Malay elements, as well as the English-educated. However, it is important to note that not 
all Straits-born Chinese were English-educated, or were disconnected from developments in China. Some 
Chinese who had been born in the Straits Settlements, including Tan Kah Kee and Lim Boon Keng, were 
China-oriented. See The Straits Times, 2 Jan 1957.  
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the Malays. In contrast, the dominance of the MCA superseded class and wealth 
differences in Malaya. 
 
Post-war Singapore was also defined less by dialectal or socio-economic divisions, but by 
politics. Before the war, the domiciled Straits Chinese had occupied a privileged socio-
economic status as compared to later Chinese migrants, but WWII was a turning point. 
Unlike the British, the Japanese made no distinction in treatment between the Straits 
Chinese and other Chinese. The war in China had started years before it reached 
Southeast Asia. Hundreds of thousands of mainland China Chinese had taken refuge in 
the Nanyang prior to 1942. Mixed with the Chinese settlers of the prewar years, the local-
born Chinese and with the regional Chinese also congregating here, the Singapore 
Chinese community was a highly pluralistic one. This may explain their general 
ambivalence to local politics in the early postwar years. 
 
From the viewpoint of socio-economic profile, the 1947 Social Survey in Singapore 
showed that more than half the local-born Chinese workers were engaged in manual 
occupations of differing skill levels.
239
 Furthermore, a census conducted in 1947 
determined that about 75.4% of the population in Singapore and 62.5% in Malaya had 
been born locally.
240
 In other words, after the war, there was no direct correlation 
between one’s social class and one’s place of birth. Regardless of whether they were born 
in Singapore or in China, most Chinese faced common socio-economic issues of 
livelihood. Hence, instead of employing the old dichotomy between Straits and China 
born, it would be more realistic to see them in terms of English or Chinese-educated.  
 
 
In Singapore, the early to mid-1950s saw the emergence of democratic socialists who 
contested for representation and leadership of the Chinese and many of them were 
English-educated. Yet the political situation cannot be simply characterized by a division 
along linguistic lines. It would be a gross generalization to simply classify the English-
speaking as Democratic Socialists and the Chinese-educated as Marxist Socialists. Each 
political leaning had supporters from both language groups. Furthermore, the 
demographics of Singapore’s Chinese society also gradually changed. While there were 
                                                        
239 The Straits Times, 16 Nov 1948. 
240 The Straits Times, 19 Oct 1949 
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many Chinese-educated Chinese before 1953, the situation was reversed soon after. From 
1954 onwards, there were more children in English-medium schools which grew at an 
increasing rate as compared to the enrolment in Chinese-medium schools which grew at a 
slower rate.
241
 Even among the Chinese-educated Chinese, more of them received 
education in English as compared to the pre-WWII years. The changing demographics set 
the stage for political change, reflecting that popular sentiment was increasingly inclined 
towards democratic socialism led, but not dominated, by the English-educated Chinese, 




Plate 8 (left): “Collecting Scraps”, Chung Cheng High School Graduation Publication, 1955. 
Plate 9 (right):“To Study? To Work?”, Chung Cheng High School Graduation Publication, 1955. 
                                                        
241  From 1953 to 1959, the total enrolment in Chinese schools rose from 79,272 to 140,213, which 
represented a 1.8 times increase over the period. During this same period, the total enrolment in English 
schools rose from 71,297 to 163,486, which was a 2.3 times increase. Over the longer period from 1953 to 
1963, the numbers of Chinese school students doubled, while that of English stream students nearly tripled. 
In 1963, there was a 3:4 ratio for Chinese to English school education. See Appendix F, Table 7. 
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THE COMMUNIST RETREAT AND 




 The Chinese communist’s adoption of the Chinese diaspora also meant that they 
embraced the fundamental weaknesses of this community as well, which included being 
Chinese in a majority Malay world. Their dilemma of citizenship in the new nation states 
in the Nanyang had also created a rift within the Chinese society which further weakened 
the hold and allure of the MCP. Ultimately, when the colonial powers declared the 
granting of independence, the communist parties of the Malay world lost all claims of 
mandate over the Chinese at large. It was during this phase of the insurgency that China 
joined the fray and attempted influencing the overseas Chinese themselves. The end 
result was the retreat of the Marxist communist and the emergence of the Democratic 
Socialists who eventually won the mandate to govern in Malaya. By this time, the issues 
at stake were more local than international, more nationalism than Cold War. When the 
overseas Chinese finally made up their minds on the issue of citizenship, the impetus for 
the communist insurgency was brought to an end.  
 
4.1 Grounds Lost, the Chinese Communists Retreat 
 
It is not surprising that extant studies mostly see the outbreak of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia from the perspective of the onset of armed struggle from 1948. 
Consequently, the retreat of the communists is viewed as the outcome of a military 
defeat. The situation was in fact more dynamic. In Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore, the 
communist insurgency could be clearly described as having existed on multiple levels: 
political, military, socio-economic and grassroots. The insurgency at each level had 
specific objectives and modus operandi. These platforms therefore constituted their 
battle-lines or lines of advancement. They overlapped, crossed national boundaries, and 
reaped different dividends at different points in time. The most apparent “retreat” or 
failure of the communists that could be seen in Malaya was their physical displacement. 
However, because of the existence of the insurgency on various levels, other forms of 
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retreat should also not be overlooked. Ultimately, the inability or failure of the 
communists to achieve their set goals, whether of creating a soviet state or achieving 
independence on their own terms, which then necessitated their shifting allegiance, was a 
case in point of their political and ideological retreat.  
 
The Chinese communist retreat did not begin on all fronts at the same time. The Chinese 
communists in Indonesia never managed to advance in the anti-Chinese climate and 
increasingly were left with even lesser room to maneuver. Even though they seemed to 
have also expanded together with the PKI in the early 1950s, they hardly achieved any of 
their long-term goals either on the military or socio-political front. By the mid-1950s, 
when MCP members sought refuge in deeper jungles, their comrades in Singapore also 
retreated from their international ideological and Sino-centric outlook to engage in the 
local constitutional struggle by supporting Left-leaning political parties. 
 
In Malaya, the Chinese communists lost grounds as a result of successful British counter-
insurgency actions, forcing them to retreat into deeper jungle towards Thailand. Having 
identified the main source of communist strength as coming from the rural Chinese 
population, the British proceeded to deal with the “squatter problem” through 
resettlement of the Chinese.
242
 Security checks were put in place at the “New Villages” to 
prevent communists from entering the villages to obtain supplies, or for sympathizers to 
smuggle supplies out.
243
 Under Sir Gerald Templer’s leadership, cooperative villages that 
were believed to be free from communist influence were declared “White Areas” and 
enjoyed relaxing of restrictions of the Emergency Regulations including greater freedom 
of movement and shorter curfew hours.
244
 Former communist strongholds such as the 
town of Gua Masang and parts of Johore were purged of the communists with the 
cooperation of residents, and by March 1960, more than four-fifths of the Federation was 
declared “white”.245 
 
                                                        
242 The Straits Times, 12 Jun 1950. 
243 Riley Sunderland, “Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya”, Prepared for the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1964), 
p.39. 
244 A “White Area” was defined as “an area in which the Emergency Regulations can be suspended because 
the inhabitants have, by their own efforts, co-operated with Government in the elimination of C.T.”, or “an 
area where there is no justification for the imposition of Emergency Regulations.” See “Paper by the 
Combined Intelligence Staff”, 2 Jun 1955, CO 1030/1. 
245 The Straits Times, 16 Jul 1957, 1 Jan 1959, 27 Feb, 13 Mar, 20 Apr 1960. 
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Success in British counter-insurgency strategies weakened the MCP and pushed them to 
retreat. Food control measures increasingly took its toll on the communists and starvation 
became a main reason for many of them to surrender.
246
 In 1955, the number of 
surrenders from communist insurgents had reached an all-time high of 245, up from 210 
in 1954, while the number of engagements communists had made with Government 
Security Forces was almost halved from the previous year, from 993 to 507 incidents.
247
 
By the mid-1950s, the MCP had removed its troops to the Thai-Malayan border, where 
they found refuge by blending in and recruiting from among the rural Chinese population 




The battle and victory against the communists in Singapore was a very different affair 
from the rest of the Malay world. Singapore city was more developed, there were more 
Chinese on the island, and much more police control in the rural and urban spaces, less 
spaces to hide and above all, the composition of its people in a single urban space was far 
more complex than the regional territories. There was also more Chinese labour serving 
the production centres within the city area where most of them also resided. Being 
located at the maritime crossroads in Southeast Asia also meant that a great many people 
from the region sojourned or transited through Singapore than any sheer city in the 
region. 
 
Hence, it was not surprising that quite a number of the communists arrested in the first 
years of the Emergency were Reds from around the region and were not local-born, or 
who had settled in Singapore. Though there were instances of skirmishes and terrorist 
acts, by and large, the battle for Singapore was another “Police Action” characterized by 
strikes, boycotts, protests and wrangling between political parties in the wake of political 
British withdrawal from Singapore. The Marxist uprising in Singapore therefore took on 
a decidedly nationalistic outlook. When direct links with the MCP were cut off, the local 
agitators simply turned their support to the socialist parties contesting local elections.
249
 
Singapore’s first mass-based elections were held in 1955 and this ushered in a new era of 
politics. This time, the votes of Chinese masses became more significant, as opposed to 
                                                        
246 Memorandum No. 11/54, P.H. Larkin to Operational Research Section (Psychological Warfare), 14 Jul 
1954, WO 291/1783. 
247 The Straits Times, 31 Dec 1955. 
248 The Straits Times, 26 Mar, 5 Jul 1965, 1 May 1987, 15 Nov 1988, 25 Oct 1989. 
249 Due to strict police action, MCP links between Singapore and Johore were cut off  by July 1954. 
Singapore Police Intelligence Journal No. 1/1955, 31 Jan 1955, FCO 141/15952. 
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the 1948 election when Indian voters dominated because of their status as subjects of the 
British Commonwealth.
250
 There was now an opportunity for the socialist students and 
workers to participate in constitutional politics by supporting Left-wing parties such as 
the Labour Front and the PAP. In reality, this support for the socialist parties was a 
paradigm shift as it meant that Marxist agitators had given way to Democratic Socialists 
who continued the fight for independence. Their struggle was now delinked from the 
international contest between political ideologies and “metamorphed” into a nationalist 
struggle by socialists contesting local issues.
251
 Before 1955, the urban agitation 
instigated by the Marxist socialists from the MCP was international and ideological in 
nature. As a case in point, the protests launched by Chinese school students to oppose 
registration for National Service in May 1954 were partly motivated by fears that they 
would be sent to fight in the Cold War against their Chinese brothers.
252
 In contrast, 
subsequent agitations including the 1955 Hock Lee Bus riot and 1956 student 
demonstrations were motivated more by local concerns of livelihood and local 
representation. 
 
While there still remained radical Marxists in Singapore in the late 1950s, they were in 
fact not members of the MCP or linked to international politics.
253
 Instead, they had 
grafted themselves onto local political parties and fought for local issues. For instance, in 
1957, a new Singapore People’s Anti-British League was formed in Bukit Panjang. 
Although it took the name of a previously MCP-led organisation and comprised some 
people who previously had links with the party, they were not in fact MCP-directed by 
                                                        
250 Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, p.266. 
251 See Footnote 139, Chapter 3. 
252 See Colonial Office Summary of "Evidence of Communist Inspiration of, and efforts to exploit the 
resistance of Chinese Middle School Students to National Service", 15 Sep 1954, CO 1030/360. Also see 
Freedom News no. 49, 15 May 1954. 
253 The communists in the MCP were ideological Marxists who engaged in violent revolutionary tactics and 
had links to other communist parties all over the world. When they launched their armed struggle in 1948, 
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald referred to them as “militant communists” 
who were “planning a violent revolution to capture by force the government of the country”. See The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Jul 1948. After the links between the MCP in Malaya and Singapore were cut 
off by July 1954, a group of Marxist socialists in Singapore emerged to take the MCP’s place. See 
Singapore Police Intelligence Journal No. 1/1955, 31 Jan 1955, FCO 141/15952. Some of these Marxist 
socialists joined and supported open Left-wing parties such as the PAP, and later formed the Barisan 
Sosialis in 1961. These socialists were ideological Marxists but did not operate with the militancy that was 
characteristic of the MCP. They ultimately operated within constitutional boundaries. At the same time, 
they were considered “radical” when compared to the dominant Democratic Socialists because they 
supported agitation through strikes and protests against the incumbent. 
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From the mid 1950s, the Indonesian Chinese community itself and not just the Chinese 
communists were in retreat. The dual nationality treaty signed between the PRC and 
Indonesian governments in 1955 had raised hopes of protection for the Chinese under 
either the Indonesian or Chinese governments, but these soon proved to be false hopes. 
Instead of resolving the ambiguity of the loyalties of the Chinese, the treaty created more 
uncertainty as it was ambiguous what a “dual citizen” meant.255 However, before more 
Chinese could take steps to acquire Indonesian citizenship, attempts to nationalise the 
Indonesian economy saw the implementation of laws that limited Chinese economic and 
social life. New business registration regulations in the late 1950s forced many Chinese 
shops out of business, and an Indonesian newspaper estimated that the ban on Chinese 
trade in rural areas would leave 500,000 without jobs.
256
 At around the same time, the 
government also closed Nationalist Chinese (pro-KMT) banks and schools.
257
 Although 
the first of these measures were said to be targeted at the Nationalist Chinese, whose 
government the Republic did not recognise, anti-Chinese feeling from the indigenous 
Indonesians soon spread to affect the entire Chinese diaspora community at large 
regardless of their political affiliations or citizenship status.
258
 Given their precarious 
situation, the Chinese had no hope of creating a home in Indonesia. This inevitably also 
prevented the Chinese communist movement from even taking off in Indonesia. 
 
Given the small size of Chinese population in Indonesia in proportion to the entire 
population,
259
 it was almost impossible for the Chinese there to make any political 
advances. Although the Indonesian Chinese organization Baperki took part in the 1955 
and 1957 national parliamentary elections and obtained a high proportion of votes in 
                                                        
254 Supplement No. 1 for 1958, Issued with Police Intelligence Journal No. 1/1958, 31 Jan 1958, FCO 
141/14768. 
255 The Straits Times, 6 May 1955, 4 Jun 1956. 
256 The Straits Times, 2 Oct 1959. 
257 The Straits Times, 25 Dec 1958. 
258 The Straits Times, 17 Dec 1957, 29 Oct 1958, 4 Nov 1958, 2 Jul 1959; Singapore Free Press, 2, 5 Apr, 
12 Dec 1958. 
259 In 1959, there were an estimated 2.25 million Chinese (2.7%) in Indonesia out of a total of more than 84 
million people. Ethnic Chinese made up 2.1% of the total population in Java, 5.2% in Sumatra, 1.1% in 
East Indonesia, and 9.1% in Indonesia Borneo. G. William Skinner, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia”, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 321 (1959): p.137. 
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areas with many Chinese,
260
 their success was considered limited as they were seen as a 
Chinese party and did not appeal to the majority of the non-Chinese. Rather than compete 
for power and influence in politics, their main task from 1957 onwards became one of 
defending the Chinese community from coming under discriminatory laws and providing 
for their education.
261
 The last hope of the Chinese socialists in the Baperki was to 
preserve their interests by forming an alliance with the PKI, the only indigenous political 
party that would defend the Chinese.
262
 However, just as in the case of Singapore, in 
doing so, the Chinese communists had retreated from their original objectives of socialist 
struggle and became drawn into broader national politics. 
 
Yet, Indonesia in the 1950s was an enigmatic period for the Chinese in the Nanyang. It 
was both “heaven and hell” for many of the region’s Chinese communists. Ironically, as 
the Indonesian government’s action in the 1950s was generally against the Chinese 
community and not specifically the communists, it became possible for Chinese 
communists fleeing from Malaya and Singapore to escape to Indonesia for refuge. From 
1953 to 1955, using a trade network on a Dutch shipping line, communist cadres from 
Singapore escaped to various parts in Indonesia and blended in with the Chinese there, 
taking up jobs such as teaching and other trades.
263
 There was even a cell made up of 
three cadres that traversed between the Riau Islands and Singapore to conduct operations 
in the latter.
264
 In 1963, to avoid arrest at the time of Operation Cold Store, nearly 60 
persons fled to Indonesia.
265
 They were subsequently dispatched to various parts of 





                                                        
260 Heidhues, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia, pp.12, 18. 
261 Ibid., pp.16, 19. 
262 Ibid., p.52. 
263  Eu Chooi Yip, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 001359, Reel 14; Ershiyi Shiji, Shenmai xinzhong de mimi: Xinjiapo yu binlangyu de gushi 
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264  Eu Chooi Yip, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 001359, Reel 14. 
265 Operation Cold Store was a security operation by the Singapore Special Branch that aimed at crippling 
“communist open front organisations” and prevent them from establishing a “Communist Cuba” in 
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members of the Barisan Sosialis, Nanyang University, trade unions and cultural organisations, were 
arrested on 2 February 1963. See The Straits Times, 3, 4, 5, 6 Feb 1963. 
266 Hara Fujio, “The Malayan Communist Party and the Indonesian Communist Party: Features of Co-
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4.2 Ascendancy of the Democratic Socialists & Contesting Leadership 
 
In Singapore, the Marxist retreat was quickly followed by the ascendency of the 
Democratic Socialists in the Labour Front and PAP.
267
 Rather than continue to support 
the MCP’s campaign of armed violence which was unsuccessful in achieving their goals 
of independence, many of the local Chinese supported these new multi-racial Left-wing 
parties led by the Democratic Socialists. In terms of political orientation, the Democratic 
Socialists supported the rights of the Chinese masses including their concerns about 
education and labour. The Democratic Socialists were also multi-cultural in outlook. 
They believed in achieving their goals through democratic means rather than violence, 
although extreme measures were sometimes tolerated.
268
 The Chinese support for the 
Democratic Socialist parties at the polls in 1955 and 1959 marked the great retreat of the 
communist movement on the island. By this time the raison d’être for the socialist 
agitation was not international Cold War politics but local politics. By the late 1950s, the 
Chinese communists were not only pushed back on the military front in Malaya, but also 
on the socio-political frontline in Singapore. 
 
The Democratic Socialist parties rose on the support obtained from Chinese students and 
workers. During the 1955 elections, both the Labour Front and the PAP campaigned for 
full self-government, merger with Malaya and multi-linguism. In addition, the Labour 
Front advocated the granting of citizenship and political rights for the China-born 
Chinese, while the PAP fought against National Service, and for the lifting of the 
Emergency Regulations.
269
 These platforms appealed to the majority of the Chinese-
educated working class, and the students also became involved in campaigning for these 
parties. The result was a victory for the Labour Front which became the dominant party 




Between 1955 and 1959, various groups of socialists vied for leadership over the Chinese 
masses, especially the workers and students. By then, socio-economic conditions had 
                                                        
267  Many political parties in Singapore in the 1950s emerged, claiming to be “democratic socialist”, 
including the Labour Front, and the PAP. See The Straits Times, 22 Aug, 24 Dec 1954, 30 Jan 1955, 4 July 
1957, 24 Jan, 10 Mar, 2 Aug 1958. In other words, they pledged to represent the workers and aimed for 
greater social equity, but to do so through democratic means. 
268 See Chapter 3, footnote 190 for the difference between Marxism Socialism and Democratic Socialism. 
269 Yeo, Political Development, pp.114-115; The Straits Times, 14 Feb 1955. 
270 The Straits Times, 3 Apr 1955. 
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achieved some degree of stability.
271
 However, while real wages had generally risen, life 
was not necessarily better as there were still more mouths to feed per family than the 
small number of wage earners could provide.
272
 Furthermore, while there were a 
significant number of blue-collar workers, they were not in the majority, which may 
reflect that opportunities for employment in industries were lacking.
273
 While living 
conditions may have improved as compared to the immediate post-war years, there still 
existed dissatisfaction among the workers for politicians to exploit. The rivalry over 
leadership of the workers through the trade unions was reflected in the frequent strikes 
and protests in the mid to late 1950s in Singapore. Out of 275 strikes in 1955, 135 were 
sympathy strikes while 90 were over wages, suggesting that to a large extent, the workers 




In the lead-up to self-government for Singapore, it was often difficult to distinguish 
between the Marxist socialists and Democratic socialists given their similar goals of anti-
colonialism, their methods of exploiting the grievances of the Chinese masses, and their 
similar tolerance of varying levels of student and industrial action. While the latter 
preferred democratic processes, the need to gain the support of the masses sometimes 
meant supporting agitation and more extreme methods. For example, even after forming 
the newly elected government in 1955, Chief Minister David Marshall continued to 
express his solidarity with the workers by supporting their strikes, saying that they 
“brought the people to the realization of the hundreds of thousands of exploited workers 
in Singapore”.275 Perhaps, unbeknown to the British, in phrasing their withdrawal through 
granting limited self-government first, they had in fact, allowed to come into power a 
political force which had majority support when they were still the de facto authority on 
the island. In short, they allowed for the creation of an opposition party, in opposition to 
the colonial master, while they tried to control the pace towards Democratization. What is 
pertinent here is that, perhaps, allowing the ascendency of a less radical political Left had 
robbed the attraction of the extreme Left from the Chinese masses. Hence, in reality, real 
                                                        
271 The price of foodstuff generally fell by 40 to over 50% from 1954 to 1960, while public housing rentals 
for families also decreased. Monthly school fees for government schools remained constant, which meant 
that the cost of living had generally not risen in the later half of the 1950s. See Appendix D, Tables 1-4. 
272 From 1952 to 1957, there were about 30% of economically active people to the total population in 
Singapore. See Appendix G, Table 9. 
273 Before 1959, government Employment Exchange registration figures also did not increase significantly 
for Chinese, possibly reflecting a lack of confidence with the government. See Appendix G, Tables 9-10. 
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power did not rest with Marshall but the British, and he thus continued to support the 
people’s anti-colonial struggle. In the same way, PAP cadres such as Devan Nair and Lim 
Chin Siong frequently instigated strikes among workers and students, giving rise to the 





Interestingly, even up to recent days, the issue of the communist influence in the early 
days of the PAP is still being debated. Just recently, a battle of words between academics 
arose over the pages of social media. The main issue contested in the true intent of Lim 
Chin Siong’s speech on 25 October 1956. While one camp is more concerned about 
whether Lim’s words incited Chinese school students to clash with the police,277 the other 
is more fixated on the fact that Lim did not literally call for the “beating of the police” but 
instead told the crowd that to “shout ‘pah mata’ (beat the police)… is wrong”.278 It is 
perhaps timing that the historiography of this period should return to empiricism, and all 
impassionate should be made subservient to historical methodology. The crux of the Lim 
Chin Siong affair should be what part it played in eventual history, rather than if he had 
been a misunderstood figure.
279
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278  See Thum Ping Tjin, “Lim Chin Siong was wrongfully detained”, 8 May 2014, 
http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2014/05/lim-chin-siong-was-wrongfully-detained/; Hong Lysa, “What is 
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279 The more pertinent question, rather, should be the demeanor of the students whom Lim was addressing. 
Were they already “left leaning”? It is with this in mind that any politician would calibrate his speech, 
content (form) and tone (communication) to achieve an intended effect. In considering the context of time 
and place, one has to note that Chinese Middle school students in Singapore had been politically active 
throughout the mid-1950s. Besides holding demonstrations against the National Service call-up in May 
1954 and participating in the May 1955 Hock Lee Bus strikes, Chinese youths had also been involved in an 
incident of stone-throwing at the police after a Merdeka rally at the Kallang Stadium in March 1956. Prior 
to the outbreak of violence at this event, Lim Chin Siong had made a speech advising the crowd to “behave 
properly” and not to “beat the police” when they left the place. Lee Kuan Yew reportedly tried to stop him 
but to no avail. Chinese Schools students in 1956 were highly politicized and supported communism. For 
example, delegates from Malaya who attended the Afro-Asian Students’ Conference held in Bandung in 
May 1956 returned with communist documents. Given that the Chinese school students were already Left-
leaning, all it took was a simple spark that could galvanize them into violent action against the authorities. 
Before Lim gave his speech at Beauty World, the Chinese High School students had already been 
demonstrating against the Labour Front government and the British for closing down the Chinese Middle 
Schools’ Students’ Union. By giving a speech to incensed Chinese students near their school, Lim and the 
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When the “fog of the battle” settled, it was the Democratic Socialists who eventually took 
control of the populist movement by maintaining leadership in their political parties. The 
Labour Front maintained from the onset that it was “anti-communist”,280 and was helmed 
by politicians who were democratic socialists or on the political right, as evinced by 
Marshall’s successor, Lim Yew Hock’s willingness to take strong police action against 
the agitating students and workers in Singapore.
281
 In contrast, the PAP maintained that it 
stood for a “non-communist, democratic socialist Malaya”, and its refusal to take an anti-
communist line allowed more radical socialists to exist with it. It was fortuitous that the 
Democratic Socialists were able to maintain control over their own party while they 
muddled through their marriage of convenience with the extreme Leftist faction within. 
As a case in point, the moderate socialists led by Lee Kuan Yew, who dissociated himself 
from their radical approaches, prevented radical socialists including Lim Chin Siong and 
Devan Nair from standing for elections to the executive committee in June 1955.
282
 In 
1958, it was again observed that the Democratic Socialists in the PAP were taking action 
to ensure that they retained control over the party by placing paid working (organizing) 
secretaries in the party’s branches and trade unions to counter-balance the influence of 
the radical Leftists.
283
 Such actions of safeguarding their position in the party would 
prepare the way for the eventual split of the PAP in 1961, during which the Democratic 
Socialists openly separated themselves from their more radical former colleagues. 
 
In Malaya, the story of the struggle between the Chinese Left and Right in the 1950s 
resulted in the eventual victory of the Right represented by the Malayan Chinese 
Association. As partners with UMNO in local government, the MCA occupied the top 
position of the Chinese socio-political structure. It had branches in all States through 
which they carried out their welfare programmes and campaigned for votes from the 
Chinese. Together with military action that isolated the communists, the presence of this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other PAP leaders played on the volatile situation to encourage anti-colonial expression, a strategic move 
that was frequently played at PAP rallies where many Chinese school students attended and helped to 
organize. For more information on the Merdeka rally in March 1956, see Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, 4 Apr 1956, Col. 1743-1746; The Straits Times, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27 Mar 1956. For more 
information on the Afro-Asian Students’ Conference in Bandung in May 1956, see The Straits Times 9 
May, 20 Jun 1956. 
280 See “Labour Front is Anti-Communist”, The Star 1, 1 (Oct 1955), p.1. 
281 Edwin Lee, Singapore: The Unexpected Nation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), pp.137-138. 
282 Singapore Police Intelligence Journal No. 6/1955, 30 Jun 1955, FCO 141/15952; The Straits Times, 27 
Jun 1955. 
283 Memo, W.A.C. Goode, 27 Feb 1958, FCO 141/15306. 
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non-communist Chinese Right prevented Left-wing elements from gaining a foothold in 
Malaya. 
 
Besides providing political representation for the Chinese, the MCA was also at the 
forefront of steering more Chinese towards localization and away from Marxism. For 
instance, in 1950, the British formed the Home Guard and Chinese Police with the 
help of the MCA.
284
 Despite some initial reluctance from the Chinese to join the 
security forces,
285
 the number of Chinese employed by the government to defend the 
land grew to exceed the number of Chinese communists. The Home Guard, which 
was set up to aid in protecting the New Villages, evolved in the 1950s to become a 
formidable force in the fight against communism in the rural areas of Malaya. In 
early 1951, there were 12,000 Chinese in the Home Guard, a number which grew six-
fold to 73,610 one year later, and 83,000 in 1953.
286
 The British and Chinese political 
Right’s strategy of using other Chinese to fight the Chinese communists split the 
local Chinese community, making it even more difficult for the communists to 
successfully continue their struggle. Involving the Chinese in the defense of the local 
territory helped many of them to develop a sense of belonging and loyalty by giving 
them a stake in the land. In fact, waning support for the communists could be 
discerned as early as in 1955 after the Baling talks, when several people from all 
walks of life and across Malaya expressed their support for the government and 





4.3 Making Education a Frontline 
 
The 1950s was the height of the exploitation of the student body by various political 
forces which competed for leadership over emotionally charged Chinese students. Both 
the government and the communists recognized the importance of Chinese education in 
local and international political struggle, and the potential that it had in enabling them to 
                                                        
284 The Straits Times 19 Apr, 15 Aug, 15 Sep 1950, 5 Oct 1952, 20 Feb 1953. In August 1950, the Selangor 
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steer the population towards their agenda. In February 1956, the Report of the All-Party 
Committee of the Singapore Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education posited: 
 
Once it is realized that Chinese education is not being repressed or 
discouraged, and that far from making attacks on Chinese culture, there 
will be positive steps taken to encourage the fostering of Chinese culture, 
together with other cultures which have richly endowed this land of ours, 
there will be no hesitation in accepting the aid which is being granted… 
Chinese education will have to play its part, as also Chinese culture, with 
which it is inextricably mixed, in the formation of a nation marching 
rapidly towards self-government and independence, … playing a 
significant if not predominant part in shaping a common ideology, and 
embracing political entity and common outlook, which are inseparable 
features for national existence.288 
 
Months later, in June 1956, an MCP directive was passed that also recognized the 
importance of Chinese students: 
 
The work of winning over the school children is very important and must 
not be overlooked. Especially in circumstances where the enemy is 
stronger than we are, the work of winning support from school children 
and organizing them to struggle in more important than military 
activities.289 
 
Clearly, the communist struggle was not simply a military battle, but was intertwined 
with socio-cultural developments affecting Chinese education. Various political forces, 
including the local government and communists, exploited the concerns of these youths 
by promising to protect their language and culture in the oppressive environment. 
 
The wave of student-led socialist activism that had previously emerged in 1954 continued 
to ferment in Chinese schools in Singapore for the next decade. Chinese students 
remained antagonistic towards government attempts to regulate Chinese education and 
protested against the arrests of students and teachers under the Emergency Regulations.
290
 
From amongst the student body emerged radical socialists who had been captivated by 
                                                        
288 Colony of Singapore, Legislative Assembly, All-Party Committee on Chinese Education, “Report of the 
All-Party Committee of the Singapore Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education” (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), p.4. 
289  Cited in Colony of Singapore, Legislative Assembly, All-Party Committee on Singapore Chinese 
Middle Schools Students’ Union, “Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ Union” (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), p.1. 
290 As a case in point, students of the Singapore Chinese High School and the Nanyang Girls’ High School 
declared that they would rescue Chen Yang Cheng, a school teacher who had been detained under the 
Emergency Regulations for his association with sympathy strikes in 1955. They proceeded to approach 
Chief Minister David Marshall for negotiations. See The Straits Times, 4 -5 Aug 1955. 
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Marxism, and likewise sought to spread the ideology with their schoolmates. The 
Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ Union (SCMSSU), which was formed in 
the aftermath of the 1954 student demonstrations against the National Service 
registration, was deeply engaged in communist activities. This inter-school student body 
had been allowed to operate legally by the Singapore government in December 1955 on 
the condition that the students stayed out of politics. However, the union quickly reneged 
on the agreement. Its leaders had been deeply influenced by communist ideology which 
thus shaped the activities of the union. For instance, Soon Loh Boon, the President of the 
SCMSSU, was a beneficiary of the MCP’s Mutual Aid Society in the Chinese High 
School, an organization used to recruit students into the communist movement.
291
 In 
1956, he made frequent verbal attacks on the colonial government and had urged other 
students to unite in the anti-colonial struggle.
292
 His communist links were shown when 
he was found to have been carrying banned Chinese communist papers upon his return 
from the communist-linked Afro-Asian Students’ Conference in Bandung in May 
1956.
293
 Some of the Chinese socialist students also used open political parties as a cover 
for their Leftist activities. For example, student leader Tan Kien Lip, an Anti-British 
League sympathizer and student of the Chinese High School, organized an indoctrination 
picnic in conjunction with the Crawford-Kampong Glam Branch of the PAP in March 
1958.
294
 There were even cases of students who used the party’s name to threaten the 
school authorities to give in to their demands. In one case, a letter presumably to have 
come from the PAP was used to pressure school authorities to allow a student to continue 




Given the explosive climate of student activism, it was easy for politicians to exploit the 
feelings of the students to advance in their agenda. Lim Chin Siong’s “fiery” speech in 
Hokkien in October 1956, for example, sparked clashes between Chinese students and the 
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 At the same time, Chinese businessman Tan Lark Sye, who had by then shifted 
to the political Left, also attempted to attain leadership over the students by encouraging 
them to support China’s socialism. In March 1956, while speaking to students of the 
Chinese High School, he dismissed allegations of communist activities as “nonsense”, 
and told them that China would soon “be the leading nation in the world”.297 Nanyang 
University also became a battleground where leadership was contested. By spearheading 
the creation of Nantah, he was already considered a grand communal leader amongst the 
local and regional Chinese. Tan also welded executive power of the university, and his 





In response to the student tensions which had erupted in the mid-1950s, the local 
government then led by David Marshall took steps to break the monopoly of Chinese 
community’s leadership over Chinese-medium education which had allowed for the 
spread of communism. From 1956, the Singapore local government set up a number of 
Government Chinese middle schools which were directly controlled by the Ministry of 
Education.
299
 This development had stemmed from one of the recommendations of the 
All-Party Committee of the Singapore Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education.
300
 By 
the end of October 1956, there were four government Chinese Middle schools and one 
primary school set up, taking in an enrolment of 926 and 492 respectively, accounting for 
1.3% of the total enrolment in Chinese-medium schools.
301
 By 1958, there were a total of 
twelve government Chinese schools with a total enrolment of 4831, which made up 3.7% 
of the total student population in Chinese schools.
302
 Although only a minority of Chinese 
school students enrolled in the government schools, these were nevertheless first attempts 
to regulate Chinese education, especially among Middle School students who had the 
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potential and idealism to be exploited by communists. Together with nationalization of 
the Singapore school system and curriculum control,
303
 government initiatives to get the 
Chinese community to support nation-building and the government’s brand of democratic 




Another anti-communist force that existed in Chinese schools was a group of students 
who were formerly KMT supporters. In 1958, this group of eight Chinese students, who 
founded the “Malayan Singaporean Anti-Communism Reform Party”, were found to 
have produced banners, posters and bilingual leaflets denouncing the Leftist PAP and its 
leaders. These students had been guided by pro-KMT teachers, among whom were Wong 
Hou Ren and Shen Shai Wei, the Principal and a former teacher respectively of the Hua 




In Malaya, it was suspected that Chinese students were inspired by the example of their 
counterparts in Singapore. In 1956, students of Singapore Middle Schools who had 
returned to their homes in the Federation for the year-end holidays were reported to have 
taught “Self-Study and strike techniques to pupils of local schools” in Negri Sembilan.306 
In response to what seemed to be increased radicalization of Chinese student agitation, 
the Federal government took severe action and expelled students involved in the 
protests.
307
 In response, the Malayan authorities started working together with Chinese 
educationists to produce Malayan Chinese textbooks.
308
 In some cases, this meant 
adopting anti-communist and pro-KMT materials.
309
 Grants to Chinese schools in the 
New Villages also allowed government leverage over Chinese schools there,
310
 and civic 
education was also introduced to orientate students to viewing Malaya as their 
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 In Indonesia, the story was one of suppression. The government had closed 
more than two-thirds of existing Chinese schools by 1959 which forced Chinese with 
Indonesian citizenship to attend national schools.
312
 The lack of educational opportunities 
for the Chinese there resulted in some students going over to Singapore to study, where 
the Chinese High School and Nanyang University became their educational safe-havens. 
Amongst the 330 that formed first batch of students in Nanyang University, 32 were from 





4.4 Abandonment and Interference by China –  
      Local Politics Coming into Focus 
 
The final blow to the Chinese communists in the 1950s came with China’s abandonment 
of the diaspora. After being pushed back in Southeast Asia, the Chinese diaspora were 
forced to live under the rules of the respective territories they were in, where they would 
not be permitted to support a foreign ideology. China’s abandonment set the foundations 
for ending the diaspora identity and consequently, any support for Chinese communism. 
Subsequently, any action that China took with regards to the overseas Chinese became 
interference with local politics, the clearest of which was seen in Indonesia. 
 
Peking’s declarations in the 1950s stating that it was severing ties with the overseas 
Chinese and promising the Nanyang governments that she “was willing to urge the 
Overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the local government and local social customs” 
indicated Peking’s retreat from claiming responsibility over the overseas Chinese whom 
she had previously claimed as her subjects.
314
 Yet China continued to toggle between 
disclaiming the diaspora at times and offering protection and leadership. In 1956, after 
telling the overseas Chinese to be good citizens of their domiciled lands, the Communist 
government appealed to them to contribute money towards the nation’s rebuilding 
project.
315
 Her insincere attempt at providing leadership for the Chinese in Indonesia was 
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also demonstrated in the short-lived attempt to repatriate Chinese nationals back to the 




China’s false promises were also demonstrated in the treatment of the overseas Chinese 
who returned home. Many were asked to extort money from their families, and forced to 
become labourers under China’s industrialization programme.  Already in the early 
1950s, news that conditions in China were less than ideal had spread through personal 
correspondences.
317
 By 1957, there were reports of disillusionment and hardships in 
China’s commune system circulating locally, resulting in a subsequent decline in the 
number of students returning to China.
318
 Increasingly, it became clear that there was no 
hope in returning to Mao’s China. The Chinese communists who had been forced to 
retreat on the military, political and ideological fronts now also faced abandonment. 
 
China’s abandonment of the diaspora heralded a new phase of China’s interference of 
Nanyang politics. In Indonesia, despite having disclaimed leadership over the Chinese 
there, China continued to protest against the laws that Indonesia implemented to curtail 
Chinese rights. Communist Chinese consuls even went to the extent of instructing the 
Chinese to resist the orders of Indonesian officials, an action that was resented by the 
Indonesian government and led to a temporary diplomatic fall-out.
319
 Rather than aiding 
the Chinese there, these attempts worsened the situationof the Indonesian Chinese by 
highlighting their position as aliens. 
 
In the case of Singapore and Malaya, China’s interference was largely rhetorical and 
flowed through propaganda of various mediums, including newspapers and Peking 
Radio.
320
 History textbooks from mainland China that had found its way into Singapore 
portrayed the MCP as a heroic nationalist organisation fighting for an independent 
Malaya.
321
In the face of this propagandistic onslaught, the Singapore and Malayan 
government concentrated on stepping up the localization of the Chinese was advocated as 
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an attempt to counter China’s influence on the overseas Chinese. In a paper presented to 
the Singapore Legislative Assembly in March 1959 on the subject of communist 
literature, the following statement was made: 
 
The grant of citizenship to the Chinese of Singapore affords them the 
opportunity to devote the old Chinese virtues of loyalty and 
reasonableness to the service of Singapore and Malaya. It is the duty of the 
Government to oppose those who wish to inculcate the spirit of dual 
nationality among Singapore’s new citizens and who endeavour to teach 
doctrines which would undermine the democratic system which has given 
them their rights. It is to be hoped that the writers of Singapore and 
Malaya will be encouraged to increase the output of Malayan literature 
and will demonstrate their ability to provide for the Chinese youth of 
Singapore the means by which they can absorb knowledge and culture 




In other words, it was believed that once the Chinese ceased to see themselves as 
belonging to two lands by adopting citizenship and developing a local Chinese cultural 
identity, the battle against communism would be won. 
 
 
4.5 Decision on Citizenship and Confronting the Dilemma 
 
In Indonesia, the signing of the Dual Nationality Treaty in 1955 between the Indonesian 
and Chinese governments forced the Chinese to come to a decision. However, this proved 
to be anti-climatic, as the officialisation of this policy into law and implementation 
stretched over the next decade.
323
 Because the Chinese in Indonesia were required to opt 
for Indonesian or Chinese citizenship, the result was that many who did not take any 
action were left in “legal limbo”.324 The ambiguity was reflected in the mixed responses 
from the Chinese in Indonesia. On one hand, some appeared to see no contradiction in 
expressing their support for both Indonesia and China. As a case in point, a Chinese 
textbook for primary school students that was published in Indonesia in 1957 included a 
page with both national flags of Communist China and Indonesia, and declared that the 
two countries were “close as brothers”.325 At the same time, there were other Chinese 
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who responded to changing circumstances by advocating integration into the new nation-
state by learning more about Indonesian culture and society. A congratulatory message in 
the tenth anniversary publication of High School Student, a publication for Chinese High 
School students in Indonesia, in 1957, suggested that overseas Chinese students learnt 
more of the Indonesian language, local history and geography. The writer urged more 
Chinese students to stay in Indonesia to contribute to the “local overseas Chinese youth 
movement”, the “friendship between China and Indonesia”, and to “fight for and protect 
Asian and world peace”, rather than to return to China.326 Even after China and Indonesia 
had signed the Dual Nationality treaty in 1955, there was still no consensus among the 
Chinese in Indonesia as to where they belonged, and there was still a long way to go 
before any resolution of the dilemma could be reached. 
  
 
Plate 11: Overseas Chinese Textbook from Indonesia, 1957 (SF 010/13/15) 
 
In Malaya, there was no citizenship treaty signed with China. Chinese who could not let 
go of their affiliation to China had to leave for China. Interestingly, there was a spike of 
departures from Malaya to China in 1957, the year Malaya became independent, a 47% 
increase from the previous year. In other words, the Chinese who chose not to make 
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Malaya their home country made their way back to China, while those who remained 
became citizens, as demonstrated in the declining numbers of departures in the years 
following 1957.
327
 In the Federation, which was organized along communal lines, the 
MCA became the undisputed political leader of the Chinese. The majority of the Chinese 
who remained in Malaya simply followed the MCA and become part of the alliance, thus 
choosing to become citizens of the newly independent Malaya. 
 
In Singapore, citizenship was not a choice, but was automatically given to those who had 
fulfilled a residency requirement. The decision for those who remained in Singapore was 
over whether to join politics, or to stay out of it. For instance, many Chinese workers who 
by 1959 had lived long enough in the colony to qualify for citizenship backed non-
Marxist political parties such as the PAP instead of opting out of politics like in the early 
years. In activating their rights as citizens, they thus started to distance themselves from 
China’s politics, and became more involved in local developments. 
 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia were by and large historically diaspora, which meant that 
while they settled and built homes in the region, they still retained a sense of belonging 
and interest in China. However, the rejection and poor treatment dished out by China led 
to a reassessment of their identity and loyalty. At the same time, local developments 
pushed and prodded the Chinese towards greater participation in national politics. The 
leadership and participation of domiciled Chinese in local developments ended their 
dilemma of citizenship. Once the Chinese ceased to be diaspora by taking up citizenship 
and “growing roots”, the Chinese communists could no longer tap on this catchment for 
support.  
                                                        
327 In 1957, a total of 29,003 people left Malaya to go to China and Hong Kong by sea. This number fell to 




RESOLVING THE DILEMMA  
OF THE DIASPORA – CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
Before August 31, if you kill a policeman or a homeguard, you can say 
you have killed a running dog of the British colonists as the Communist 
described them. But after August 31 if you kill one of the homeguards you 
are killing the guardians of the freedom of Malaya. 
 
Lee Kuan Yew328 
 
I joined Barisan because I was against merger with Malaysia. 
With Singapore’s independence, there is nothing for me to fight for. 
 
Lim Boon Huan329 
 
5.1 Birth Pangs – the Rise of Nation States  
      and the End of the Communist Movement 
 
The rise of independent nation-states ended the diaspora identity of the ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia. Since links with China, their cultural capital, were broken, they were 
forced to change their mindset to become citizens of newly created legal entities of 
Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia. In Malaya and Singapore, the Chinese were given 
newly acquired rights of citizenship and the opportunity to participate in political, 
economic and social life of the new nation, while in Indonesia they accepted their status 
as Indonesian citizens of alien descent and lived within the legal and social boundaries 
marked out for them as guests in Indonesia. The Chinese diaspora identity ended when 
nation-states were born. Once the Chinese in the Nanyang were no more diaspora, the 
Chinese communists could no longer exploit them for support. 
 
The response to the Chinese communist movement took different pathways in Indonesia, 
Malaya and Singapore. Indonesia had already achieved sovereignty in 1949 without the 
help of the Chinese, a small minority vis-à-vis the indigenous population. There was thus 
no need for the state to woo them politically. Instead, the Chinese were treated as 
                                                        
328 The Straits Times, 22 Aug 1957. 
329 Lim was one of the 13 Barisan Sosialis MPs, and the first to resign from the party and Parliament in 
December 1965 because he disagreed with party chairman Lee Siew Choh’s decision to opt for ‘extra-
parliamentary struggle’. See The Straits Times, 1 Apr 2011. 
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foreigners in the nationalization process and discriminated against. In such a climate, the 
Chinese communists could not sustain any political movement or win mass support. In 
contrast, their counterparts in the PKI were relatively more successful in reaching the 
masses in the 1950s and 60s given that they were seen as an indigenous nationalist party 




In Malaya and Singapore, the large proportion of Chinese had made it necessary for the 
British and local nationalist leaders to incorporate them into the planning for the future of 
the nation. Once independence was achieved for Malaya in 1957 and internal self-
government for Singapore in 1959, the communists could no longer claim to represent the 
people’s demands for indepedence and decolonisation. Despite their promise at the 
Baling talks in 1955 to lay down their arms as soon as the Tunku’s government obtained 
control over internal security and defence,
331
it never materialized which, to many, 
indicated that they were in reality not a nationalist group fighting for freedom and self-
determination as they claimed, but were “terrorists” out to disrupt the peace of Malaya.332 
The perception that the MCP was opposed to the welfare of the nation was further 
reinforced from 1963-1965 when the MCP opposed the formation of Malaysia, deeming 
it as a neo-colonial plot by the British to retain control. This coincided with Indonesian 
President Sukarno’s policy of Confrontation with Malaysia. With the help of the PKI, the 
MCP’s Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL) set up a representative office in 
Jakarta in 1965,
333
 which declared the need to “crush” Malaysia.334 Although this issue 
gave them a justification to continue their struggle, it inadvertently linked them with 
Indonesian nationalism.
335
 This gave the Chinese even less reason to support them, given 
that they had shifted from agitating for the welfare of the Chinese to becoming part of 
regional politics, and in this case, Malay world nationalism. 
 
                                                        
330 This view was reflected by Tengku Abdul Rahman at the Baling talks of 1955.  See “Verbatim Record 
of the Baling Talks”, 28-30 Dec 1955, CO 1030/31. 
331 At the Baling talks in December 1955, the MCP signed an agreement which read: “That as soon as the 
elected Government of the Federation obtains complete control of internal security and local armed forces, 
we will end hostilities, lay down our arms and disband our army. It does not amount to accepting the 
present Amnesty terms.” See “Verbatim Record of the Baling Talks”, 28-30 Dec 1955, CO 1033/31. 
332 The Straits Times, 30 Dec 1955. 
333  Eu Chooi Yip, Recorded Interview (Singapore: Collection of Oral History Recording Database), 
Accession No: 001359, Reel 15. 
334 See “Manifesto of the Malayan National Liberation League”: Struggle to Crush “Malaysia” and for the 
Genuine Independence of Malaya”, Peking Review 27 (1965): 18-20. 
335 The Straits Times, 27 Jan 1962. 
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In Indonesia, the Chinese communist movement was never able to take off, given the 
general anti-Chinese sentiment there. The Chinese communists together with their 
Indonesian counterparts were ultimately oppressed and in some cases brutally wiped out 
by 1966. The Indonesian Chinese were continually made to feel unwelcome due to their 
relatively higher economic standing. An Indonesian minister noted in 1955 that while the 
Indonesian revolution was “for the intellectuals against Dutch political colonialism”, for 
“the masses it was against Chinese economic colonialism, and to that extent the 
revolution has failed, for the Chinese still hold too many of the purse strings.”336 This 
resentment against Chinese wealth was later repeated in Indonesian nationalist 
newspapers which accused the Chinese of “sitting high and mighty on Indonesia’s 
economic throne”, and claimed that they were only interested in accumulating wealth and 
would harm the Indonesian economy.
337
 The anti-Chinese resentment found some 
expression in actions taken to limit the scope of Chinese economic and social activity in 
the late 1950s under the State’s nationalization policy. For instance, Chinese were chase 
out of rural areas regardless of whether they were born in China or Indonesia, and 





The plight of the Chinese in Indonesia was made worse by the PRC’s mixed signals to 
the diaspora and interference in the local politics. While the Chinese government claimed 
leadership over the overseas Chinese by frequently encouraging them to “return to the 
warm embrace of the Motherland”, it also made life difficult for the local Chinese when it 
denounced Indonesia’s anti-Chinese policies.339 In any case, of the 100,000 Indonesian 
Chinese who went to China after 1959, almost none of them found a better life. Instead, 
in 1962, the Chinese communist government denounced those who returned to China, 
accusing them of being “irresponsible, lazy and unable to perform farm work”.340 Such 
was the politics of use. Even your “own people” would use you when it was expedient. 
After China signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Indonesian 
government in 1961, they became more reluctant to come to the aid of the overseas 
Chinese when the latter faced trouble. As such, China raised no protest in response to 
                                                        
336 The Straits Times, 13 Apr 1955. 
337 Cited in Singapore Free Press, 7 May 1959; The Straits Times, 14 May 1959. 
338 The Straits Times, 11 Aug, 27 Oct 13, 25 Dec 1959. 
339 The Straits Times, 2 Jan, 23 Dec 1959. 
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anti-Chinese rioting in Bandung in May 1963, and instead blamed the incident on 
“counter-revolutionary groups” trying to undermine “Sino-Indonesian friendly 
relations.”341 In this instance of anti-Chinese violence, the local Indonesian Chinese were 




There was no hope for the Chinese communist movement to succeed in the anti-Chinese 
climate in Indonesia. Even when there were some Chinese communist guerillas from 
Indonesia who were trained to participate in the confrontation against Malaya from 1963-
1965, they were dismissed by the authorities, who believed that “Indonesians were loyal 
to one nation, but Chinese had two loyalties and held themselves apart.”343 In other 
words, their ethnicity excluded them from local political developments. By 1966, it 
became a tragedy to be Chinese or communist in Indonesia, and even worse if one was 
both. In October 1965, a failed pre-emptive strike by the PKI provided the US-backed 
military with an opportunity to usurp power in the country and suppress the communists 
in the process of doing so.
344
These events led to the downfall of Baperki because of its 
close links with PKI, and pent-up resentment towards their high socio-economic status 




The Chinese tragedy in Indonesia also dealt a death-blow to the regional communist 
movement. After the clamp-down on communism, communists from Malaya and 
Singapore who had been hiding in Indonesia lost their safe-haven. A few MCP members 
who had operated openly with the help of the PKI were deported after being arrested, 
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5.2 The Democratic Socialists in Malaya and Singapore 
 
In Singapore, the Chinese communists were unable to depend on the support of the 
majority of the Chinese population after the rise of the nation-state. The people had 
achieved their goals of self-determination and representation under the leadership of the 
Democratic Socialists, and were engaged in the process of building a new home for 
themselves. Consequently, the Chinese communists lost the mandate to claim leadership 
over them in their struggle for independence. Since the diaspora identity had ended and 
the Chinese people became citizens, the communists could no longer exploit their sense 
of being alienated as diaspora. 
 
As the Democratic Socialists in the PAP shifted to the right, repressive actions were 
taken to prevent the communists from having any opportunity to spread their influence 
among the Chinese and exploit the socio-economic hardships of the people. During the 
days of decolonization, they had tolerated radical methods of agitation among students 
and workers. However, after the PAP became the incumbent power, such methods were 
abandoned, and more moderate approaches towards achieving national goals were 
preferred. Although the PAP had risen on the support of Chinese students and workers, 
the latter’s potential to create internal unrest had to be carefully dealt with and prevented 
from going out of control. The Democratic Socialists thus took steps to consolidate their 
control over these groups. Under the pretext that having too many labour unions would 
be negative for the industry, 41 trade unions were dissolved between June to December 
1959, and another 48 unions in 1960.
347
 Simultaneously, the PAP government attempted 
to unify the trade movement by bringing it under an umbrella organization of the 
Singapore Trades Union Congress (which became the National Trades Union Congress 
after 1961).
348
 Finally, it also established itself as a friend of the workers by endorsing 
certain unions. As a case in point Minister for Labour and Law K.M. Byrne lent his 
                                                        
347 The full list of trade unions that were dissolved from 1948 to 1963 can be found in Appendix H. Besides 
trade unions, many societies and schools were also dissolved in 1959. The government crackdown on 
schools, trade unions and societies was the greatest from 1959 to 1960 in the whole decade. See Appendix 
H, Table 13. For more information on the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance passed in 1959 which 
empowered the Registrar of Trade Unions to cancel the registration of trade unions, see Ong Yen Her, 
“Labour Movement in Singapore: Its Development and Modernization”, Nanyang University Graduation 
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support to the celebration of the anniversaries of five labour unions in 1960, and 
encouraged them to play their part in the government’s programme of national 
construction.
349
 The various measures of exerting control over the unions drew criticism 
from the party’s opponents, who saw this as an attempt to interfere with the freedom of 




On the education front, the Democratic socialists continued to exercise control over 
Chinese education by continuing their predecessor’s policy of building and running 
government Chinese schools. They also attempted to incorporate the various races into 
the nation-building projects by forming integrated schools where common languages of 
Malay and English would be learnt.
351
 At the same time, plans were made to streamline 
school syllabi so that all students, regardless of the stream they were from, learnt the 
same content and values that would aid in creating a single nation.
352
 These policies 




5.3 Localizing the Agitation - The Barisan Sosialis  
 
By the early 1960s, the Chinese communist struggle in Singapore was essentially over. 
The Chinese community had been transformed from being diaspora to becoming citizens, 
and they became involved with national developments led by the PAP. As a result, the 
Chinese communists could no longer use the people for their agitation. In the aftermath 
of the demise of the Chinese communist movement, the Barisan Sosialis emerged to 
represent the interests of the radical Chinese-educated socialists. However, although it 
occupied the political Left, the Barisan was a purely local political party devoid of 
international politics, which demonstrated that the original communist insurgency was 
now just a whimper.  
 
                                                        
349 “Special Souvenir of 5 unions to celebrate the anniversaries of the unions and the birthday of the pioneer 
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350 For example, see The Straits Times, 18 Jul 1959, 28 Jun 1961. 
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Having been born out of a split within the PAP, the Barisan’s struggle was a local one.353 
The objectives expressed in the party’s constitution were to:  
1) eradicate colonialism and set up a united independent State comprising 
the Federation of Malaya and Singapore 
2) establish a democratic Government of Malaya based on universal adult 
suffrage of all those who are born in or owe their allegiance to Malaya 
3) bring into being an economic system that will ensure a prosperous, 
stable and just society 





These principles set out in the party’s constitution were almost identical to those of the 
PAP. In fact, one of originally stated aims in the constitution to “crush colonialism, 
establish an independent united Malaya, and advance the cause of Socialism” had even 
been even lifted from the PAP’s constitution, and because of this, their original 
application was rejected by the Registrar of Societies.
355
 That this so-called “Leftist” 
party shared a similar Constitution with the PAP indicated that its position on the political 
spectrum had not shifted, but it occupied the Left now that the PAP had shifted to the 
Right. Upon the Barisan’s founding, Dr Lee Siew Choh, its new chairman who had 
formerly been a cadre of the PAP, denounced the PAP leadership for “deviating to the 
Right and forsaking all its friends from the Left.”356 
 
The issues that the Barisan took on in the early 1960s were mainly to oppose the PAP’s 
leadership of Singapore. For instance, in opposing the PAP’s plan for merger with 
Malaya, the Barisan argued that to do so would make Singapore subordinate to the 
Federation rather than put it on equal standing, and that the people in Singapore would 
have to accept a lesser citizenship status and become second-class citizens.
357
 In 1965, it 
supported student protests in Nanyang University against proposed government 
curriculum reforms.
358
 In truth, with its central focus on local issues, the Barisan Sosialis 
                                                        
353 The trigger for the split between two factions within the PAP was the issue of the terms of Singapore’s 
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was at best Marxist Socialist and not the true communists as a number of discourses have 
made them out to be. 
 
At the same time, because a remnant of the radical Marxist socialists existed among some 
Chinese-educated intellectuals and workers, the Barisan’s support base became an almost 
exclusively Chinese one. Eventually, the Barisan’s struggle became a local Chinese 
movement that had no place in the politics of multi-racial and multi-cultural Singapore. 
Its emergence was the last hope of the remaining Chinese socialists, but this hope faded 
away after the majority of the Chinese in Singapore threw their support behind the PAP 
in the polls. 
 
For the Chinese-educated Left in Singapore, Nanyang University was their last bastion. 
In the years following its founding, it continued to be a hotly contested ground between 
the political Left and Right for power and influence over the Chinese-educated although 
the students claimed that they simply regarded their struggle as one of defence of their 
culture. The polemic was clearly evident when the local government attempted to reform 
Nanyang University from the late 1950s, and students of the university led by Left-
leaning student leaders, protested. The crux of the matter was the “Chinese-ness” of 
Nantah. After the PAP formed the local government in 1959, two review committees 
were appointed to look into conditions and standards of the university. In July 1959, a 7-
man ad hoc committee led by Gwee Ah Leng was appointed to review the earlier 
controversial Prescott Report.
359
 The Gwee report urged greater government support for 
Nantah if the university carried out an administrative reform.
360
 While this proposal was 
accepted in principle by the Government, there was no progress for several years, in part 
because of the lack of cooperation between Nantah’s leaders and the government.361 In 
1964, after the resignation of Chuang Chu Lin, the Vice-Chancellor of Nantah, a pro-tem 
Committee was set up to carry out the administrative duties, and in 1965, this committee 
formed another ad hoc committee led by Wang Gungwu to review the university’s 
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 The report proposed that more could be done to “re-orientate the 
University towards serving… society as a whole”, for instance, by allowing students from 




The proposals of this report and reforms from the Chinese Right who had taken over 
Nantah were met with fierce resistance from the Left and from students who viewed the 
proposed reforms as a plot to eradicate Chinese culture and education. After the 
Curriculum Review Committee presented its recommendations, students broke out in 
protest, leading to the expulsion of 85 students from the university in October 1965.
364
 In 
response to this expulsion, other students boycotted classes and carried out protest 
marches, prompting the government to station policemen and reserve unit troops on the 
university grounds.
365
 Of course, not to be left out, the Barisan Sosialis came out in 




The students at Nantah in the 1960s were a part of the baby boomers generation who 
graduated from Chinese Middle Schools in the late 1950s, during a time of political 
tension and when Chinese education was clearly on the decline.
367
 Their protests were 
thus closely linked to the frustration they faced in being a marginalised group, and 
motivated by the belief that it was up to them to defend the old Chinese system lest it 
disappeared. The preoccupation with preserving their socio-cultural way of life can be 
discerned in the petitions and memorandums that they presented to the authorities at that 
time. For instance, on 26 October 1965, ten academic and cultural student societies of the 
university wrote a joint memorandum petitioning against the reforms proposed in the 
Wang Gungwu report, because the spirit of its recommendations “went against the 
university’s purpose”, and accused the PAP government of using this to attempt to 
eradicate Chinese education. 
368
 Shortly after, the Ngee Ann College Students’ Union, 
University Socialist Club and Singapore Polytechnic Political Society presented a 
memorandum to the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, calling the President of 
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the Chamber to support their efforts to “preserve and safe-guard Chinese Language and 
culture… and not to allow Nanyang University [to] be converted into an English 
University.”369 It is significant that the concern with the status and future of Nantah was 
not only limited to Chinese-educated Chinese students, but also extended to English-
educated students in other institutions of higher learning. Given that the Chinese primary 
and middle schools had mostly come under the government’s control by the 1960s, 
Nantah was seen as the last bastion of preserving Chinese culture and education, and 
consequently for any hope of the survival of Chinese socialism, explaining why the 





5.4 North of Border: The Remains of the Malayan Communist Party 
 
By the early 1960s, the MCP’s struggle was over. On the military front, it was estimated 
in 1959 that there were less than a thousand insurgents from the MRLA left, mostly 
hiding in dense jungle along or beyond the Thai border. This was a stark contrast to the 
estimated 10,000 estimated strength of the communist guerillas at the height of the 
Emergency.
 371
 With independence achieved for Malaya in 1957, there was no more 
reason for the communists to continue their guerilla warfare, and neither did they have 
any more strength or popular support. 
 
Before 1960 when the Malayan and Thai governments reached an agreement on joint 
operations against the communists, the Chinese communists in the MCP had leveraged 
on the lack of policing by the Thais and the inability of Commonwealth troops to enter 
Thailand without permission to set up a base camp there.
372
 Subsequently, the few 
hundred of them managed to avoid detection by the Thai military and police forces partly 
because they could blend in with other Chinese who lived in South Thailand.
373
 There, 
the remaining communists of the MCP managed to survive with Chinese help, and 
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continued their methods of extorting money, and disseminating propaganda among the 





5.5 Growing Roots: From Diaspora to Citizens 
 
The position of the overseas Chinese was integral to the survival of the Chinese 
communist movement. As the Chinese transformed from being diaspora to permanent 
settlers, the Chinese communists could no longer draw support from them, thus ending 
their movement in the Malay world. Core to the process of assimilation of the diaspora to 
was the ability to grow roots, or 《落地生根》(luodishenggen).375 Although the Chinese 
had settled in the Malay world for a long time, not all considered their abode as 
homeland. In fact, even after decades of nation-building, some could not or were unable 
to do so 《落地不生根》(luodi bu shenggen), as they still considered themselves linked 
to China.
376
 It was only more in the 1970s when many Chinese-educated Chinese started 
to see themselves as Singaporeans rather than Chinese from China.
377
 Before that, 
especially at the height of the Cultural Revolution which influenced many Chinese 
students and intellectuals abroad, there arose a strong sense of linkage with China which 
they considered homeland.
378
 Evidently, settling and growing roots was a long process. 
Of course, given time, most Chinese in Singapore and Malaya eventually grew roots 
where they set up home in the two countries. With this, there was no chance the 
communist movement could succeed in the Malay lands of Southeast Asia. 
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The historical narrative of the Chinese communist movement in the post-WWII years is 
as much about its rise and fall of the Chinese communist movement as it is about the 
transformation of the Chinese communities in each territory. While the Chinese diaspora 
faced a common dilemma of identity in the post-war years, the resolution of this dilemma 
took on different pathways owing to local political and social developments. This partly 
explains the different position of Chinese vis-à-vis the indigenous population in each 
nation-state until recent times. 
 
Among the three countries, only the Chinese in Indonesia were left in a permanent 
dilemma by being unable, or disallowed, to grow roots. From the onset, the Chinese 
communist movement did not manage to take off because of the weak position of the 
diaspora vis-à-vis the indigenous peoples. The problem continued after Indonesia’s 
independence, as the legal status of the Chinese remained a thorny issue that was never 
quite fully resolved. As a remnant of the Dual Nationality Treaty that had been signed 
between China and Indonesia, the term “Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa” 
(Indonesian Citizen of Chinese Descent) which had been originally used to distinguish 
this group from the China Chinese, still continues to be used to emphasise their position 
as guests vis-à-vis the other indigenous citizens.
379
 The New Order government also set 
up a coordinating agency to regulate the “masalah Cina”, or the “Chinese problem”.380 
Laws were passed to limit Chinese citizenship, economic, social and cultural activities. 
Even Chinese names had to be changed into Indonesian sounding ones. By treating the 
Chinese as a “problem”, the state indicated that they were not welcome. Consequently, 





Despite the inability to assimilate into Indonesian society, the rise of the nation-state 
nevertheless transformed the community by ending their diaspora identity. Under 
oppressive laws, they no longer retained links with China or saw her as their homeland. 
Rather, they became permanent “guests” in Indonesia, a status which was accepted by 
many of them. This was stated with clarity during the crackdown on communism in 1967, 
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when many Chinese in West Kalimantan did not resist their explusion by the Dayaks 
from the interior. Instead, they fled to refugee camps in the towns of West Kalimantan, 
accepting that they were “guests” living in another’s land.382It is this acceptance of their 
alien status that allowed some capitalist Chinese became business partners to the military 
government from the 1960s to the 90s. 
 
In Malaya, the dilemma of the diaspora was solved with Chinese acceptance of a lesser 
form of citizenship in the Malay-dominated Federation. Although many Chinese were not 
in favour of this arrangement which they saw as unequal, they eventually had no choice 
but to accept it because they were not bumiputera.
383
 Nevertheless, under the leadership 
of the MCA and other Chinese parties, the Chinese experienced improvements in their 
lives. Pilot surveys conducted by Ray Nyce in several New Villages in 1962 showed that 
many resettled Chinese were disinclined to leave their new homes where they enjoyed the 




In Singapore ethnicity was played down and multi-racialism emphasised. As a result, a 
new local national identity was created to replace the diaspora identity. Nation-building 
policies introduced from the 1960s onwards including the Home Ownership Scheme, 
National Service, and the implementation of a forced savings plan in the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF), contributed to the rooting of the Chinese community to Singapore. 
Under the national school system where various races were encouraged to interact, inter-
ethnic understanding could occur, with English used as a bridge for communication.
385
 
Eventually, after decades of participation in the building of the nation, many Chinese 





Viewed on a spectrum, the Indonesian Chinese remained the most “excluded” and were 
treated like foreigners or guests in the nation, while the Chinese in Malaysia managed to 
retained their culture and way of life by becoming friends with their non-Chinese 
counterparts. By stressing multi-culturalism in Singapore, the relationship between 
                                                        
382  John Braithwaite, et al., Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian 
Peacebuilding (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2010), pp.294-95. 
383 “Bumiputera”, or “sons of the soil”, is a term used to refer to indigenous people in the Malay world. 
384 Ray Nyce, “Chinese New Villages in Malaya”, p. Lvii. 
385 The Straits Times, 11 May 1971. 
386 Mr Quek, Conversation with Author at China Square, Jan 2014. 
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Chinese and the other ethnic groups in Singapore were more akin to family, even if it 
weakening some of their ethnic connections and cultural practices. They were thus most 
successful in growing roots in the region. Decades of nation-building brought with it 
varying degrees of assimilation of the Chinese, thus ending the diaspora identity. At the 
same time, clearly demarcated borders in the era of the strong nation-state also weakened 
the cross-border Chinese connections that had previously thrived under colonial rule. 
 
As a result of the socio-economic and political changes that ended the diaspora identity 
and weakened their connections, the communists were deprived of any mass support or 
resources that they could use. One could state simply, the birth of nation-states was the 




Plate 12: Proposals from Ten Student Bodies on the Nanyang University Curriculum Review Committee’s 
Report, 26 Oct 1965 (SF 029/14/100) 
 102 
 
Plate 13: Maoist Content in New Youth and Renmin Luntan, 1969  
















The advent of the Cold War had invariably altered the story of the Chinese diaspora in 
the Nanyang and it was this shift in history that ultimately spelt the failure of the 
Chinese-led communist insurgency in the Malay Archipelago. This story began during 
the days of the Japanese Occupation which brought fundamental changes to Southeast 
Asia. Lessons of the war led to a heightened political consciousness amongst most of the 
peoples of the European colonies in this part of the world. Coupled with the 
commencement of decolonization, the domiciled Chinese communities in the Malay 
Archipelago were presented with an even greater dilemma of citizenship when their 
position within the local and regional sociopolitical arena intertwined with the shifts and 
slants of the international Cold War politics. It was in this environment that the forces 
from the political Left, Right, from within and from outside all sought to control and 
direct the hitherto latent potential of this sizeable “morphed” oriental community to 
champion their objectives or ideologies.  
 
This research examines the socio-political variables that shaped the course of history for 
the Chinese diaspora in Malay Archipelago which impacted the Chinese communist 
movement until the 1960s. While there is no shortage of historical and political discourse 
on the communist movement, guerilla warfare, student activism and industrial strikes, 
focusing on the insurgency and the state’s counter-response, there remain fundamental 
questions which most of these tracts simply gloss over through assumptions and 
overgeneralizations. These include premises that the students and workers were simply 
communist or communist influenced, or that the general Chinese population were mostly 
communist sympathizers since they considered China their “motherland”; and 
conversely, that those Chinese who did not support the communists were either 
functionaries of the colonial powers or absolutely ambivalent to ethnic-cultural linkages 
of the Chinese diaspora. These form the foundations of several arguments and 
contentions which include: the British defeated the MCP by winning the hearts and minds 
of the Chinese and equally, by its military and policing strategies in winning the jungle 
war and isolated the MCP; or that in Indonesia, the iron hand of the military government 
eliminated the communists. In Singapore, the skillful maneuvering of the first fully 
elected self-government has been credited with the eventual purging of all communist 
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elements. Those who have attempted to offer alternative accounts, have postulated 
betrayal and atrocities by the newly elected local governments.
387
 They may all be right, 
from their perspectives, in that the communists had failed because of official policies and 
actions or were themselves weak, outnumbered and poorly supported. 
 
Yet, there is still one story that needs to be told in order to add greater depth to these 
theses and perhaps also to offer a fresher and wider perspective that is able to bridge the 
gaps between these discourses. The story of the ordinary Chinese in the Nanyang which 
both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum exploited needs to be considered in 
the historical discourse of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. It did not matter if the 
overseas Chinese were labeled diaspora, Straits-born or simply alien – most of them had 
settled in the region for a very long time, with some communities tracing their origins a 
few centuries back. By the end of the 1940s, the ethnic Chinese in the Nanyang 
numbered in the millions, many of whom had fled the civil war in China just after the end 
of WWII. In the Malay world, the non-Muslims had been more amenable to foreign 
ideas, philosophies and faiths vis-à-vis the larger Muslim population.
388
 The Chinese 
diaspora were therefore the most ideal community to tap on in order to spread 
communism in the Malay world. And this the MCP did, a strategy they depended on for 
success. However, the strength of this strategy provided was also the MCP’s Achilles' 
heel. After all, what success would the Chinese Marxists movement have in a non-
Chinese environment? Because they were themselves Chinese, it was only logical to 
channel their ideology through the Chinese community. However, it was because the 
community was Chinese that their inherent issues in the Malay world also hampered the 
progress of the Marxists/Maoist on this front. 
 
The MCP, or generally, the Marxist socialists, had found in the diaspora Chinese a 
convenient “constituency” with which they could cajole, inspire to their cause and above 
all, to lay claim of leadership. The British similarly employed this modus operandi 
                                                        
387  In recent years, there have been several attempts to provide “alternatives” to Singapore’s official 
historiography. See Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli, The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and its 
Past (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Loh Kah Seng and Liew Kai Khiun, The Makers and Keepers of 
Singapore History (Singapore: Ethos Books and Singapore Heritage Society, 2010). 
388 This can be seen in the case of Catholic Christianity. Most of the Catholic Churches in the Malay 
Archipelago were ethnically Chinese in the immediate postwar years. See Clement Liew, “Rooting A 
Church in an Immigrant Society: The Chinese Catholic Community Of Singapore, 1832 To 1935”, (M.A. 
Thesis, National University of Singapore, 1999). 
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themselves and through their political constructs like the MCA, calling it “winning hearts 
and minds”. From the mid-1950s, China also made its presence felt in this part of the 
world, more so in Indonesia when the issue of the citizenship of the Chinese diaspora 
status came to fore there. Naturally, Mao Tze-tung was mainly eyeing the resources the 
Chinese overseas possessed which he could use to rebuild a China torn by years of civil 
war. Therefore, he did not miss the opportunity for “leadership” in championing the 
welfare of the Chinese “persecuted” in Indonesia.389 In Singapore, in the same fashion, 
Marshall’s Labour Front had claimed to have championed workers’ rights and so did the 
PAP later. It was politics, and about “use”.  
 
The Chinese diaspora in postwar Southeast Asia were pulled in many ways by many who 
promised them a better life and future. Consequently, they were caught in a permanent 
state of “political tug-of-war”, with various parties claiming leadership of their cause. In 
the traditional field of overseas Chinese studies, the leadership has always been seen in 
ethnic and communal forms: clans, guilds, temples and churches, and Chinese business 
tycoons who headed the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In this instance, the actions of 
Tan Lark Sye had demonstrated that in the postwar era, even traditional Chinese 
leadership had to vie for leadership of the masses. Tan Lark Sye’s attempt to form his 
own political party underscores this. What all these “politics of use” demonstrated was 
not simply that the Chinese diaspora in the Malay world were destined to function as 
pawns in the political chess maneuvering of the day, but that they had real life issues 
which needed resolution and that they too played along with their chess masters to attain 
their desired goals. Hence, simply calling all Chinese agitators “communists”, students or 
workers, would be a gross overgeneralization of a community of people who had sought 
to support any party which offered the best chance of success to better their condition. No 
doubt this took the form of a socialist movement, but they were hardly ideologues who 
supported a Marxist, Maoist or pro-China regime. Their socio-economic struggle was 
inevitably hijacked by the politics of use. In the case of Singapore, the differences 
between the Marxist Socialist and the Democratic Socialists became somewhat blurred as 
far as the British were concerned. Both camps had fought for decolonization, but the 
former advocated armed struggle while the latter preferred democratic processes. The 
                                                        
389 The irony is that Peking defended the diaspora in Indonesia in the 1960s after they had already shown 
signs of abandoning them, thus pointing to the token leadership Mao was after. See The Straits Times, 9 Jan 
1960, 18 Sep 1964. 
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deeply divided Chinese community were therefore faced with yet another dilemma on the 
route to citizenship. The English-educated Chinese, and a great number of the Malayan 
Chinese, had led the Democratic Socialists to circumvent the Marxists in their ranks. This 
led to their eventual victory at the polls. However, once assuming the position of the 
incumbent, the path through “class struggle” had to be abandoned. For the PAP, this 
meant the purge of the party’s leftists. The Marxist Barisan Sosialis was born out of this 
process. These twists and turns further polarized the Chinese community at large. 
 
The birth of nation-states in the Malay world heralded the beginning of the end of the 
dilemma the Chinese diaspora were in, but in varying degrees. At this final stage, the 
socialist-inclined Chinese who had tried the Red Tiger ended up being swallowed by 
their users while Lee Kuan Yew, who purged many of the Chinese Marxist socialists in 
his party, only did so after riding the Marxist Chinese Tiger to success. It is in this 
context that till this day, a number of the Chinese educated in Singapore still speak of the 
“betrayal” by Lee Kuan Yew in those early days, instead of attributing their eventual 
socioeconomic marginalization to the changing world that favored the English-educated. 
While the struggle of the Chinese diaspora had been compounded in many ways by the 
nexus of the international and local politics, they must themselves assume some measure 
of responsibility for their choice of “pied pipers” and remember that there will always be 
a loser in any political chess game. Their story should not just be understood from the 
perspective of the “winners” or from the alternative “losers”. It is in understanding the 
layers of dilemma they were in that the varying discourses on the Cold War in SEA could 
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The Relationship Between Cost of Living and  
Social Agitation in Singapore from 1947 to 1963 
 
Table 1: Average wages for Manual Labourers, Singapore 
 
Year Average weekly 






1947    
1948 30.44 60.84  Sago Factory Workers 
1949 16.51 49.35               “                    
1950    
1951 between $17-25   
1952 31.43 50.86  
1953 31 49.25  
1954 33.1 50.54  
1955 36.8 49.98 Main reason for wage increase: 
success of wage demands from 
April onwards, generally 
through trade unions 
1956 37.12   
1957 37.98   
1958 36.67   
1959 37.5   
1960   average of 3 children per 
family 
1961    
1962    
1963 43.89   
Sources:  
a) Colony of Singapore Annual Report (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952-1963). 
b) Report of the Singapore Labour Department (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1948-1963). 
c) The Straits Times, 16 Nov 1951. 





Table 2: Average Market Prices of Goods in Singapore, 1947-1960 
 




























1947 0.25 0.28 0.66 1.94 2.51 1.67 1.46 
1948 0.29 0.26 0.62 1.94 2.33 1.49 1.43 
1949 0.29 0.25  1.64 2.13 1.42 1.4 
1950 0.26 0.29  1.62 2.08 1.3 1.29 
1951 0.28 0.29  2.14 2.64 1.57 1.52 
1952 0.34 0.27  2.18 2.78 1.63 1.54 
1953 0.36 0.3  2.01 2.75 1.65 1.51 
1954 0.28   1.72 2.5 1.42 1.35 
1955 0.23   1.6 1.8 1.29 1.19 
1956 0.23   1.67 1.5 1.33 1.2 
1957 0.24 0.25 0.48 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.21 
1958 0.26 0.25 0.45 1.49 1.8 1.19 1.11 
1959 0.23 0.25 0.4 1.61 2.8* 1.28 1.23 
1960 0.21 0.25 0.38 1.54 1.4 1.11 1.06 
* The high price in 1959 was a result of the creation of an export industry in Singapore for the good, 
which caused a rise in the prices – see The Straits Times, 9 March 1959, p.6. 
 
Sources: 
a) Malayan statistics: digest of economic and social statistics relating to the Colony of Singapore and 
the Federation of Malaya (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1947-1961). 
b) The Straits Times, 4 Feb, 15 Dec 1956, 9 Jan 1957, 9 March 1959, 23 March 1962. 




Table 3: Rental Rates in Singapore, 1948-1964 
 
















1948    60 
1949   20  
1950    65 
1951   12.5-20  
1952    68 
1953    50-60 
1954 10 to 25 10 to 20 20-25 57-100 
1955    50 
1956     
1957    30-50 
1958    35-50 
1959     
1960     
1961 20^   40-60 
1962 20^    
1963     
1964    30-60 
* house for family with income of  less than $200 a month (subsidised)  
** For families, usually two bedrooms, a sitting room and a kitchen 
^ HDB one room flat for 3 people 
 
Note: There are many blank entries in the table because much of the necessary data could not be found 
during the writing of this thesis.  
 
Sources:  
a) The Straits Times, 31 March, 3 May 1954, 20 June, 26 Nov 1957, 2 Nov 1958. 
b) Singapore Free Press, 20 April 1950. 
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Table 4: Monthly School Fees in Singapore, 1947-1961 
 
Year Primary School fees (monthly, in dollars) Secondary School Fees (monthly, in 
dollars) 
1947 Govt school 
Govt-aided school 




1948 2.5  4 (boys) 
3 (girls) 
 
1949 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
8* 
1950 2.5^  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1951 2.5 between 4-12 4 (b) 
3 (g) 
between 4-12 
1952 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1953 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1954 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1955 2.5 $6-8** 4 (b) 
3 (g) 
$9-10** 
1956 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1957 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
up to 10 
1958 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1959 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1960 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1961 2.5  4 (b) 
3 (g) 
 
1962 2.5  All streams: 4 
^ The government offered a subsidy of $2.50 a month for children of the correct age group in schools 
for the first five years of their primary education, in effect making primary education free for most 
children in the government and government-aided schools. 
* It was proposed in January 1949 (under the Department of Education’s 10-year plan) that Chinese 
middle school fees should be reduced from $8 to $4 a month. 
** This was according to Govt fee regulations introduced in January 1954, but whether it was adhered 
to is not certain. 
 
Sources:  
a) Colony of Singapore Education Report (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1948-1949). 
b) The Straits Times, 6 Jan 1949, 14 Nov 1953, 2 Sep 1956. 






The Ascent of Communist China and its Pull of the Chinese Overseas 
 
Table 5: Departures of passengers by sea from Malaya to China and Hong Kong, 
1948-1960 
 




China ports (B) 
Total Departures 
from Malaya to 
Hong Kong and 
China 
1948 27,156 39,648 66,804 
1949 25,284 38,304 63,588 
1950 8304 13,644 21,948 
1951 18,948 31,872 50,820 
1952 9,456 12,924 22,380 
1953 10,872 8,862 19,734 
1954 9561 8,164 17,725 
1955 9,898 4,836 14,734 
1956 12,867 6,847 19,714 
1957 15,174 13,829 29,003 
1958 9,801 3,040 12,841 
1959 9,333 1,457 10,790 
1960 10,798 6,613 17,411 
Source: 
Malayan statistics: digest of economic and social statistics relating to the Colony of Singapore and the 







The Decline of Chinese Education and Its Relationship with  
the rise of Student Agitation 
 
 
Table 6: Enrolment in Chinese Primary and Middle Schools, 1946-1963 
 







in All Chinese 
Schools 
1946 44,032 2,280 46,312 
1947 49,452 4,026 53,478 
1948 52,910 5,186 58,096 
1949 65,300 3,134 68,434 
1950 69,433 3,518 72,951 
1951 71,471 4,503 75,974 
1952 68,323 5,781 74,104 
1953 71,802 7,470 79,272 
1954 73,067 8,538 81,605 
1955 83,231 11,013 94,244 
1956 95,768 12,722 108,490 
1957 102,164 15,210 117,374 
1958 112,560 16,595 129,155 
1959 121,891 18,340 140,231 
1960 127,383 20,065 147,448 
1961 130,842 21,987 152,829 
1962# 129,934 24,737 154,671 
1963# 132,488 29,997 162,485 
# includes Chinese stream of Integrated Schools 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Department of Education & Ministry of Education, Singapore 




Table 7: Total School Enrolment in Singapore, 1946-1963 
 


















1946 76,341 100 46,312 60.7 23,847 31.2 6,182 8.1 
1947 92,456 100 53,478 57.8 28,840 31.2 10,138 11.0 
1948 101,125 100 58,096 57.4 33,214 32.8 9,815 9.7 
1949 119,846 100 68,434 57.1 37,500 31.3 13,912 11.6 
1950 139,066 100 72,951 52.5 49,521 35.6 16,594 11.9 
1951 147,442 100 75,974 51.5 54,645 37.1 16,823 11.4 
1952 155,107 100 74,104 47.8 63,086 40.7 17,917 11.6 
1953 161,098 100 79,272 49.2 71,297 44.3 10,529 6.5 
1954 177,958 100 81,605 45.9 84,418 47.4 11,935 6.7 
1955 204,154 100 94,244 46.2 97,057 47.5 12,853 6.3 
1956 234,852 100 108,490 46.2 112,575 47.9 13,787 5.9 
1957 259,997 100 117,374 45.1 127,853 49.2 14,770 5.7 
1958 290,129 100 129,155 44.5 145,362 50.1 15,612 5.4 
1959 320,977 100 140,213 43.7 163,486 50.9 17,278 5.4 
1960 349,890 100 147,448 42.1 180,275 51.5 22,167 6.3 
1961 375,838 100 152,829 40.7 191,651 51.0 31,358 8.3 
1962 397,005 100 154,384 38.9 200,062 50.4 42,559 10.7 
1963 426,045 100 156,302 36.7 209,070 49.1 60,673 14.2 
Source: Annual Report of the Department of Education & Ministry of Education, Singapore 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1946-1963). 
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Table 8: Enrolment in Chinese Schools (by type), Singapore, 1946-1963 
 
































1946 209 124 46,312 88 17,332 36 28,980     
1947 270 154 53,478 105 24,160 49 29,318     
1948 337 184 58,096 127 21,338 57 36,758     
1949 447 271 68,434 208 29,525 63 38,909     
1950 517 287 72,951 214 30,202 73 42,749     
1951 532 288 75,974 208 30,432 80 45,542     
1952 537 279 74,104 192 24,451 87 49,653     
1953 560 273 79,272 162 20,686 111 58,586     
1954 563 277 81,605 74 4,542 203 77,063     
1955 595 273 94,244 56 6,976 217 87,268     
1956 643 291 108,490 51 7,008 235 100,064 5 1,418 
1957 677 279 117,374 37 3,499 233 110,228 9 3,647 
1958 702 283 129,155 38 3,550 233 120,774 12 4,831 
1959 718 287 140,213 39 6,280 235 127,387 13 6,564 
1960 571 279 147,448 36 5,192 235 132,106 18 10,150 
1961 565 275 152,829 33 4,603 230 136,809 12 11,417 
1962 565 273 154,384 33 4,582 228 136,872 12 12,930 
1963 578 269 156,302 32 4,182 224 136,198 13 15,922 





Employment Conditions and Industrial Agitation 
 
Table 9: Employment Estimates in Singapore, 1947-1965 
 
Year Population Mid-year 
estimates 
Total no. of 
economically 
active persons 





940,824 357,535 124,244 
1948 972,600  117,906 
1949 1,017,300  111,796 
1950 1,060,400  116,845 
1951 1,104,200  123,365 
1952 1,151,500  126,616 
1953 1,204,700 425,000 119,025 
1954 1,260,500 433,000 120,555 
1955 1,316,500 440,000 117,552 
1956 1,377,700 450,000 120,555 
1957 
Census 
1,445,900 480,267 122,999 
1958 1,514,000  115,352 
1959 1,579,600  106,605 
1960 1,634,100  105,605 
1961 1,687,300  105,990 
1962 1,732,800  111,141 
1963 1,775,200  116,966 
1964 1,820,000  118,743 
1965 1,864,900  123,140 
Sources: 
a) M.V. Del Tufo, "A Report on the 1947 Census of Population” (Government Printer, Federation of 
Malaya & Government Publications Bureau, Singapore, 1947). 
b) S.C. Chua, Report on the Census of Population 1957 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 
1957). 
c) Malayan statistics: digest of economic and social statistics relating to the Colony of Singapore and 
the Federation of Malaya (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1951-1961). 






Table 10: Employment Exchange (Singapore), 1947-1966 
 
Year  Number of Registrations  Number of Placements  
Chinese Others Total Chinese Others Total Percentage 
placement 
1947 12,891 15,279 28,170     13,012 46.2 
1948 12,180 8,405 20,585 4,049 3,456 7,505 36.5 
1949 11,570 6,139 17,709 4,305 2,778 7,083 40 
1950 9393 5,764 15,157 5,329 2,832 8,161 53.8 
1951 8467 6,265 14,732 6,396 3,434 9,830 66.7 
1952 8534 8,650 17,184 6,130 3,837 9,967 58 
1953 9032 10,663 19,695 4,201 2,868 7,069 35.9 
1954 11,386 9,420 20,806 2,895 1,669 4,564 21.9 
1955 9250 7,320 16,570 2,854 1,566 4,420 26.7 
1956 9183 6,240 15,423 2,759 919 3,678 23.8 
1957 8804 5,982 14,786 2,644 1,328 3,972 26.9 
1958 9331 6,990 16,321 1,125 691 1,816 11.1 
1959 30,057 6,649 36,706 2,067 1,905 3,972 10.8 
1960 9099 2,838 11937 996 312 1,308 11 
1961 7320 2,905 10,225 1,044 451 1,495 14.6 
1962 8676 3,364 12,040 1,009 453 1,462 12.1 
1963 13,769 4,904 18,673 973 403 1,376 7.4 
1964 19,002 4,489 23,491 884 287 1,171 5 
1965 18,991 4,638 23,629 1,717 558 2,275 9.6 
1966 18,354 4,550 22,904 1,860 1,041 2,901 12.7 
The Employment Exchange was established in the Labour Department in 1945 by the British Military 
Administration to assist workmen in finding employment after WWII. It was open to all workmen in 
the colony whether unemployed or employed but seeking alternative or more suitable employment. 
 






Table 11: Profile of strikes in Singapore, 1955-1966 




1955 275 90 13 7 135 30 
1956 29 7 8 2 0 12 
1957 27 6 12 0 1 8 
1958 22 0 16 0 0 6 
1959 40 15 9 4 0 12 
1960 45 6 20 2 0 17 
1961 116 32 25 12 1 46 
1962 88 33 22 5 0 28 
1963 47 16 16 1 0 14 
1964 39 6 16 0 0 17 
1965 30 13 8 3 0 6 
1966 14 1 5 7 0 1 
Source: Singapore Department of Labour Annual Reports (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 
1955-1966). 
 










1947 45 24,561 492,708 
1948 20 20,586 128,657 
1949 2 935 6,618 
1950 1 87 4,692 
1951 4 1,185 20,640 
1952 5 10,067 40,105 
1953 4 8,870 47,361 
1954 8 11,191 135,206 
1955 275 57,433 946,354 
1956 29 12,273 454,455 
1957 27 8,233 109,349.5 
1958 22 2,679 78,166 
1959 40 1,939 26,587.5 
1960 45 5,939 152,005.5 
1961 116 43,584 410,889 
1962 88 6,647 165,124.5 
1963 47 33,004 338,219 
1964 39 2,535 35,908 
1965 30 3,374 45,800 
1966 14 1,288 44,762 
Sources: 
a) Singapore Department of Labour Annual Reports (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1948-
1966). 
b) Malayan statistics: digest of economic and social statistics relating to the Colony of Singapore and 





Regulating Unions and Societies (Singapore) 
 
Table 13: Numbers of Trade Unions, Schools, and Societies  
Registered and Dissolved in Singapore, 1948-1963 
 
 Trade Unions Schools Societies 
Registered Dissolved Registered Dissolved Registered Dissolved 
1948 10 18  1 20 25 
1949 9 34   9 63 263 
1950 6 8   2 48 63 
1951 18 2   12 47 48 
1952 19 4   16 73 32 
1953 20 9   5 91 23 
1954 12 9   5 98 25 
1955 61 10   10 90 31 
1956 27 9   9 112 39 
1957 20 9   6 132 54 
1958 18 16   9 99 30 
1959 14 56 10 19 92 140 
1960 2 48 7 38 54 71 
1961 3 9 30 13 351 25 
1962 0 2 14 7 116 6 
1963 1 11 2 4 83 31 





List of Trade Unions in Singapore Dissolved by Registrar, 1948-1963 
 
Date Name Last known 
membership 
1948 
28/9/48 Lian Kung Shock Chien Workers' Union  
30/9/48 Pulau Brani Tin Smelting Workers Union  
30/9/48 Singapore Sundry-shop employees union  
30/9/48 Singapore Sago Workers' Union  
15/10/48 Singapore Federation of Trade Unions [Federation] Federation 
15/10/48 Singapore R.E. Workers Union  
2/11/48 Singapore Biscuit and Confectionery Workers' Union  
2/11/48 Singapore Cane Washers' Union  
2/11/48 Changi 14th Mile Employees Union  
2/11/48 Singapore Fishermen's Union  
1949 
 The Singapore Cinema Workers Union 337 
 Singapore United Engineers Labour Union 150 
 Singapore Drivers' Union 2485 
 The Singapore Coal Labour Union 650 
 Royal Air Force Employees Union (Selatar) 610 
 Singapore Laundry Workers Union 90 
 Singapore Jurong Fishermen's Union 450 
 Singapore Harbour Labourers' Union 765 
 Singapore Pooh Neang Workers Union 46 
 Singapore Bakery Employees' Union 249 
 The Singapore Charcoal Porters' Union 180 
 The Singapore Rubber Workers Union 7344 
 Singapore Fire Brigade Labour Union 198 
 Singapore Building and Construction Workers Union 2908 
 Singapore Sawmills Employees Association 1115 
 Yang Yea Workers union 1480 
 Singapore Aerated Water and Beer Workers' Union 147 
 Singapore Foochow Seamen's Union 1233 
 Singapore Office Attendants' Union 127 
 The Singapore Seamen's Union 2962 
 Singapore Tea-shop Employees' Union 1000 
 Singapore Tinsmith's Union 346 
 Singapore Wood Workers' Union 380 
 Singapore Electro-Plating and Engraving Workers 
Union 
113 
 Singapore Diethelm and Co. Labour Union 20 
 Shell Company Employees Union, Singapore 200 
1950 
22/5/50 Singapore Chinese Ship-Building Carpenters' Union 68 
5/7/50 The Staff Association of the British Far Eastern 
Broadcasting Service, Singapore 
52 
13/10/50 Royal Air Force Employees Union (Tengah) 90 
157 
 
5/12/50 Singapore Oil and Soap Workers' Union 236 
20/12/50 Singapore Oriental Telephone Labourers' union 245 
1951 
 Singapore Newspaper Vendors Association 73 
 Singapore Taxi-Drivers Unions 583 
1952 
 Singapore Chinese Teachers' Union 122 
 Union of Singapore Rubber Workers 992 
22/12/52 The Singapore Biscuit Industry Workers' Union 13 
1953 
21/5/53 Singapore Rattan Factory Workers' Union 102 
5/8/53 Singapore Army Labour Union 100 
 Singapore Battery Manufacturing Workers' Union 35 
 Singapore Rubber Shoe Manufacturing Workers' Union 611 
 The Singapore Glass Factory Employees Union 96 
1954 
3/5/54 Singapore Furniture Employees' Union 51 
1/6/54 Singapore Foodstuffs Manufacturing Factory Workers 
Union 
9 
23/8/54 Singapore Brewery Workers' union 10 
28/9/54 Singapore City Council Workers' Union 246 
5/10/54 Malayan Guttas Workers Union 38 
1955 
23/5/55 The Indian Drivers' Union 214 
20/4/55 Singapore Lighter Workers' Union 174 
9/5/55 Singapore Quarry and Stone Workers' Union 147 
17/5/55 Bukit Timah 11th Mile Employees Union 55 
1956 
20/6/56 Federation of Shipping and Commercial Workers' 
Union 
Federation 
24/7/56 The Singapore Hair Dressing Workers' Union 20 
3/9/56 The Singapore Building Construction and Materials 
Manufacturing Workers' Union 
58 
30/11/56 K.P.M. Local Employees' Union 94 
1957 
 The Singapore General Labour Union 18 
 The Singapore Shop Employees Union 395 
 The Singapore Departmental Store Employees Union 339 
 The Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union 29959 
11/5/57 Singapore Clog Workers Union 167 
2/12/57 Singapore "Pelni" Local Employees Union 20 
1958 
 Singapore Civil Air Transport Union 51 
 Radio Malaya Local Programme Staff Union 66 
 Singapore Harbour Board Stevedore and Wharf 
Workers' Union 
150 
 Singapore Amusements Workers Union 115 




2/7/58 National Union of General Workers 196 
16/5/58 Jacobson van der Berg Local Employees' Union 34 
 Pakistani Seamen's Union of Singapore 98 
 The Singapore United Workers Union 50 
10/7/58 Singapore Sundry-shop Employees union 60 
26/7/58 The Malayasia Mariners' Union 736 
8/9/58 Malayan National Seamen's Union 4433 
8/9/58 The Asian Maritime Officers' Union 335 
2/10/58 The Singapore Harbour Board Engineering Workmen's 
Union 
34 
12/11/58 Federation of Singapore Petroleum Employees' Union Federation of 
3 unions 
1959 
4/6/59 The Singapore Painting and Whitewashing Workers' 
Union 
75 
1/7/59 Singapore Chinese Clerical Union 15 
3/7/59 Singapore Tobacco Distributors' Workers' Union 35 
24/8/59 Singapore Motor-Vehicle Drivers' Union 256 
24/8/59 Singapore Sago Workers' Union 219 
27/8/59 The Singapore Cinema and Entertainment Workers' 
Union 
1064 
27/8/59 The Singapore Court Ushers' Union 10 
12/9/59 National Union of Industrial and General Workers 11 
14/9/59 The English Teachers' Union (Chinese schools) 109 
16/9/59 The Singapore Ship Workers' Union 623 
25/9/59 The Singapore Motor Traders Salaried Employees' 
Union 
238 
28/9/59 National Chinese Seamen's Union 286 
29/10/59 The Metal Box Staff Union 80 
3/11/59 Fred Waterhouse Workers' Union 209 
23/11/59 The Singapore Workers' Union 369 
23/11/59 The Cantonese Restaurants Staffs' Union, Singapore 117 
23/11/59 Singapore Transport Employees' Union 761 
23/11/59 The Union of Singapore Lightermen 58 
23/11/59 The Cable and Wireless Workers' Union 70 
28/11/59 Union of Foochow and Shanghainese Restaurant 
Employees 
68 
28/11/59 Henry Waugh (Singapore) Employees' Union 67 
28/11/59 Naval Base Industrial Staff Trade Union, Singapore 261 
28/11/59 The Singapore Harbour Board Wharf and Stevedores 
Workers Trade union 
200 
28/11/59 The Singapore Miscellaneous Workers' Union 12 
5/12/59 The Amoy Canning Corp. (Singapore) Ltd Employees' 
Union 
137 
5/12/59 The Singapore Radio Officers' Union 10 
8/12/59 The Singapore All Races Seamen's Union 384 





12/12/59 The Rural Board Inspectorate and Technical Staff 
Union 
34 
12/12/59 Singapore Government School Employees' Union 436 
12/12/59 The Singapore City Council Technical Officers Union 215 
12/12/59 Singapore Psychiatric Nursing Staff Association 17 
12/12/59 The Singapore Social Welfare Department Staff Union 274 
12/12/59 Singapore Customs Service Union 90 
22/12/59 Singapore Alliance of Teachers 42 
22/12/59 The Singapore English School Tamil Teachers' Union 28 
22/12/59 School Certificate Trained Tamil Teachers Union 19 
22/12/59 Chinese Universities Graduates Teachers' Union of 
Singapore Government English Schools 
11 
22/12/59 The Singapore Chinese Primary School Teachers' 
Union 
178 
22/12/59 The Singapore Normal Trained (Chinese) Teachers' 
Association 
25 
22/12/59 Froebel Association of Singapore 21 
1960 
 Foochow Coffee, Restaurant and Bar Employees' 
Union, Singapore 
276 
 Singapore Hair Dressing Workers' Union 67 
 The Otis Elevator Company Local Staff Union 38 
 Malayan National Seamen's Union 4010 
 Singapore Hock Poh Sang Drivers' Union 490 
 The Singapore Fishing Boat Workers' Union 243 
 Singapore Rubber Milling and Manufacturing Workers 
Union 
685 
 Pepsi-Cola Singapore Staffs Union 157 
 The Singapore Harbour Board Mechanical Equipment 
Drivers' Union 
65 
18/3/60 Singapore Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union 2105 
29/3/60 The Government Health Technical Staff Union 39 
29/3/60 Singapore Chinese Eating-Shop Workers' Union 21 
29/3/60 Singapore General Trained Nursing Staff Union 84 
4/4/60 Government and City Council Labour Union 1009 
22/4/60 The Singapore Government Workers' Union 1543 
22/4/60 The Singapore Government Junior Staff Union 654 
22/4/60 The Singapore Government Medical, Health and 
Technical Workers' Unoon 
1259 
22/4/60 The Singapore Government Miscellaneous Services 
Union 
157 
22/4/60 The Singapore Government Pharmacists Association 16 
22/4/60 Professional Women's Association 147 
25/4/60 Stanvac Employees' Union 361 
25/4/60 Federation of Oil Workers' Unions (Singapore)  
26/4/60 Singapore Wharf and Ship Labour Union 266 
9/5/60 Harbour Board Employees Union of Singapore 312 
9/5/60 The Singapore Harbour Board Labour Union 356 




24/5/60 Chinese Seamen's Union, Singapore Branch 276 
24/5/60 The Singapore Chinese Seafarers' Association 438 
24/5/60 The National Pakistani Seamen's Union of Singapore 58 
24/5/60 United Seamen's Union of Singapore 1221 
30/5/60 Singapore Spray Painting Workers' Union 400 
11/7/60 Singapore Federation of Health Ministry's Employees' 
Unions 
 
18/7/60 The Association of Army Civilian Officers, Singapore 37 
15/8/60 The Singapore Association of Nurses 373 
29/9/60 The Automobile Association of Singapore Employees 
Union 
40 
3/10/60 The Singapore Higher Services (Part 1) Officers 
Association 
23 
16/11/60 The Singapore Certificated Teachers' Association 293 
1961 
 Singapore Petroleum Workers Union 1205 
 National Union of Oil Workers 1386 
 Domestic Employees' Union 226 
5/7/61 Singapore Rice Transport Workers' Union 43 
1963 
 Singapore Chinese Electrical Trade Union 93 
1/4/63 Singapore Spinning Workers' Union 364 
1963 Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association 9071 
4/9/63 Singapore Dyers and Dry-cleaners Union 15 
30/10/63 The Singapore Bus Workers' Union 2263 
30/10/63 Singapore Brick-Making Workers' Union 606 
30/10/63 The Singapore General Employees' Union 25546 
30/10/63 The Singapore Machine and Engineering Employees' 
Union 
990 
30/10/63 Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union 6091 
30/10/63 The National Union of Building Construction Workers 757 
30/10/63 The Singapore National Seamen's Union 3446 






Letter found in Barisan Sosialis Publication, New Youth: Chinese-educated 
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